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Haunted by Specters, Surrounded by Spectators explores the pervasive nature of digital 
media and the social web in challenging the ways we understand self, other, society, and the 
world around us. Juxtaposing the histories of public and private, both as terms and conditions, to 
contemporary understandings and communicative practices we enlist, this project considers the 
ways digital media and the social web fundamentally alter how we relate to each other through 
visuality at a distance rather than experientially, empathetically, and interpersonally. Exploring 
three pertinent case studies that highlight the fragmentation of identity when imagery is taken as 
the totality of those depicted, this project illuminates the process I call “Crowdsourced Morality” 
whereby individuals actively enlist imagery and physical and psychological distance to 
decontextualize, devalue, shame, and torment those depicted in visual content. So distanced from 
those captured in visual content, context becomes constituted in the mind of the viewer who 
visualizes the content and imbues it with his or her thoughts, beliefs, and values as he or she 
shares it across connective media with little to no regard for the person(s) depicted. As a 
consequence, individuals not only engage each other as information to be disposed of, which aids 
in the reduction of personal accountability for the actions they take against one another, they 
further perpetuate “visuality as reality” in denying the embodied, corporeal form of those 
depicted in visual content and those associated with them. Supplanting experiential engagement 
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for vision, such nuanced practices of communication online not only drive us into further 
physical isolation from one another they contribute to greater selection and confirmation biases 
that encourage “truthiness”—personal feeling over recognition and acknowledgement of 
others—as well as, in America and certain other Western societies, the growing divide between 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
FRAGMENTS OF IDENTITY  
IN A WORLD THAT NEVER STOPS WATCHING 
Introduction 
Digital media and the social web challenge how we understand self, other, society, and 
the world around us. Consider the case of Lindsey Stone whose casual visit to the Arlington 
National Cemetery in October 2012 dramatically changed her life. Strolling through the site’s 
immaculate grounds with a co-worker, she happened upon a circular iron placard placed before 
the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The placard read, “SILENCE AND RESPECT.” In a moment 
of jest, Stone asked her co-worker to snap what she thought would be a humorous photo. 
Crouching beside the placard, Stone posed, pretending to scream while flipping off the placard 
(see Figure 1).  
                  




She later uploaded the photo to her Facebook profile, thinking her friends would find the scene 
amusing. Yet, much to her surprise, the majority of the comments were unsupportive. In an 
attempt to assuage the negative reactions, Stone replied to her friends: 
Whoa whoa whoa... wait. This is just us, being the douchebags that we are, 
challenging authority in general. Much like the pic posted the night before, of me 
smoking right next to a no smoking sign. OBVIOUSLY we meant NO disrespect 
to people that serve or have served our country [author’s original emphasis] 
(Stone quoted in Zimmerman, 2012a). 
 
The damage was already done. Although her reply seemed to pacify her friends, she could not 
control the distribution of the image, which managed to circulate beyond her profile and her 
friends’ to an individual who acted on his indignation.  
A month after the picture was originally shared with her friends, a page called “Fire 
Lindsey Stone” was created and, within hours, thousands of “likes”—Facebook’s seemingly 
innocuous blue button and a quintessential act of agreement with the author—populated the 
page. Started by a former armed forces service member who also appropriated her image (see 
Figure 2), the page encouraged the agreeing masses to “let [Stone’s] employer know what a 
waste of oxygen this disrespectful person [was],” and it quickly spawned an online petition that 
gained over 3,000 signatures urging Living Independently Forever, Inc. (LIFE), Stone’s 
employer, to fire her (Zimmerman, 2012a, 2012b).  
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Figure 2: The Manipulated Image of Lindsey Stone. 
 
Under pressure from these “cyber activists,” LIFE issued a statement that clarified that 
both Stone and her co-worker who took the photo had been placed on unpaid leave pending an 
internal investigation. During this time, Lindsey Stone “deleted all of her Facebook posts” and 
waited for the verdict (Zimmerman, 2012a). Four days later, Stone and her co-worker were fired, 
and, in an ironic twist of personal expression online, Stone deactivated her Facebook profile and 
denied all media requests to speak with her (Zimmerman, 2012b). 
Regardless of whether Stone’s photo was in poor taste and posted without careful thought 
in a public medium, her incident illustrates interpersonal and societal tensions surrounding 
expression online through digital media and the social web. Proffering a world of interconnection 
through a never-ending stream of information both personally supplied by others and ourselves, 
connective media challenge the ways we communicate with one another by constituting our 
communications as a series of ongoing interactions in the form of content—an array of textual 
and visual information—shared online and across networked technologies. Although ostensibly 
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“harmless” and “presumably” within the realm of individual control, information shared online 
by others and ourselves now increasingly overlaps, transgresses, and ultimately contests the 
historically-inflected conditions of public and private across the domains of our personal 
relationships, organizational settings, and our culture. 1 
Interpersonally, the technologies that structure digital media and the social web challenge 
the dichotomy between public and private by flattening or denying the context of information 
shared between individuals (Baym, 2010; Marwick & boyd, 2011a; Trottier, 2012; Van Dijck, 
2013b; see also Nissenbaum, 2010 regarding contexts of information). In particular, the most 
prominent example of connective media, social networking sites, presents individuals with a 
primary interface through which they communicate with others: a personal profile. Although 
seemingly simple, a user’s profile operates as a complicated nexus of contested impression 
management, particularly as he carefully manages his identity through privacy settings, his 
selective expressions to others, and the various content he allows others to share about him to the 
extent he can control such content.2 As an intermediary space and an extension of the self 
projected on the screen, the profile allows the user to freely and creatively express himself to a 
collection of intimate and unknown others.3 Enlisting the profile as an extension of select aspects 
of identity affords the user the condition of being “materially ‘here’ at the same time as 
                                                
1 I use the terms “digital media and the social web” and “connective media” interchangeably. These technologies 
form the wide range of connective networked services, platforms, and devices such as blogs, email, social 
networking sites, phone apps, computers, and cell phones. Together, these media constitute what José Van Dijck 
(2013a) calls the “networked ecosystem of digital communication” because each medium affects one another and 
shapes sociality. 
 
2 I use the term “user” as a broad placeholder for any individual who uses a social media site founded on the sharing 
of information such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Tumblr. However, I do not necessarily agree that the term 
“user” is interchangeable with “individual” since social media sites refer to a person as “a user,” which in turn 
assumes that he is solely a composite element of the greater array of social media. Therefore, when I discuss a user 
as an individual within this project, I am attempting to contextualize the human communication elements implicated 
within (and most often overlooked by) the current array of digital technologies that structure digital media and the 
social web. 
 
3 I will be using both masculine and feminine examples. At times I will use “she” and at other times I will use “he.” 
 
 5 
seemingly ‘there’,” or what Hillis refers to as “telepresence” (2009, p. 215).4 Through 
telepresence, what Hillis terms the “source/body”—the physical form of an person, object, or 
phenomenon depicted in visual content—is projected onscreen and elsewhere. As a consequence, 
however, the profile—and, arguably, any image of an individual shared online by himself or 
others—becomes a site of potential social “accidents.”  
Though an individual curates what others can see in his profile, he is never fully in 
control of the ways others visualize, interpret, and/or alter the projection of the “source/body” 
that appears before them. As viewers encounter imagery across connective media, they come to 
understand the visually-dependent telepresence depicted before them in ways that allow them to 
objectify the content as information to be consumed. Afforded distance from the physical form 
of the source/body depicted in visual content, the viewer comes to fetishize the screen-based 
telepresence by imbuing the visual display with her thoughts, beliefs, and values. The objectified 
assemblage of personal ideation in connection with or opposition to visual content, what Hillis 
(2009) calls the “telefetish,” then takes on a life beyond the source/body. Subject to the 
interpretation of countless others that may encounter the visual display and cast it as a telefetish, 
an individual’s telepresence and his actions lose the context and character germane to the realm 
in which they were originally performed and shared. As a result, viewers shape and reshape the 
coherency and context of the telepresence in dramatic ways. In creating associations and 
meanings in connection with or opposition to the telepresence, it becomes a telefetish that 
operates beyond the control of the source/body that produced and shared it. This not only leads 
                                                
4 While Hillis primarily refers to “telepresence” in the more “interactive” forms of avatars and personal webcams in 
his analysis, Hillis also critically notes that telepresence “induces” an individual to become one with image, which I 
will extend throughout this project. As will become clearer in my analysis, whether imagery is more “interactive” in 
moving forms in film, video, or avatars, or more “static” in a photo, image, or graphic, it is potentially subject to the 
same kinds of adulteration and appropriation given the array of accessible technologies available through digital 
media and the social web. 
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to “misinterpretations” of the visual display that overlook the context of its formation, but often 
also to psychological and personal threats to the individual(s) depicted.  
All content shared online is “public by default, private through effort” (boyd, 2012). 
When “accidents” occur, then, content of a profile spirals out of the assumed control of the 
individual managing his profile. With the individual no longer in control of the original context 
in which select visual content was shared, content becomes subject to heightened scrutiny as 
countless unknown others evaluate and judge the individual and his actions, and easily circulate 
and manipulate the content they find objectionable to foment greater collective action. In 
extreme instances, such as Lindsey Stone’s, content can attract others who capture the 
telepresence in visual content, discount the corporeal form beyond/behind the image, and enlist 
physical and psychological distance and anonymity to decontextualize, devalue, shame, threaten, 
and torment the individual as content is shared and spreads across digital media and the social 
web. Visual content shared online comes to operate as the digital placeholder of physical 
presence, ultimately “appearing” as an almost totalizing embodiment of those depicted while 
also not wholly encapsulating who and what they are. As a consequence, individuals not only 
engage each other as information to be disposed of—which aids in the reduction of personal 
accountability for the actions they take against one another—they also further perpetuate 
“visuality as reality” by discounting the embodied, corporeal form of those depicted in content 
and those with whom they are associated.  
Similarly, at the sociocultural level, connective media in the form of email, social 
networking sites, and mobile applications challenge the private quality of personal interactions. 
Whether a person communicates through email, a social networking site, or an app on her mobile 
device, all her interactions through these channels become a product of the service in use. When 
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a person uses her personal Yahoo email account, the information she shares with others, however 
personal, belongs to Yahoo. Any status updates or personal information posted to Facebook, 
whether personally shared or supplied by another, become a product of Facebook. All tweets are 
products of Twitter, and public tweets are housed by the Library of Congress and can be mined 
by researchers and advertisers for a variety of purposes (Gross, 2013; Van Dijck, 2013b). In each 
instance, an individual’s privacy is never assured or protected; instead, it is a commodity one 
willingly (or, perhaps, unknowingly) cedes for convenience and ease. Because each of these 
services holds proprietary claims over the information stored and shared within its databases and 
because individuals accept the terms and conditions of use without much protest, personal 
information becomes abstracted from the individual and is rendered increasingly public through 
technological features and individual communicative practices.  
Consider social networking sites. Initially founded upon self-expression and connections 
with friends, social networking sites shifted from community-based connectivity when site 
creators and investors realized they could monetize the personal data and internet traffic 
generated on their sites (Van Dijck, 2012). As a result, producers of social networking sites 
gradually restructured the interfaces of their sites, inviting users to share more information about 
themselves in the moment through status updates, across their social circles through page 
comments, and even through their personal histories with features such as Facebook’s 
“Timeline” (Van Dijck, 2013b). As personal input options became relatively fixed through each 
new feature (e.g., providing geo-location with each status update, sharing comment posts with all 
of a user’s followers, requiring profile images and Timeline cover images, encouraging more 
image-like status updates), site creators, encouraged by investors, refashioned the architecture of 
the sites to allow easier message dissemination and access to others.  
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This, in turn, allowed site creators and investors to more easily monitor, track, aggregate, 
and analyze user information. As users communicate with people through the new features, they 
encode their personal information for site databases and supply behavioral data about their wants 
and desires to site creators who use the information to personalize advertisements for each user. 
Consequently, user information is a public commodity for these sites; a proprietary product that 
site creators and investors use to justify a shift in socially normed practices of public and private 
expression and identity management. In particular, Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of 
Facebook, infamously stated that users “have one identity,” and that any attempt to maintain 
multiple identities was “an example of a lack of integrity” (Zuckerberg quoted in Kirkpatrick, 
2010, p. 199). Despite the illusion of privacy one believes one is maintaining through managing 
one’s privacy settings, and despite any socially normed expectations that privacy “exists” when it 
comes to personal information and personal communications, digital media and the social web 
collapse private into public to promote a singular, uniform identity that abstracts, quantifies, and 
commodifies the individual as content produced by the self and others primarily for consumption 
by others. So disembodied in content, an individual is “known,” not by her physical presence and 
in experiential engagement, but instead as the composite of content she and others share, as well 
as the behavioral data gleaned from her interactions within and across technological networks. 
As individual identities become quantified as information and content, digital media and 
the technologies that support them challenge both ontological and epistemological assumptions 
about identity and social order. Ontologically, the digital components of connective media 
challenge the performative process of impression management by flattening it into a rather 
singular, public, front-stage mode of interaction that digitally inscribes identity as content shared 
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by others and ourselves.5 As an individual interacts with others through a digital interface, her 
identity becomes less a product of the personal information she directly supplies and more of a 
product of how others use and interpret the information gleaned in her interactions with others, 
on sites, and across sites (boyd, 2012). As a result, her identity becomes inextricably linked to 
the highly dramaturgical expectations of the public image shaped in communicative practices 
online, despite any efforts or desires to express a more dynamic and nuanced presence (Van 
Dijck, 2013a; see also Goffman, 1959, 1966 regarding front and back regions of interaction). 
Constricted by social pressures to conform and an awareness that content can be shared beyond 
its original context, an individual limits what she shares and, consequently, reproduces a 
hierarchy of social order that redefines “appropriateness” as a matter of collective taste.  
Whereas “appropriateness” historically structured social order by detailing sumptuary 
rules germane to class interaction out in public (Bourdieu, 1984; Sennett, 1977; see also 
Nissenbaum, 2010 regarding “cultural norms”), connective media and shifting communicative 
practices recast “appropriateness” as a matter of perpetual public consumption and commentary. 
Countless others, known and unknown, are encouraged to participate in each others’ expressions 
and lives with little to no recognition for the individual depicted beyond/behind the screen. As 
this occurs, individuals feel encouraged or even entitled to participate—to comment, critique, 
and shame—with ethical abandon as they do not physically experience the other and do not need 
to account for the effects of their actions (see Zimbardo, 2008 regarding dehumanization in 
                                                
5 Here I am invoking “impression management” with reference to Goffman’s (1959, 1966) and Mead’s (1934) 
works about the “front ” and “back” regions of interaction a person occupies. “Front region” performances are 
public interactions an individual engages in with others where she may perform to expected roles or where she may 
emulate others to fit a social situation. “Back region” performances are personal, private, and/or hidden 
performances an individual enlists to cast off an expected role and be herself. Goffman believed these regions were 
performed theatrically and spatially, where front-stage performances corresponded to public space and back-stage 
performances typically corresponded to personal or private spaces such as the home. Where digital media and the 
social web collapse public and private we see a conflict of impression management that challenges individuals to 
express themselves in ways that are deemed appropriate to the public, even if they are not beneficial or therapeutic 
for the individual. 
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physical and psychological distance). The technological features and communicative practices 
individuals engage in online, therefore, destabilize the context of information shared, which in 
turn diminishes privacy as a condition of impression management and identity (Goffman, 1959, 
1966; Mayer-Schönberger, 2011; Nissenbaum, 2010). Consequently, an individual’s identity is 
constituted in streams of content online that conflate identity with information and which 
overlook the embodied corporeal form (Hillis, Petit, & Jarrett, 2013; Kitchin & Dodge, 2011; 
Pariser, 2011).  
As a form of “market-based data,” content shared by others and ourselves generates 
information that allows sites to target specific advertisements, products, and news stories at 
individuals based on desires and wants revealed in ongoing interactions (Van Dicjk, 2012, 
2013b). Although seemingly harmless, the creation of filter bubbles in site-specific algorithms 
shapes the content individuals interact with and consume (Pariser, 2011), which inevitably 
affects how they view others, society, and the world around them. In extreme instances, when 
these data are used beyond the immediate context of the site or service in which they emerged, 
they also reveal personal information about an individual to other sources who may misuse, 
misinterpret, and misrepresent the individual. For example, users’ personal data generated and 
aggregated within specific social media sites such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter, were 
monitored, tracked, and stored by the United States Federal Government (USFG) as part of 
counterterrorism measures. Though this massive collection of information was done without 
public knowledge or informed consent, the USFG justified its decision as a “necessary tradeoff” 
for the good of the public, an argument that numerous politicians extended through the all too 
familiar aphorism, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” Yet, in monitoring 
information about U.S. citizens, foreign nationals, ally nations, and terrorist suspects, the USFG 
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cast each as a potential suspect. Consequently, the USFG not only challenged checks and 
balances to power in a democratic society in its massive surveillance program, it also recast the 
construction of society toward a surveillance state where information itself comes to constitute 
identity and where data and internet traffic are determinants of culpability.  
Even today, the problem of unwitting data mining persists. Over the past three years, 
Cambridge Analytica (CA), a data collection and aggregation enterprise owned by hedge fund 
billionaire Robert Mercer and headed by Steve Bannon during from 2014 to 2016, amassed the 
personal data of over 50 million users (Picchi & Carissimo, 2018). Using quizzes and 
manipulating Facebook’s API, CA obtained scores of information from users who took the 
quizzes, as well as the personal information of users who were connected to those who took the 
quizzes (Aleem, 2018). Though the problem was documented back in 2015 when The Guardian 
published a story that revealed that US Senator Ted Cruz hired CA to help his campaign market 
specific ads and target voters based on their psychological profiles (Davies, 2015), Facebook did 
little to resolve the issue at the time. Facebook, instead, allowed and perhaps even expected that 
data could and would be harvested without users’ permission. Though Facebook might not have 
anticipated that user data would be harvested in mass as it was with CA, Facebook never 
implemented greater safeguards that allowed individuals to control and manage who accessed 
their information when the initial problem was reported (Davies, 2015; Romano, 2018). When 
the revelations of the expansive breech broke in 2018, Facebook finally acknowledged its 
complicity. After days of silence as news outlets reported the story and as the #deleteFacebook 
hashtag exploded on Twitter (Romano, 2018), Mark Zuckerberg apologized and offered “new 
solutions” aimed at policing organizations accessing user data and granting users more control in 
managing access to information by third parties.  
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Yet, there will be no mass exodus from Facebook even if users massively and hastily 
delete their profiles. Because Facebook owns Instagram and What’s App, both popular mobile 
applications around the world, user data will always be subject to data mining and manipulation. 
Even as Facebook races to adjust its API and reconfigure the technology, then, the streams of 
data that individuals produce in accessing connective media and sharing content on them always 
potentially exposes individuals in ways they are not aware. Only after the fact does such 
manipulation appear to be a problem, too, and only minimally as most users have adjusted to 
accept that they have no legitimate control over their data online (Nissembaum, 2010). 
Regardless of whether one uses social media or not, then, the array of digital media and 
social web that now essentially structures society compel individuals to participate by responding 
to the hails of content shared by individuals, organizations, and media. In this sense, individuals 
participate in what Althusser (1971) called “interpellation.” Recognizing themselves in the hail 
of broader domains of social life, culture, and politics (Althusser, 1971; Barney et al., 2016; see 
also Jenkins et al., 2009, 2013; Rambukanna, 2015; Tufecki, 2017 regarding connectivity and 
convergence through the social web and social media), individuals respond by participating 
through any and all channels available, of which digital media and the social web are readily 
available and easy to enlist (for most). Indeed, while Althusser (1971) described interpellation as 
the process of hailing, hearing, and responding to broader ideological formations (namely, 
authority in a lawful exclamation), its extension in digital media and the social web echoes to the 
root of its conception: individuals become subjects through their participation, and through 
participating—whether in-person or online—they inscribe themselves in the social order. 
Participation has become such a contextual feature of everyday life in the contemporary West 
due in part to its extension in digital media, that Barney et al. (2016) argue we now occupy the 
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conjunction of the “participatory condition,” as participation in everyday activities comprises 
being in the world.  
Yet, while Barney et al. (2016) accurately label our contemporary moment, the way 
visuality increasingly supplants experiential engagement through connective media it also casts 
our interactions as streams of content for consumption and disposal. As a result, we produce 
images of ourselves for each other and we voyeuristically watch one other, observing what we 
assume people think about us and sharing our comments to inscribe ourselves in the social order. 
We rely on imagery to constitute others and ourselves, and we create our own contexts for the 
content we consume, leading to a reliance on imagery that fundamentally, and paradoxically, 
disassociates us from one another.  
This dissertation ultimately explores this paradox. Chapter Two charts the history of 
“public” and “private” as conditions and contexts, and explores how both terms are implicated in 
sociality and codified in law. Drawing connections to the gradual emergence of newer visual 
technologies, I demonstrate how our usage of technology continues to challenge the conditions 
and contexts of “public” and “private” in how we relate to each other, in how we relate to 
authority, and in our understandings of law. In exploring these three dynamics, I rely on three 
case studies where technology, imagery, and law intersect to expose the conflicting nature of 
“public” and “private” as they pertain to digital media and the social web and our participation 
with and through them. Each case study also highlights rules, procedures, institutional practices, 
statues and laws to reveal how “public” and “private” are treated with regard to information, 
individuals, and the institutions represented. Although there were and will continue to be 
multiple examples to explore, I chose these three case studies because each highlights the 
extreme failures of technology and law, and the devastating harms posed to individuals and 
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collectives as imagery spreads across digital media and the social web. As legally resolved cases, 
each case study was also chosen because each highlights ramifications for society in our 
contemporary moment that allow us to further consider the effects of our communication 
practices through technology, the ways technology both extends and delimits what we know 
about self and other, and the ways law fails to account for contexts and conditions of public and 
private.  
Chapter Three, Who Watches the Watchmen?: Contextualizing (Counter)Surveillance 
and Threats to Authority, explores the fatal shooting of Oscar Grant by  Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(BART) officer, Johannes Mehserle. Situating the scene through court documents, testimony, 
and descriptions of the cellphone videos that captured the event almost in its entirety, I clarify 
how individuals employed visual media to monitor authority figures and how such practices 
extend the “camera wars” earlier engendered by the specter of the Rodney King Jr. beating of 
1992. Similar to the Rodney King Jr. beating, where George Holliday videotaped the events from 
an apartment balcony overlooking a freeway in Los Angeles, numerous passengers of the BART 
train recorded the altercation between Oscar Grant and the BART officers on the scene. Drawing 
connections to both authorial narratives of the event and the contextualization of the event 
captured in the various cellphone videos, I argue that surveillance of those in power or authority, 
or “sousveillance,” works to check police power in situating events. Yet, I clarify that such 
practices also fundamentally support the perpetuation of the information state, which may 
ultimately serve the interests of the state in monitoring all individuals and indirectly disciplining 
them for any actions they engage in when taken out of context. 
Chapter Four, Damage Without Injury: The Harms of Visuality in Our Technologically 
Mediated Society, investigates the death of Nichole “Nikki” Catsouras and the spread of the 
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images of her dead body via email by Officers Aaron Reich and Thomas O’Donnell of the 
California Highway Patrol (CHP). Exploring the events surrounding the death of Nikki and the 
subsequent actions by the CHP and the Catsourases, I clarify how imagery becomes constituted 
as visual content that, in turn, decreases personal accountability for one’s actions and objectifies 
those depicted in the imagery.  
This occurs through the process Hillis (2009) calls “middle ground” wherein the visual, 
intermediary form displayed on a screen becomes “fused” with the physical, material form at a 
distance and elsewhere in the mind of the viewer, as if they are one and the same. Extending the 
affective elements of “middle ground” within the broader nature of the “participatory condition” 
we occupy (Barney et al., 2017), I argue that visuality becomes reality as imagery increasingly 
stands in for the corporeal form of another and in so doing denies her actual presence, casting her 
as information to be disposed of. This not only allows people to disembody the person(s) 
depicted (or what Hillis [2009] calls the “source/body”), but as a circumstance of the 
participatory condition, I contend that it also affords people reduced accountability for the effects 
of their actions as they become so disassociated from each other in the content they share with 
abandon. As a result, individuals shame and cyberbully others, fomenting greater entitlement to 
personal feeling (i.e., “truthiness”) over fact, context, and empathy as content spreads beyond 
any one person’s control.  
Chapter Five, Police (In)Action: The Limits of Law in Protecting the Individual, charts 
the yearlong investigation into the alleged rape of Rehteah Parsons, a teenage girl from Nova 
Scotia, Canada. Exploring events surrounding the dissemination of an image of the alleged act in 
progress and the events leading to the creation of a new law to protect individuals from 
cyberbullying known as the Cyber-safety Act, I argue that police and prosecutors maintain and 
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reproduce systemic patriarchal practices that fuel and shape legal and popular conceptions of 
rape, victims, and consent (see Johnson 2017; Yung, 2017 for more detailed account of rape and 
rape culture). In interrogating the roles police and prosecutors play in classifying evidence and in 
interpreting and applying laws to protect individuals, I argue that law enforcement acts with 
profound authority as gatekeeper, which crucially shapes broader understandings of law, rape, 
and what counts as “private” or “personal” information across digital media and the social web.  
My aim in exploring these case studies and the emergent challenges to how we relate to 
each other, how we relate to authority, and how we understand “public” and “private” in practice 
and law is to encourage greater sympathy and empathy in how we relate to each other. 
Somewhere along the way in our expansive use and affiliation with connective media we have 
come to disconnect from each other. Users of social media experience less of each other as they 
visualize one another as the images they produce, project, share and consume on the screen. 
Through visuality users are quicker to assume, and quicker to judge and shame each other due to 
the speed, accessibility, and range of digital media and the social web. Images stand in for users, 
though they are not the actual user. As a condition of social media, individuals cannot seem to 
escape the idea that they “must” produce and manage the images created and shared for others 
online. Through social media, society appears so obsessed with image and imagery, yet 
individuals continue to do very little to change it. Instead, users of social media perpetuate the 
ideas that what appears to be is all there is, and who we appear as online to be is who we are. In 
order to change this, we, as a society, must better understand how we got to this point, what the 
parameters are in technology and law, what the stakes are for individuals and collectives, and 
what we can do together to re-humanize each other as technology and law depersonalize us as 
images and words. I hope this project does just that.
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CHAPTER TWO:  
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: HISTORY, CONDITION, CONTEXT 
Introduction 
Before exploring the contemporary social and technological forces and formations that 
structure our current conjuncture, an understanding of the conditions of public and private is 
necessary. Whereas the concept of public (hereafter referred to as public) historically shaped 
understandings of political life, communal interaction, and class, the concept of private (hereafter 
referred to as private) historically shaped understandings of personal life, friends, family, and the 
home. While both public and private developed alongside each other over time, this chapter 
considers public and private separately in order to contextualize the socially normed dichotomy. 
I ultimately argue against any spatial binary, however, as I expose the performative duality 
between public and private, particularly as it pertains to a contemporary conjuncture where both 
are inextricably interwoven as if they are one and the same when individuals participate with one 
another as information through connective media. 
Performing Public  
While history proves that public and private primarily functioned as spatial oppositions, 
the foundations for public and private as informational contexts guided by social interaction were 
also apparent in their original sense. In particular, public comes from the Latin pūblicus, which is 
a blend of poplicus, as in “of the people,” and pūbes, as in “adult men” (“Public”). As the 
combination of terms indicates, the classical understanding of public was restricted to 
landowning men who, by status and gender, represented society. However, this understanding of 
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public neglects the more spatial and political undertones of the term, which are most apparent in 
two corollary terms that contextualize public in historic practice: forum and res publica.  
In Latin, forum comes by way of foras, which meant “outdoors,” and fores, which meant 
“(outside) door” (“Forum”). Thus, forum in classical Latin meant, “what is out of doors,” a 
classification that clarified that everything that existed outside the doors of an enclosure 
surrounding a home was, essentially, a public space. Understood this way, forum constituted the 
spatial associations of “the public place of the city” where people interacted with one another 
(“Forum”). Moreover, in a practical sense, a forum was also a very real physical space in ancient 
Rome where men assembled to discuss “judicial and other business”(“Forum”). Therefore, forum 
highlights the rudimentary spatial association we attribute to public today, particularly as a 
“space where one is easily observed” and a place of “political engagement” (“Public”). 
 Similarly, res publica contextualizes the sociopolitical associations we attribute to public 
in our common usage today. In Latin, res publica meant “common good” and it was understood 
as an idea and an action that the polity engaged in as citizens (Sennett, 1977). As an ideational 
extension of pūblicus, res publica refined and expanded public life to include the political and 
collective obligation each citizen had in maintaining society and social order. In redefining the 
vested interests of an individual within the interwoven interests of all found in the community, 
then, res publica became an idea that citizens enacted as part of their ritualistic practice of 
engaging in the commons with others of the society (Sennett, 1977). Thus, res publica resembles 
our contemporary understanding of “republic,” again highlighting the sociopolitical connections 
we see in republic as “a collection of elected representatives engaged in civic duty” for a group 
or a society. Yet, res publica also constitutes the interiority and exteriority of public, not in a 
strict spatial sense, per se, but rather as “a collection of individuals of a similar nationality, 
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background, or other collective identity” (“Public”). In ancient Roman society, this interior was 
embodied in its classically rooted sense of “adult men” who owned land and represented society. 
As the dominant class, this group constituted the collective identity of the public, particularly as 
they shared common ethnic and racial backgrounds, social affiliations, beliefs, and values. Those 
of differing ethnic and racial backgrounds were cast as the exterior, which meant that they were 
not represented as a part of the public (see Sennett, 1977). Moreover, since the dominant class 
determined the social and political order of society, it also claimed public life as its realm. As a 
result, res publica ultimately shaped the discursive formation of public and its interiority as one 
of elite or high class. 
This discursive formation of public persisted throughout much of European history, most 
notably in monarchical societies that relied on it to create and maintain social order. Ordained 
into their heighted status by a “Higher Authority,” monarchs and nobles supported this discursive 
formation because it granted them power, which they wielded and managed in designating title 
and class, shaping social interaction across class, granting land, and determining the affairs of 
public life and the populace by extension (Sennett, 1977).6 By codifying these practices in law, 
monarchs not only secured their power, they also instilled a sense of identity and place for 
themselves and others. This “sense of place” was most apparent in laws about clothing and laws 
about socialization in specific spaces.  
Although peculiar by today’s standards, class distinctions were historically evident in 
clothing designated by class. Sumptuary laws in London and Paris from the 13th Century up to 
the mid 18th Century specifically regulated the type of clothing a person could wear based on his 
or her class and/or trade (Sennett, 1977). Monarchs and nobles dressed in finer, ornate garb to 
                                                
6 To remain cogent, I highlight only the most relevant examples monarchies used to maintain class distinctions. The 
two I highlight relate most closely to my discussion of technology in the next section. For a more elaborate 
explanation, see Sennett’s (1977) The Fall of Public Man.  
 
 20 
distinguish status and to draw attention to their presence in public. A carpenter, on the other 
hand, was forbidden from wearing the finer clothing of a lord, as this was a violation of station 
and social norms. Instead, a carpenter and others of lower classes and trades wore simpler 
apparel, which was often regulated by their respective guilds. This visual demarcation in clothing 
ultimately served three purposes. First, it regulated class as a visual array one could easily 
discern in public and in interaction, which allowed a person to “maintain” to his or her class and 
find safety and communality in mutual affiliation. Second, it guided social interaction across 
class by allowing both parties to visually encode and decode the proper social etiquette necessary 
for address and communicative interactions. In particular, it standardized social protocols for 
formal address, which ultimately eased tensions across class and provided a semblance of 
genuine interaction (Sennett, 1977; see also Giddens, 1986). Third, it lessened social mobility, 
which worked to temper dissention by relegating individuals to their respective classes and/or 
trades. As ornate garb was legally restricted to certain echelons of society and—practically 
speaking—more expensive than laypeople could afford, individuals were fundamentally 
constrained by politics and economics, thereby limiting their abilities to change their social 
status. In regulating the clothing a person could wear, therefore, monarchs and nobles enacted a 
decidedly visual interplay of encoding and decoding formality that found its support in law and 
social identity, and helped ensure their control of the social order.  
Today, stratification of class in clothing is neither a matter of sumptuary law nor is it as 
visibly apparent. Yet, the emphasis on image and the “social protocols” of promoting and 
projecting a particular visual array to be encoded and decoded by others are inflected in 
contemporary practices through digital media and the social web. As individuals adorn their 
profiles with curated images that obscure their blemishes and highlight their best features—often 
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with photo editing—they give off an appearance that attracts the attention of others in a 
particular, positive light. The profile, therefore, extends aspects of bodies from the past adorned 
according to everyday “norms,” yet it is a mannequin on display to others, for others.  
The historical limitations of social space, similarly, further supported monarchical 
control. Limiting the confines of “the public sphere” to the royal court, most monarchies actively 
excluded specific classes from participating in the affairs of state (Habermas, 1991). As a result, 
monarchies further affirmed their power by strategically refining public life, in its res publica 
root, as the physical space that the elite primarily occupied. In this way, monarchies ensured that 
the interior of public remained in the hands of the elite. Yet, since the elite and the people they 
represented in court shared a similar national background and other collective attributes, the 
spatial division of “the public sphere” recast the exterior of public to also include the vast 
expanse of the capital city, like London or Paris (Sennett, 1977). Therefore, the streets, parks, 
shops and pubs of the city operated as spaces where an individual performed his identity and 
reinforced class as he socialized with unknown others (Goffman, 1959). In this way, individuals 
not only interacted with one another, or at least maintained a semblance of interaction across 
class, they also performed and collectively shared in public identity as a people.  
The discursive formation of public that supported the elite interior and its claims to public 
life dissolved in the late 17th Century. While 17th Century French society visibly maintained 
social order in its division of “le public” between “la cour et la ville,” or the court and the city 
(Sennett, 1977), the rise of Louis XIV and the French Revolution slowly fissured these divisions 
in space (Fraser, 1992; Habermas, 1991; Livingstone, 2005).  For example, “la cour,” which 
constituted the spatial and ideological interior of public, expanded under Louis XIV’s rise to 
power as he allowed nobles and the rising mercantile class to participate in the court. 
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Recognizing the growing economic power the mercantile class was acquiring through market-
based trade and the effects this new development posed for the State, Louis XIV granted this 
rising class a more prominent voice in the court. This move both tempered the elite, whom Louis 
XIV distrusted, and inadvertently redefined public life around the growing economic forces of 
“la ville” that were to fragment the highly classed spatial interior of pre-Revolutionary French 
public life (Habermas, 1991; Sennett, 1977).  
To meet these changes, the nature of urban life also shifted. In particular, guilds, a staple 
of the city, began to disappear as social class became increasingly fluid due to the rise of the 
market economy (Habermas, 1991; Sennett, 1977). Afforded new liberties due to newfound 
wealth, the mercantile and bourgeoisie classes of the late 17th and early 18th centuries explored 
the fluidity of class by dressing in the clothing of different classes. Thus, individuals 
experimented with their identities through clothing, not necessarily to “jump” class, but rather, to 
be recognized as distinct individuals out in the city (Sennett, 1977). As a result, sumptuary laws 
governing dress slowly fell out of fashion, which ultimately allowed individuals more power and 
control over their social identities as they adorned their bodies to be recognized by specific 
others and to affiliate themselves with specific groups. 
As monarchical societies reorganized, socially and politically, around the rising 
mercantile class and the shifts brought about by the market economy, the understanding of public 
changed to more closely resemble its contemporary social and material forms. Citizens of mid 
18th Century Paris and London understood public to mean, “a region of social life located apart 
from the realm of family and close friends.” Unlike the earlier socially stratified conception of 
public, the term was now understood to encompass a realm that included a relatively wide 
diversity of acquaintances and strangers formerly obscured or restricted from public life 
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(Sennett, 1977, p. 17). Therefore, while public became a term of discomfort for the elite who 
previously championed the dichotomy it once maintained in society, the term now permitted 
individuals of lesser status the possibility of social mobility. As an individual crafted himself in 
the clothing with which he adorned himself, and as he connected with others in public, he 
participated in public life and progressively inscribed himself in the social order of everyday life. 
Indeed, as obvious class distinctions by attire continued into the 19th Century (Giddens, 1986; 
Sennett, 1977), the spatial and performative shifts in public brought about by the rise of the 
mercantile class shaded public toward how it is widely understood today: the observable space 
outside the home where one interacts with others in his community, as well as the wide expanse 
through which a society’s members communicate messages to one another (“Public”). And as 
distinctions by clothing and title/address began to fade in the mid-19th Century in most parts of 
the world, the “sentiment of responsibility” in distinguishing others out in public and regarding 
them formally also gradually eroded (Le Bon, 1895/1960). As a result, being out in public today 
entails being outside the home, as well as greater choice as to whom and to how one 
communicates.   
Performing Private  
Private, like public, derives from classical Latin. Etymologically, “private” is derived 
from prīvātus, which meant, “withdrawn from public life” (“Private”). In this way, the term 
operated in direct opposition to public; however, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the 
term also operated as both an adjective and a noun that entailed more than an opposition to 
public life. As an adjective, private indicated a condition, as in “restricted for the use of a 
particular person or persons”; “peculiar to oneself, special, [and] individual”; a state of being, as 
in “a private person, not holding public office,” as well as “belonging as private property” 
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(“Private”). As a noun, private denoted an individual “who holds no public office,” who was “a 
private person,” as in “an individual” who kept to herself (“Private”). Here, both forms of the 
term highlight a spatial connotation. First, physically, as in one’s property outside of public 
space, as well as being either outside of public purview or withdrawn from public life. Second, 
interpersonally and psychologically within the company of particular individuals, as well as 
within the conceptual space of one’s mind. In its classical conception, then, the term originally 
communicated a relatively flexible array of conditions and qualities, each in relative opposition 
to public. 
As the meaning of private developed over time, it took on largely personal connotations 
that were not entirely spatial. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, private became 
associated with “close” and “intimate” in the 8th Century, marking its early transition toward a 
particular person, event, or with regard to particular information (“Private”). During this time, 
the term guided interactions between close individuals who felt they could share personal, and 
therefore, private information with one another that would stay within the intimate context in 
which it was shared. As these close associations continued into the 12th Century, private 
expanded its associations, becoming synonymous with the adjective “confidential,” as a 
condition of a person, event, or with regard to particular information. The nouns “confidant” and 
“close friend,” also become synonymous with “private,” both denoting the way that privacy 
became contextually bound to particular individuals and the information they shared (“Privacy”; 
see also Nissenbaum, 2010 regarding historic contexts of privacy). As the meaning of privacy 
expanded beyond spatial contexts, it became a quality germane to dyadic interactions and small 
groups of trusted individuals, such as close-knit communities. 
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It is worth noting a now obsolete interpretation of the term private arose during the late 
14th Century. John Wyclif—an English philosopher, theologian, reformer, biblical translator, and 
seminary professor at Oxford—applied the term to the mendicant orders of the Christian faith as 
a way of distinguishing their distinct practices of asceticism (“Private”).7 So applied, the term 
clarified the intimate communal associations of private as well as finessed the term’s more 
common exclusionary aspect of segmenting information and practices from others. Developed in 
the context of religious orders, this definition defined private as a condition of an individual 
“living according to distinct religious rules; set apart by distinct beliefs, religious practices” 
(“Privacy”). Specifically, as an individual followed the precepts of the religious order, and as he 
communed with others who held the same beliefs and practices, he and the others together 
formed mutual associations of affinity that brought them together as a private community that 
was exclusionary to outsiders who did not know about or share its distinct beliefs and practices. 
In this context, then, private not only constituted the intimate connotations accorded it from the 
8th Century onward—which were inclusive of those from a particular religious in-group—but it 
also included the exclusionary dimension of the term witnessed in being set apart from others, 
either by space, grouping, or informational context.  
Though this interpretation of private faded during the early 15th Century, largely due to 
attacks on monasticism, it fueled transformations of private that developed in the mid 15th 
Century. Beyond expanding private as an inclusive condition of particular groups and 
individuals, this interpretation gave rise to the common expression “privy to” and also the term 
                                                
7 A proponent of the ideal of poverty, Wyclif used the term to extol the virtues asceticism, which initially put him in 
line with the mendicant orders to which he applied the term: the Franciscans, Augustines, Dominicans, and 
Carmelites (“Privacy”; Urquhart, 1912). Yet, as the Catholic Church and its numerous orders expanded and acquired 
property, Wyclif later challenged the imperial nature of the Church and its growing acquisition of and reliance on 
possessions. This put him at odds with the mendicant orders that once supported him, as they came to rely on alms. 
Arguing against these “sects,” as he later referred to the orders, Wyclif urged the church to abolish all monastic 
orders to reclaim the holiness of the faith (Urquhart, 1912).  
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“privacy.” A common expression in Middle English, “privy to” verbally signaled when specific 
information “belonged to one’s own private circle” (“Privy”). In this way, the condition of being 
privy to particular information was entirely a matter of one’s affiliations and the quality of one’s 
relationship with specific others. Therefore, the various practices of private borne out of the mid 
15th Century recast private by extending it beyond its classical spatial associations to include the 
wider array of contexts governed by the condition of one’s associations and the quality of one’s 
relationships (see Petronio, 2002 regarding privacy management in interpersonal contexts). For 
example, during the 15th Century, an individual might choose to disclose private information 
outside of the home when he communicated with others of his service or guild. Given the mutual 
context of their shared interactions and depending on the quality of their relationship, a baron’s 
valet and his footman, for example, might discuss personal affairs with one another that they 
would not discuss with others employed by another baron since they would not be privy to the 
affairs of the estate at which the first baron’s servants worked. Furthermore, since these servants 
shared a mutual social context, these conversations could occur within the service quarters of the 
property or they could occur out in public, depending on how comfortable the servants felt 
discussing information with one another in the settings in which they interacted.  
Concurrently, in highly stratified societies of the 15th Century, an individual of a lower 
social class was not necessarily privy to the affairs or practices of a higher social class; instead 
he was largely relegated to his station in society. For example, even though a valet served his 
lord, he would not be allowed to partake in the various social gatherings—whether mundane or 
extravagant—his lord was party to unless the lord extended him an invitation, which was a rare 
occurrence. Additionally, the differences between high and low class afforded those of higher 
status the unrestrained opportunity to inquire about the affairs of those socially beneath them; 
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yet, an individual from a lower class would be found “out of turn” if he inquired about the affairs 
of someone from a higher class (Sennett, 1977; Petronio, 2002). Members of lower social strata 
had far less social leverage they could employ against their more stately counterparts, at least 
until the early 18th Century when the aforementioned rise of the mercantile class reorganized 
society and practices of public and private expression (Habermas, 1991; Sennett, 1977).  
In addition to the expression “privy to,” “privacy” emerged as a common term in the mid 
15th Century. As an extension of private, privacy marked “a condition of being alone, 
undisturbed, or free from public attention, as a matter of choice or right” (“Privacy”), and its 
interpretation has remained relatively stable into modern times. Like private, privacy operated as 
an oppositional term to public, which expanded beyond its initial associations with “outside (the 
home)” and “common good” during the first half of the 14th Century to encompass the condition 
of being “generally known” and the quality of being “open to general observation or view; 
carried out without concealment” (“Public”). Molded by its spatial and communal foundations, 
public progressively included an awareness of others as they communed with the vast and 
interactive audience outside the home as individuals collectively performing identity albeit 
within the confines of their roles and social classes (Fraser, 1992; Habermas, 1991; Livingstone, 
2005; Sennett, 1977). Carefully managing their verbal and nonverbal expressions in the purview 
of the vast and interactive audience outside the home, individuals collectively performed their 
identities with others to maintain their personal public images (Goffman, 1959, 1966; Petronio, 
2002; see also Giddens, 1986 regarding socialization as ordered in structuration). This not only 
promoted a semblance of sociability across social classes (Sennett, 1977), it reaffirmed public 
and private as mutually constitutive processes of shared communicative performances.  
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An individual, for example, a valet, performed public image—his “front stage” 
performances—through his social class and role as a valet in his physical appearance and 
clothing, and in how he conducted himself in his deliberate and spontaneous communication 
with others (Goffman, 1959, 1966). Specifically, his physical appearance and clothing would be 
neat and appropriate to his class; he would appear well dressed, but perhaps not in the most 
recent fashion (see Sennett, 1977 for more elaboration on how physical appearance dictated 
sociality). In his deliberate communication with others, he would speak properly and avoid slang. 
He might also deliberately avoid shameful individuals of lower classes, such as prostitutes and 
beggars, whose association might mar his public image. Unconsciously, he might even avoid 
particular places where a proper gentleman should not be seen, such as underground clubs or 
back alleys where unsavory individuals might congregate. Yet, in all of these public 
performances of his identity, he also performed private as he consciously guarded information 
about himself that he deemed relative to specific place, familiar affiliations, or to his self. Thus, 
he relied on privacy—or the spaces where he enacted his “backstage” performances—in the 
home, with close friends and family, or in his own personal solitude to protect him from the 
excruciating gaze of the public (Goffman, 1959; 1966; Sennett, 1977).  
Conversely, as I discuss in detail later, digital media and the social web collapse these 
historically inflected spatial demarcations of public and private by promoting a singular space 
where private and public are on display together at once. Personal thoughts, feelings, and 
expressions that would otherwise be private, backstage performances contained within a 
particular audience are, instead, cast as front stage, public performances that are widely available 
to countless individuals across space and time. Utterances and images composed long ago and/or 
in jest amongst friends become subject to the vast gaze of others who may lack familiarity with 
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the source and the context. Because public entails a much more massive audience than one 
contained in a geographic space or set location, individuals can and do become victims of the 
varied and emergent “social norms” developing across digital media and the social web. To 
combat this, individuals either attempt to maintain public and private as separate spaces by 
eschewing digital engagement to the extent they can, however limited, or they manage 
expressions and depictions shared as they internalize the infinite gaze of others. Therefore, the 
return to one’s self in solitude or with close, intimate others—private space—recedes more and 
more to the thoughts of the individual, the only “space” as yet publicly inaccessible.  
Demarcations of Public and Private in Law 
As terms and as practices, public and private mutually define specific spaces, 
possessions, conditions, and interactions from opposing sides of a relatively stabilized spectrum. 
Despite these historic spatial demarcations, however, public and private intersect in law, but 
often in seemingly contradictory ways. In American law, in particular, “privacy” is alluded to but 
never fully stated as a right. Nowhere is privacy specifically mentioned in the Constitution; 
rather, privacy is embodied in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th amendments where each outline a 
sense of privacy protection from indemnity or public censure (Nissenbaum, 2010). Indeed, while 
individuals make claims to privacy as a matter of personal right, privacy protections are abstract 
and highly contextual in law, especially as newer technologies change the ways we practice, 
understand, and value privacy (Alderman & Kennedy, 1995; boyd, 2011; Warren & Brandeis, 
1980/2010).  
Regardless of the equivocal place privacy maintains in law, people believe they have a 
fundamental right to the quality of “intimate information” and to a space protected from the 
purview of the public. Etching out frameworks for privacy in practice, individuals, philosophers, 
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and legal scholars often cite the text of the 4th Amendment to justify privacy as a personal right. 
However, the language of the 4th Amendment only outlines individual protection from 
unreasonable search and seizure without probable cause and due process in the law. The 4th 
Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. (U.S. Const. amend. IV) 
 
The 4th Amendment, therefore, does not wholly constitute a right to privacy, at least not in 
contemporary personal invocations and conceptions. Rather, when James Madison authored the 
Constitution in 1787-1788, he wrote the Amendment to grant individual protections to property 
on the heels of the Revolutionary War. Madison reflected on the transgression of personal space 
that occurred when British soldiers commandeered colonists’ houses for boarding and military 
purposes. To ensure protection for personal possessions, Madison articulated security for 
landowning citizens in a classic conception of public and private space. Thus, Madison’s words 
reflect a particular time when the context of public and private existed in a spatially dichotomous 
relationship.  
Madison and the other Founding Fathers fundamentally relied on this binary 
understanding of public and private space dominant during their time. With all things private 
inextricably tied to personal possession, Madison and the Founding Fathers never fathomed a 
day when public and private might collide unless there was probable cause to investigate a 
person. Yet, freedom of the press and, later, the advent of newer visual technologies such as the 
snap camera and the x-ray would, over time, test and challenge this binary, as they expanded 
accessibility to what was, at the time, private. 
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The presidency of John Adams, for example, saw the first societal challenges to the 
public-private binary as it clashed with the freedom of the press. When France and England went 
to war in 1792, shortly after the Revolutionary War, President Washington declared American 
neutrality as America traded with both England and France. Despite neutrality in the war, 
England and France seized the ships of those that traded with their enemies. The Jay Treaty of 
1795 settled the commandeering of American vessels with England, but also angered the French 
government, which stepped up its efforts in undermining American trade with England. By the 
time Adams assumed office in 1797, he faced a tense political relationship with France that 
bordered on war. He sent a diplomatic commission to France to negotiate the end of the seizure 
of merchant ships. The American commission, however, failed to formally negotiate with the 
French, as it refused to pay the bribes that the French commission demanded. When the 
dispatches of the failed American diplomatic commission were later released to Congress in 
1798, leading to the XYZ Affair, the Democratic-Republicans and those that supported them in 
the press railed against Adams. Making a mockery of his political prowess in drawings shared in 
newspapers, the Democratic-Republicans and the press angered Adams.  
Infuriated by the outpour of what he believed to be slanderous depictions of his likeness 
in drawings from those who found his international engagements with France questionable, 
Adams passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. The first three acts restricted the movements and 
actions of foreigners, who posed security risks to the government. The fourth and final act took 
aim at the press, declaring it a criminal offense to publish “false, scandalous, and malicious 
writing” against the government and government officials. Thus, Adams made it legal, albeit in a 
temporary law, to prosecute those who mocked the actions of government officials and/or 
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reported false information. This extended to reporters, members of the government, and even 
private citizens.  
Although the Alien and Sedition Acts concluded with Adams’ presidency, the ongoing 
critiques of public officials and everyday affairs continued in the sensational reportage found in 
“yellow journalism.” The historic equivalent of modern tabloid journalism, “yellow journalism” 
heightened aspects of stories by fabricating, obfuscating, and/or excluding information about 
people and particular events. Most notably, the yellow press’ 1898 reportage of the sinking of the 
USS Maine in Cuba contributed to public sentiment that inflamed tensions between America and 
Spain.8 Exhorting the public to “Remember the Maine” and sharing drawings of the bombing and 
photographs of the wreckage, the yellow press swayed public opinion, which eventually 
contributed to the declaration of war with Spain in 1898. The dissemination of imagery coupled 
with incendiary sentiment—whether true or exaggerated—by the yellow press, therefore, 
demonstrated the power of imagery and information to challenge the coherency and context of 
public events and phenomena, as it continues to do today through digital media and in our 
interactions across the social web. The primary difference today, however, is that the legally 
inflected binary of public and private is dramatically challenged by the amplification of 
information as public by default once shared online, regardless of how personal or private it may 
be. 
Technology, Imagery, and Challenges to the Public-Private Binary. Historically, 
visual technologies such as the x-ray and snap camera collapsed the extant distinctions between 
spatial and embodied spaces of public and private life. The advent of the x-ray in 1895 
challenged commonplace notions of public and private by drawing focus to the private space of 
                                                
8 William Randolph Hurst and Joseph Pulitzer led the yellow press. Proprietors of the “New York Journal” and the 
“New York World,” both Hurst and Pulitzer supported war with Spain for its alleged cruelties to the people of Cuba. 
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the body. In the process of illuminating the skeletal structure of a body, the ghostly contrast of 
black and white exposed an individual’s internal organs. In exposing the “private parts” of a 
human body, the x-ray stripped the skin away, making it “just another wrapping, something to be 
removed to reach what was more valid beneath it” (Kevles, 2007, p. 28).  
Comparably, during the late 19th Century, the snap camera complicated the spatial 
boundary between public and private when individuals, usually journalists, used it to expose 
otherwise private facts and personal affairs of notable public figures (Solove, 2007). As 
journalists visually splayed formerly private facts on the front page of newspapers, the snap 
camera slowly promoted the photograph as evidence and testimony in the public eye. Offering 
imagery as an allegedly complete representation of a person or an event removed from original 
accounts from any individual or persons depicted, the emergent photographic mode of visual 
content directed interpretation toward the eyes of the viewer (see Althusser, 1971; Bolter & 
Grusin, 2000; Peters, 1999; Warren & Brandeis, 1890/2010).  
Incensed by these emergent invasions of privacy revealed in the various uses of the 
camera that contributed to surveillance, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, prominent 
lawyers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, argued that “instantaneous photographs and 
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; numerous 
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet 
shall be proclaimed from the house-tops’” (1980/2010, p.195/p.6). Cognizant of the potential 
invasion to one’s right to privacy exposed by newer technologies, even beyond the scope of the 
snap camera, Warren and Brandeis argued for personal protections in U.S law (Peters, 1999). 
Noting that privacy invasions caused “damnum absque injuria” or damage/loss without 
(physical) injury, Warren and Brandies authored a tort to grant justice to those who were 
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psychically or publicly marred by an invasion of privacy (1980/2010). In establishing personal 
privacy protections for individuals within the confines of their homes, the tort granted 
individuals the opportunity to seek recompense for the personal, psychic damage that occurred 
due to the visible broadcast of private facts and private performances. The tort also limited 
personal privacy protections. Since an individual willingly disclosed personal facts to others, 
regardless of the space in which he shared that information, the disclosure was not considered 
wholly private. Instead, it was considered vaguely public. Consequently, the tort fundamentally 
reified the extant spatial binary in law as it ignored expectations to privacy in public and in 
specific contexts (see Nissenbaum, 1997, 2010 regarding contexts of privacy). 
Despite its shortcomings, Warren and Brandies’ tort established new conditions of 
privacy in American law. The ulterior uses of newer visual technologies and the innumerable 
unforeseen ways each newer technology remediated attributes of previous media (Bolter & 
Grusin, 2000) later challenged privacy as a condition governing personal information 
(Nissenbaum, 2010). The use of film and the moving image at the end of the 19th Century, for 
example, further complicated the “spatial binary” articulated by Madison by, again, collapsing 
private into public in a similar fashion as the snap camera and photograph had done. Moreover, 
since film and the moving image captured an individual’s movements across space and time, the 
challenges to the spatial binary in law became more expansive, reflecting newer contexts already 
remediated by the camera and photograph. Notably, the perceived authenticity—the 
“immediacy”—of the moving image and the potential for heightened surveillance further 
challenged privacy law to conceptualize how and when certain movements and interactions 
across space worked to constitute private action (Bolter & Grusin, 2000; Nissenbaum, 2010; see 
also Humprheys, 2011). Personal recordings of private events in one’s residence could now 
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potentially become public as a matter of information if shared beyond the original context, just as 
had happened with photographs in the past. Even recordings of physical public spaces, which 
later became a method of observation utilized by law enforcement, challenged the privacy of the 
individual. For example, when surveillance cameras became part of major metropolitan cities 
like London and New York in the 1970s, individuals decried the loss of privacy, particularly 
since their “private” movements from one public place to another now became subject to 
continual documentation, aggregation, and analysis by an outside authority (Nissenbaum, 2010). 
Indeed, while an individual moved about the city of his own accord, the presence of surveillance 
engendered by the omnipresent lens of the camera now threatened to expose his otherwise 
private facts.  
The visual components of digital media and the social web, coupled with the growing 
emphasis on visuality, engender similar concerns for privacy today. Whereas the photograph and 
film extended private information into public, connective media amplify the anxieties associated 
with potential violations to privacy further as content is easily replicated and manipulated, 
indefinitely stored, and shared across vast audiences (Baym, 2010; Marwick & boyd, 2011). As 
previously noted, the projection of the self on the screen in static or animated imagery—one’s 
telepresence—becomes the means through which people connect and share with each other, as 
well as objectify and harm one another. Cast as a telepresence, any other can potentially seize the 
individual and objectify her at a distance, making her into a telefetish that is manipulated to fit 
the ideas and beliefs of those who encounter her visual content, at least until the power of the 
fetish has diminished (Hillis, 2009). As users share visual content through digital media and the 
social web, therefore, they fundamentally surrender their privacy for the sake of connection. In 
so doing, individuals not only expose themselves to potential harms that emerge when an image 
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spirals out of control, they also become commodified by others and the social media platforms 
they use. The vast array of networked technologies that structure digital media and the social 
web, then, erode privacy as individuals and entities seize each other in content and treat each 
other as information to be engaged to the extent that this information entrances the audience until 
such time as it is disposed of when said audience feels it has lost its allure.    
Privacy as Control and Access to Information. In light of the progressive collapse of 
private and public into each other through technology, it’s necessary to consider how both access 
and control of personal information are constituted within the discourse of privacy. Gavinson 
(1980) argues that “privacy is a limitation of others’ access to an individual” and that “a loss of 
privacy occurs as others obtain information about an individual, pay attention to him, or gain 
access to him” (p. 421). Gavinson’s arguments align with the U.S. legal definition of privacy, 
which highlights an invasion of privacy as the public disclosure of a private fact “which would 
be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person, and which is not of legitimate public 
concern.” Yet, today’s networked digital technologies upset this “threshold” delineation in the 
law. With networked digital technologies constantly tracking users through their searches, 
purchases, and personal statements (Mayer-Schönberger, 2011; Rosen, 2009); and with social 
media recasting disclosure and sharing as “default” social norms (Baym, 2010; boyd, 2008, 
2011; boyd & Hargittai, 2010); privacy is no longer a matter of limiting others’ access to an 
individual, but rather the ability, however limited, to control the excess of information available 
about oneself in one’s interactions online.  
The widely and wildly accessible nature of information online ultimately complicates the 
ability to control the flow of personal information for both the individual and the collective. 
Since information is gathered in each action online and stored in proprietary databases, the 
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individual lacks the ability to exert control over how and where her information is used. Beyond 
her individual actions online, she must also contend with what others may share about her. Since 
others can, and are encouraged to, share information through digital media and the social web, 
she has limited control over what may get published, and what may be seen to comprise her. In 
particular, if others post photos of her online and tag her in them, their actions—whether benign 
or malicious—can reveal personal moments in time that would otherwise be unseen and 
unknown to the public. How she is seen and known becomes constantly comprised in the 
information she discloses, the information that is shared about her, and the excess of information 
always available at the hands of the expansive collective that monitors, tracks, and mutually 
constitutes her in her interactions and digital presence online. In this way, the collective shapes 
the all-encompassing collage of information about an individual, whether this collective actively 
participates in sharing or not, by monitoring her through participatory surveillance that, at its 
best, helps build affirmation as people connect to one another and find community (Baym, 
2010), and, at its worst, restricts expression to the point that an individual self-censors, feels 
threatened, and/or potentially harms herself due to the weight of the public reprimand leveled 
against her when her expressions are taken out of context (Mayer-Schönberger, 2010). The end 
result is a collapse of the experience of “public” and “private” in offline and online spaces, as 
well as a growing shift in social norms. Our engagement with digital media and the social web, 
in line with Warren and Brandeis’ prescient predictions, continue to shift our understanding of 
public and private and how we understand others and ourselves. 
Disciplining Others and Ourselves 
Technology and tools alter our relationship to the world. Whether we use a clock for 
marking time or, more contemporarily, a computer for searching, the way through which we see 
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and understand the world is affected by our usage of technology (McLuhan, 1995; see also Innis, 
1951). Contemporary digital technologies dramatically alter our relationship to the world through 
the availability of information, the perpetual streams of content, and the increasing capacity to 
store massive amounts of data. Thus, where analog technologies like the clock allowed humans 
to alter their physical relationship to their environment and the world around them, contemporary 
digital technologies facilitate a new understanding of one’s relationship with the world through 
increased ease of access to and processing of information (see Innis, 1951 regarding time-
binding and space-binding media). In this way, digital technologies function as more immersive 
“intellectual technologies”—technologies that expand and constrict our mental capacities as 
individuals process the world as streams of information created, shared, and readily available in 
ways it was not as easily accessible before (Bell, 1974; Carr, 2008; Stiegler, 1998). 
In particular, the invention of the mechanical clock and the adoption of time zones 
highlight to the ways in which intellectual technologies alter human action. As both Harold Innis 
(1951) and Joseph Weizenbaum (1976) argue, the mechanical clock altered human biology, 
coordinating it around a mechanized system that quantified time in rejection of human senses. As 
Nicholas Carr (2008) notes, with the advent of the clock we began to stop listening to our senses 
for when to rise, to sleep, and to eat, and instead started to create and obey a new social order of 
life. The advent of widely available means of understanding mechanical time through the clock 
fundamentally altered social, political, and personal spaces around time with the end result of 
further abstracted boundaries of “public life” and “private life.”  
Digital technologies extend this abstraction and do so through greater storage, visuality, 
diffusion, and deindividuation. With the increasing capacity to store data across multiple nodal 
points in geographic space and over time, digital technologies alter human practices of 
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remembering and forgetting. Just as the mechanical clock slowly reordered human biology 
around arithmetical time, digital media and the social web have changed the ways we know, 
remember, and forget by offering “perpetual” storage and “constant” engagement as we are 
hailed to participate.  
 As Viktor Mayer-Schönberger (2010) elaborates, the storage capacity available through 
digital technologies shifts human abilities to remember and recall from a mode of biologically 
inclined forgetting to one of technologically augmented remembering. Where humans previously 
forgot particular events over time, as humans are inclined to do, the technological mediation 
facilitated by digital storage shifts the norm from forgetting toward remembering. What Mayer-
Schönberger finds so troubling about this shift is not that humans must now constantly remember 
events of the past. Rather, he worries that the massive stores of information continuously 
archived by our networked digital technologies and across the social web freeze an individual in 
time and, more crucially, constrain human agency interpersonally, socially, and politically. As 
individual identity is conflated with content that is shared and acquired online, Mayer-
Schönberger argues that individuals are interpreted through the constellation of information 
available that is fundamentally removed of context. Our awareness of this “perfect” catalogue of 
the past that is readily available and stored in databases, then, forecloses greater possibilities to 
forgive one another, as well as recognize that we change over time. Through technology and the 
externalization of memory afforded by it, individuals are predisposed to remember, and as they 
do, they become biased by the stores of information they access to inform their opinions and 
guide their actions.  
Whether individuals learn self-censorship or attempt to avoid using digital media and the 
social web, they are implicated in the networked nature of the technologies that now so crucially 
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structure society. A consequence of the “participatory condition” of our current conjuncture 
(Barney et al., 2016), individuals participate in the broader domains of social life, politics, and 
culture as they enlist or become a product of technology in their everyday activities. Where an 
individual chooses to shop, what she buys, and even her spatial movements encompass 
participation at the social, cultural, and political levels of everyday life. Choices in where she 
shops, what she buys, and what she looks at in a store contribute to an elaborate profile of the 
individual that is digitally catalogued by omnibus advertising companies and sold to numerous 
agencies and advertisers (Cohen, 2012; Magnet, 2011). Transactions with credit and debit cards 
create digital records with banks, creditors, and companies that further codify the individual in 
terms of worth—an investment, a credit score, and purchasing power. Even her spatial 
movements become a product of marketers and security forces, which use them to make sense of 
how individuals maneuver space and engage with product. 
What emerges from our engagement with connective media, then, is a linear record of 
content accessible to multiple entities and others who may manipulate the information removed 
from its original context. Fearful of how this information can incur incalculable damage to an 
individual’s reputation over time, Mayer-Schönberger (2010) argues that individuals must learn 
to err on the side of caution by self-censoring to minimize any unforeseeable retaliatory action 
for past transgressions. Yet, such practices cannot fully ensure protection for anyone given that 
information is gleaned in the choices, transactions, movements, and interactions that an 
individual engages in on a daily basis. Caught within the web of networked technologies at our 
fingertips and all around us, we become composites of the information collected, amalgamated, 
and codified with or without our consent and knowledge.  
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Disciplinary power, then, comes to exercise greater influence over each individual and 
her actions in all arenas of life. Uncertain of who is watching and what they might do with the 
information garnered, the individual cedes control over the social situation to technology and the 
collective (boyd, 2008, 2011). Attempting to compensate for this loss of control, the individual 
engages in the “illusion of control” online by manipulating her privacy settings where available 
(boyd, 2008, 2011), and also practicing restraint in personal expression. As a result, the 
individual begins to internalize the watchful gaze of the always unknown other who imposes the 
“generalized order” upon her (Foucault, 1975). Stripped of true mechanisms of control, yet 
strangely vested in the “illusion of control,” the individual’s agency becomes bound to contexts 
where she believes she can control the information about herself. Yet, because information is 
always potentially accessible through digital media and the social web, even despite privacy 
settings or personal restraint, public and private clash again and again to reveal that information 
is in the eye of the beholder. Thus, how one is seen, known, and remembered is a process and 
product of what one produces and what others share about one, with or without one’s consent.  
Beyond the problem of access, then, the problem of conflation of medium with memory 
continues because context is collapsed by the medium itself (Mayer-Schönberger, 2010; see also 
Hillis, 2009). We lose essential referential information that would properly inform us of the 
phenomena we observe though digital media and the social web. As context is obscured or 
distorted by connective media, agency is similarly constrained as individuals primarily rely on 
visual content to depict self, know others, and socially participate. The end result of this process 
of digital remembering is a threefold reverberation of panopticism a la Foucault (1975): power 
relations become subtle, operating almost invisibly, as individuals cede power to a wide array of 
mechanisms that bind the individual to both the technological and political forces at work; 
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subject to judgment by others (e.g., family, friends, former romantic partner, employers, 
institutions, and society by and large) through the networked technologies, individuals 
increasingly censor themselves and police each other; finally, individuals limit their expressions 
to conform to collective taste in emergent social norms or they stay silent out of fear of 
retaliatory actions with unknown consequences. Of central concern here is that expression itself 
is the hallmark of a democratic society, yet it is continually under assault by digital media and 
the social web and how we use them to deny or distort each other’s presence. 
Technologies of Subjugation and Social Order  
When Foucault began his study of the prison system, he was well aware that the 
mechanisms of control exerted on the bodies of prisoners extended beyond the enclosed space of 
the prison. In his genealogical exposition of the panoptic practices that shaped the modern prison 
system, Foucault uncovered the power relations that disciplined the body at a distance in practice 
and in perception. Noting the strong hierarchical organization of the prison system, Foucault 
argued that the vast separation of power relations between the surveyor (i.e., the prison guards) 
and the surveyed (i.e., the prisoners) engendered pliancy in the latter (1975). Operating through 
“disciplinary power,” Foucault argued that this panoptic system constrained human action to 
produce a human being who could be treated as a “docile body” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; 
Foucault, 1975). Once docile, Foucault argued that the system further exerted control over the 
individual in its implied power. Internalizing the disciplinary mechanisms of surveillance and 
punishment for unsuitable actions, individuals became productive members of the system out of 
fear of officially sanctioned disciplinary retaliation on their bodies. 
Beyond the prison walls, Foucault argued that other institutions such as the military, 
schools, and factories exerted similar forms of disciplinary power on the individual. With the 
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intent of producing a docile yet productive subject, disciplinary power was employed to 
constrain undesired actions with the intent of duly producing the individual as an object of and 
for the State. Thus, mechanisms of discipline slowly spread, subtle and seemingly innocuous as 
they filtered into political and organizational settings and came to structure social order (Dreyfus 
& Rabinow, 1982; Foucault; 1975).  
Foucault linked the rise of mechanisms of discipline to the apparatuses of State Control. 
He examined the military and the police as two institutions where disciplinary power organized 
and enforced the will of the state through strategic practices of surveillance and plays of power 
(1975, pp. 213-215). Within the military, disciplinary power primarily operated to structure the 
enlisted troops under the purview of the State, trained to effectively protect the State from 
external forces that would harm the social harmony within. Comparably, disciplinary power 
within the police system focused inward to the bodies contributing to the State. The police 
system functioned by monitoring the everyday activities of individuals to keep them in line with 
the greater social order of the State (Williams, 2007). In this fashion, then, the police system 
functioned as a ground-level mechanism of sovereign power. The scope of the State primarily 
expanded by and through the flow of disciplinary power that linked one system of authority and 
control to another through an interconnected web of power relations for the sake of social order. 
Extending Foucault, Helen Nissenbaum (2010) points out that the multimodal network of 
digital storage media ultimately contributes to a longstanding image of the individual as 
information. That is, in allowing personal information to be accessed and stored across multiple 
network nodes, disciplinary mechanisms become increasingly difficult for the individual to 
identify per se. The problem here is not that the mechanisms are invisible; rather, it is that 
mechanisms are so diffuse and seemingly unassailable such that the individual fails to recognize 
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the various social forces that now have access to and power over an his or her information. As a 
consequence of this “digital diffusion,” the individual slowly loses any sense of “personal” and 
“private” information in the face of a growing “public awareness” of the self (Foucault, 1975; 
Nissenbaum, 2010;). In essence, then, the neo-panoptic power afforded by digital storage 
technologies turns the “all-seeing” gaze increasingly inward, not simply to the individual qua 
society, but rather toward the individual’s sense of self and her expressions of that self.  
In the most extreme fashion, these disciplinary mechanisms can seem to enmesh the 
individual. If individuals are unable to point to the stores of information that may incriminate or, 
at the very least, implicate them, then the neo-panoptic power potentially constrains individual 
agency in how they express themselves and in what is known about them. Operating out of 
uncertainty for how one’s actions will be perceived, both in the present and in the future, the 
individual curtails self-expression to comply with what she observes around her. The 
“backstage” of the individual gives way to the “front stage” (Goffman, 1959), and she performs 
only the self she knows will be seen by all, as case study chapters exemplify. Compliant to the 
social order in which she is enmeshed, she not only acts as if she is being watched, she remains 
constantly skeptical of others and the diffuse systems of information that may exert their power 
on her at any time. She may, for example, avoid sharing her political beliefs, fearing judgment 
from others if ever she changes her positions. She may delete old posts, or she might delete her 
account altogether. Or she may go so far as to create separate accounts: a public-facing one 
where she is seen and known, and “personal,” perhaps even disposable, ones where she believes 
(however naively) she can engage with others with little to no repercussions.  
Digital media and the social web ultimately compel us to think about the diffuse nature of 
our information and our likeness in the content we share about others and ourselves. In 
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participating through digital media and the social web, and as we are hailed to through the 
“participatory condition” (Barney et al., 2017), users lose sight of the traces of information they 
cede to others. Individuals may also overlook the accumulation of personal information available 
in our email accounts, online database searches, purchases, and through social media that, 
through terms of service, become the property of the service providers and other entities 
enmeshed in the network of interconnected technologies (Mayer-Schönberger, 2010; 
Nissenbaum, 2010; see also Kirschenbaum, 2008 regarding storage capabilities of technologies). 
Email messages and database searches reveal personal interests and curiosities, shaping the ads 
individuals encounter online, as well as potentially revealing proclivities some individuals would 
rather keep private from others. Individual purchases and debts contribute to credit records, 
which determine and shape purchasing power, interest rates, as well as personal relationships. In 
the name of convenience and ease, individuals share the self as through carefully chosen bits and 
pieces they use to adorn their profiles on social media. Through their profiles, users allow others 
to visualize this carefully curated version of the self as they wish to appear, yet users are also at 
the mercy of any who would use the information shared online without accounting for context. 
And when individuals are no long a part of the network, either through personal volition or 




CHAPTER THREE:  
WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?:  
CONTEXTUALIZNG (COUNTER)SURVEILLANCE  
AND THREATS TO AUTHORITY 
Introduction 
“Get the fuck off the train,” Police Officer Anthony Pirone shouted at Oscar Grant in the 
early morning hours of January 1st, 2009 at the Fruitvale Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) station 
in Oakland, California. Complying with the demand, Grant slowly exited the train to join three 
other men who were sitting against the platform wall where Police Officer Marysol Domenici 
was stationed. Grant sat down, visibly shaken. Officer Pirone then returned to the train for 
another passenger believed to be involved in the allegedly drunken New Year’s Eve altercation 
to which he and Officer Domenici had been dispatched to investigate (People v. Mehserle, 
2009/2012). Numerous bystanders’ phones suddenly snapped on, recording the scenes before 
them as Officer Pirone returned to the train.  
Standing at the doors of a car, Officer Pirone screamed at Michael Greer, telling him to 
step off the train before he reached for Greer to force him off the train. As Pirone pulled Greer 
from the train by the back of his neck, Greer thrust about wildly. Attempting to subdue Greer, 
Pirone pushed him and knocked him off balance before sweeping his legs in a takedown 
maneuver. Pirone then handcuffed Greer, pinning his body to the ground with his knee, as Grant 
and the three other detained men rose to their feet and shouted, “This is fucked up, this is fucked 
up” (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). Officer Domenici hastily urged the detained men to “stand 
down,” but they continued to shout. Sensing that the situation might escalate further, Pirone 
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stood and moved toward the platform wall to provide support for Domenici, who now urged the 
detained men to return to a seated position. Protesting, the men moved in around Domenici until 
Pirone drew closer to the wall and struck Oscar Grant in the face with his fist. Forcing Grant to 
the ground, Pirone then unleashed his Taser and threatened to use it, as Domenici drew her Taser 
and pointed it at the protesting men. “Don’t tase me,” they shouted as they raised their hands and 
slowly lowered their bodies against the wall.  
With the allegedly drunken and disorderly individuals restrained, Officers Pirone and 
Domenici began to secure the detention area, but the tumult continued from the train as four men 
from one of the passenger cars approached. Domenici turned toward these men and ordered them 
to keep their distance. They shouted at her, decrying the display of violence they witnessed, but 
were soon intercepted by back-up forces dispatched to the scene: Officers Johannes Mehserle 
and Jon Woffinden.  Moving in on both the detained men and the four moving toward Domenici, 
Officers Mehserle and Woffinden enacted pacification tactics. Mehserle drew his Taser and 
pointed at the detained men, who began protesting once again, as Woffinden drew his baton and 
ordered the four men approaching Domenici to back away. Amidst the ensuing commotion, 
Pirone—the primary responding officer in charge of the scene—ordered Merhserle to arrest 
Oscar Grant, who had not been handcuffed like the three other detained men.  
Grant stood up, shouting, “Who can we talk to?” as Officers Pirone and Mehserle 
advanced toward him. Pirone yelled at Grant, calling him a “bitch-ass nigger” before knocking 
Grant to his stomach and pinning his head to the ground with his knee (People v. Mehserle, 
2009/2012). Grant cried, claiming he couldn’t breathe. “I quit. I surrender. I quit[,]” Grant 
continued (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). Mehserle then ordered Grant to give up his arms to 
handcuff him, but Grant argued that he could not move with his neck and upper back pinned by 
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Pirone. Mehserle pulled at Grant’s right arm once, twice, and then again, but it remained 
restrained under his body. Exclaiming that he could not get Grant’s hands free to cuff him, 
Mehserle yelled that he was going to tase Grant (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). Tugging at his 
right leg multiple times, Mehserle finally secured his device and pointed at Grant’s back. 
Mehserle then pulled the trigger of his gun, firing the ill-fated bullet that would end Grant’s life. 
Documented by various passengers using video applications on their mobile devices, the 
events surrounding the detainment and mortal wounding of Oscar Grant highlight ongoing 
concerns over the use of “necessary force” and also contribute to emerging discussions about the 
contested applications of surveillance and the role technology plays in both supporting and 
challenging authority and vindicating victims. Spontaneously captured by and informally 
directed at the police dispatched to the scene, the video documentation at the Fruitvale train 
station not only resituates the actions of both the officers and the men detained that night, it also 
challenges the formal written records of authority figures that serve as legal record and so justify 
the use of  “necessary force.” In this way, these video recordings serve as a form of “cop 
watching” and mobile sousveillance (Huey, Walby, & Doyle, 2006); however, the impromptu 
nature of these recordings both expands and contests the practice of “cop watching,” first, by 
subsuming circumstantial voyeurism as both a tool for social justice and a threat to authority, 
and, second, by making a case for perpetual documentation as a means of personal protection, 
public discourse, and media spectacle.   
Exploring the circumstances surrounding Oscar Grant’s death, the array of visual 
evidence captured during the altercation at the Fruitvale train station, and the court proceedings 
that ultimately led to Officer Mehserle’s involuntary manslaughter conviction, this chapter first 
contextualizes two perspectives of surveillance: first, as a perceived neutral, yet authoritative 
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form of documentation through visualization; and, second, as a “bottom-up” account of 
authority—also known as “sousveillance” (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003)—that often, though 
not always, coincides with social justice goals. Extending these perspectives to the mobile video 
technologies highlighted in the Grant case, this chapter then examines how circumstantial 
voyeurism functions as a form of sousveillance that perpetuates a discourse of information 
excess, which relies on imagery to affectively (re)shape public opinion. Similar to the late 19th 
Century when imagery was used in the American yellow press to galvanize public support for 
war against Spain, here sousveillance aims to resituate the relationship between citizens and the 
state by creating a “countervisuality” that challenges the commonly accepted authorial narrative. 
Concurrently, as a form of information power, the information excess produced by sousveillance 
is also supported by greater authorial systems of information aggregation and analysis. Focusing 
on this tension between surveillance and sousveillance, this chapter questions the allegedly 
emancipatory nature of documentation and visual evidence, and in so doing also assesses the role 
visual technologies play in law and law enforcement. 
Surveillance and The Seat of The State 
 Surveillance is an idea and a practice that serves a variety of functions. Derived, in 
theory, from the classical work of Jeremy Bentham in “The Panopticon Writings” (1787/1995), 
the concept of surveillance serves the authoritative practice of monitoring, or the “perpetual 
inspection,” of incarcerated individuals within an enclosed, yet all-encompassing structure that 
allows a central authority figure to watch each person housed within. Although the word 
“surveillance” is not used by Bentham, and his design for the panopticon never was built, per se, 
the Foucaultian-identified practice of a centralized authority monitoring others, criminal or 
otherwise, has developed into an social institution with far reaching powers. The modern prison 
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tower, for example, embodies aspects of Bentham’s ideas, yet the conceptual formation of the 
panopticon and the practice of surveillance extend well beyond prison walls.  
Beginning with historic authority figures such as kings and lords who enlisted forces to 
monitor and manage lands and holdings, surveillance primarily functioned as a form of 
containment under the veil of security (Garland, 2001). Subjects of a lord or king maintained his 
land through various agricultural practices and trades, and, through the social contract, the lord 
or king protected them from outside threats in exchange for their services. This exchange, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, required the formation of a hierarchical social organization that could 
exercise force over subjects in place of the lord or king while also maintaining his legitimacy and 
power. Employing guards, surveyors, and later, beadles and constables throughout the 1600s, 
lords and kings ceded part of their authority to institutional figures who would act on their behalf 
and report to them. Rudimentary, unorganized, and subject to corruption by wealthier vassals in 
its earliest iterations (Garland 2001; see also Williams, 2007, regarding organization, 
development, and institutionalization of watchmen), the system of enforcement and protection 
through intermediary authority figures gradually stabilized into a force that operated as an 
essential arm of the State whenever and wherever the key figures of the State could not be 
present. Under this arrangement, guards and other military forces protected the population from 
outside threats at the will of the lord or king, while the budding interior force ensured taxes were 
collected through constables and beadles, and that local areas were monitored and protected by 
watchmen who understood the local population.  
To ensure that the interior force maintained a level of legitimacy on par with the salience 
of military forces, kings and lords issued edicts that granted tax collectors and watchmen the 
abilities to use force, publically humiliate perpetrators, and, in extreme cases, punish the 
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fraudulent and the culpable. As the interior force became a greater feature of everyday life from 
the 1600s into the 1700s, it increasingly legitimated its presence by force of consequence 
(Neocleous, 2000; Williams, 2007). Tax collectors obtained monies through threat of violence 
and incarceration (Garland, 2001). Thugs and thieves, similarly, faced violence, incarceration, 
and death at the hands of watchmen working in tandem with military forces. By leveraging the 
threat of injury to self or loss of life, the interior force became a powerful entity that steadily 
shaped local practices as it curtailed the actions of individuals, criminal or otherwise.  
As a newer, developing presence of authority, the interior force did not enlist the 
bellicose tactics of the military. Unlike the militant arm of the state, the interior force maintained 
the fine line between individual agency—now increasingly restrained by force of consequence—
and state power. It could not, therefore, exercise a degree of aggressive force that might alienate 
subjects and citizens, yet neither could it be so lenient so as to render itself ineffective and cede 
control to the hands of the military. New tactics and procedures, in the form of coercive soft 
power, became the means through which it acted, enforced laws, and further fortified its 
presence (Neocleous, 2000). Among the array of soft power tactics employed by the interior 
force, none became more pervasive or powerful than surveillance. Through physical observation, 
information gathering, and ongoing documentation, bands of watchmen relied on the monitoring 
of others to prevent crimes, keep track of suspicious individuals and known criminals, and 
produce evidence of malicious intent in the event witnesses or other concrete evidence were not 
readily available. Surveillance allowed watchmen to convey an aura of authority, and as they 
gained power to use force against unlawful individuals, watchmen found support in local 
communities, the personal interests and day-to-day safety of which became the focus of their 
efforts (Neocleous, 2000). In Colonial America in the late 1600s, for example, city watch and 
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slave patrols gradually became features of local communities as white elites sought to protect 
their business interests. In cities, businesses, which previously employed personal guards to 
protect their properties when closed or not in service, increasingly relied on night watchmen to 
secure their premises. Similarly, nighttime patrols of plantations emerged as common practice. 
Slave owners, however, also employed hard power in the form of violent public displays that 
were intended to curtail the behaviors and actions of slaves and any sympathizers (Williams, 
2007). As citizens found greater security in watchmen forces that demonstrated greater presence 
and capabilities in preventing crimes and routing out those who might harm them, their loved 
ones, and their business interests, the interior force became a key feature of state power and 
social order. 
In the early 1700s in major cities in England and the United States, local watchmen of a 
particular borough banded together with those from other boroughs, and their surveillance 
services expanded from night watches to round the clock monitoring. Watchmen also began to 
work with their counterparts in other towns and cities to coordinate shifts and discuss known 
issues and perceived threats. These discussions fostered a centralized store of knowledge about 
criminal activity each band of watchmen could refer to and rely on, and they also justified the 
importance of an ongoing interior force mediating between the state and the lives of citizens. In 
having a working shared knowledge about a town or city, borough by borough and population by 
population, watchmen forces grew throughout the 1700s and became centralized networks of 
enlisted officials who could predict criminal acts with greater accuracy, monitor suspicious 
individuals with more awareness, and provide more physically present and perceptibly stronger 
security (Williams, 2007).  
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Networked, institutionalized, and visibly positioned within various cities and towns by 
the late 1700s and early 1800s, these watchmen became the discernable arm of the state we now 
know as the police. By subdividing and diversifying the presence of the state into more localized 
forces vested with authority, state power extended its presence and reach into the lives of its 
subjects, citizens, and, eventually, others perceived as enemies. No longer constituted as a 
singular entity in the key figure of state, state power instead became an array of social 
organizations and institutions that served the central authority by performing specific functions 
aimed at managing, controlling, and curtailing the actions of individuals which might threaten 
social stability, national unity, and sovereign power (Neocleous, 2000). State power, therefore, 
became both the insurer and destroyer of life through law and its military and police forces that 
upheld the law (see Foucualt, 1977 regarding biopower; also Graham, 2010 regarding police 
force, militarization, and externalization of threat). Able to intercede in the everyday affairs of 
individuals and able to affect whole populations within its geographical confines through police 
action and those beyond its borders through military action, state power came to support 
surveillance, information gathering, and record-keeping. It did so to maintain control at a 
distance and, where necessary, to eliminate perceived threats. 
Who Watches Whom?: Police Power and Policing the Police 
Direct observation and informant-based surveillance allowed watchmen to carry out their 
mission, and, in many ways, fostered a deeper connection between them and the communities 
they served (Williams, 2007; see also Biber, 2007 regarding direct observation and witness 
testimony). Yet, as newer technologies emerged—the various uses of which had yet to be fully 
determined—authority figures and citizens learned new ways to share information. Such 
practices created more awareness of the personal lives of everyone and exposed and abstracted 
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new aspects of the physical body, as well as empowered the state to further encroach upon the 
lives of citizens and enemies alike. In particular, as visual technologies such as the camera 
became further integrated into the practices of law enforcement, technology allowed police 
forces to catalogue individuals and gradually create visual records as early as the mid 19th 
Century.  
As the camera became integrated within law enforcement, it was perceived as producing 
a neutral, ostensibly objective depiction of individuals in the form of photographic evidence that 
could be used in legal proceedings (Chinn, 2000). Compared to witness testimonies, which were 
potentially biased and fallible, photographs came to be seen as a means of establishing objective 
truth (Biber, 2007). Photos depicted a scene, they positioned a person in time, and they 
documented a person’s actions to the extent they were captured in images. In so doing, law 
enforcement objectified citizens as products of the state that could pose potential threats to State 
power (Neocleous, 2000). The growing repository (and arsenal) of photographs of individuals 
not only became a form of record keeping for law enforcement, then, it was also a form of power 
that could potentially be used against any individual if employed without his knowledge and 
consent (Wall & Linneman, 2014). Therefore, as laws granted police the power and authority to 
maintain social order, photographic evidence and record sharing imbued the police with 
hegemonic authority that visually distributed state power across geographic space to citizens, a 
condition encapsulated in what Nicholas Mirzoeff (2011) calls “visuality.”  
The visual field of photography, however, was limited as it only portrayed individuals 
and scenes as stationary objects frozen in time. As newer visual and, later, biological 
technologies such as finger prints and the video camera emerged in the 19th and 20th Centuries, 
respectively, police forces gradually integrated them into their practice. In particular, as video 
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cameras became more reliable and portable, police began to use them to produce newer forms of 
evidence and records. In-car cameras or dashcams, which were introduced in the 1960s and later 
generally integrated into American police force practices in the mid 1980s due to the grassroots 
efforts of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), allowed police to document culpable 
individuals during routine stops and police chases (IACP, 2004). Compared to stationary images, 
the moving image introduced greater context, as it constituted action in a tangible form one could 
visualize. Yet, as a tool employed by law enforcement, in-car cameras further supported the 
authorial accounts of police by capturing a single angle of the altercation framed from the 
perspective of law enforcement. Video, therefore, expanded the visuality of police, yet it also 
engendered questions about police action and authority in practice as individuals were further 
enabled to “witness” scenes in ways they were not able to before. 
Against the hegemonic visual field of the state perpetuated by institutions of authority 
through technology, people and communities frequently targeted by the police and other state 
institutions gradually enlisted visual technologies such as photography and video to challenge 
authority, ensure greater accountability, and create a counter-visuality that resituates the 
relationship between the state and its citizens though “sousveillance” (see Mann et al., 2003). 
Employing technology to scrutinize police action and keep police accountable through the tactic 
of “countersurveillance” (Huey et al., 2006; Monahan, 2006), activist groups, alternative media, 
and everyday citizens have turned the camera (and other forms of evidence) on police to recast 
the dynamic social force of the (moving) image in their favor, or, at the very least, to disrupt the 
authority so often claimed by the police. Kindled in part by George Holliday’s filming of the 
1991 beating of Rodney King Jr. by Los Angeles police officers, which led to a fiery media 
spectacle and rebellious riots in 1992, countersurveillance tactics have become more public, 
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pervasive, and—through newer technological applications—more subtle, spreadable, and 
unplanned.   
In formal cop watch programs, citizens and activists publically document and share the 
actions of the police they monitor, track, and record in photos, videos, and audio recordings. By 
documenting the array of actions and abuses executed by police and other authority figures, 
formal cop watch programs have publically pressured police forces to conduct themselves with 
greater integrity. Leveraging personally documented audiovisual evidence in public to spark 
public discourse, protests, media spectacle, and, in extreme cases, riots, formal cop watch 
programs aim to provide greater context that properly situates the “objective” accounts provided 
by authority figures (Huey et al., 2006). Originating in Berkeley, California in 1990 when 
Copwatch, a formal, voluntary copwatch program, was formed, cop watch programs and 
organizations have since expanded across America, Canada, and Europe as a response to the 
potentially abusive practices of police forces.  
Impromptu recordings of police action through cell phones, correspondingly, have also 
contributed to the project of countersurveillance, yet the unplanned nature of these recordings 
does not wholly serve the ongoing counter-archive that “sousveillance” portends. Indeed, 
impromptu recordings, facilitated by cellphone and proprietary mobile video applications that 
upload to a data cloud and others such as the American Civil Liberties Union’s “Police Tape” 
and the ACLU Blue app, help contextualize police action as it ‘naturally’ occurs; but they, too, 
are subject to interpretation and a critique of context. While these applications and recordings 
allow concerned citizens and targeted individuals to “securely and discreetly record and store 
interactions with the police” as a part of their direct experience (ACLU-NJ, n.d.), they may 
obfuscate the context of any encounter by omitting circumstantial information and relying on 
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stereotypical, often “implicitly” racist, interpretations of police. Concurrently, “objective” 
evidence found in official police footage must also contend with context and the omission of 
circumstantial information to manage its visuality (Wall & Linneman, 2014; see also Biber, 
2007). Yet, the formalized nature and routine procedure of documenting suspicious others 
supports the hegemonic power of the police—and therefore the state—which profoundly affords 
police footage greater authority in the eyes of law. Hence, the ultimate contribution of 
subversive, unplanned recordings to the project of countersurveillance is a form of 
deconstruction—of actors, actions, motives, and outcomes. 
If the most powerful contribution of impromptu recordings is the deconstruction of 
authorial narratives, then perpetual documentation through circumstantial voyeurism might be 
the best technique individuals enlist to counter the visuality of the state maintained by the police 
and other institutions of authority. Yet, because circumstantial voyeurism contributes to a 
fetishization of staring—of discreetly watching and sharing information about self and other 
regardless of social status, situation, or future effects—it finds oblique support in the greater 
authorial systems of information aggregation and analysis (Wall & Linneman, 2014). By 
indirectly and inadvertently contributing to the accretion of personally identifiable information 
and the categorization of individuals through narrowly defined social scripts and media frames 
based on classifications of race, ethnicity, sex, and age, circumstantial voyeurism fundamentally 
positions the police and the policed in prearranged roles that both affirm authority and perpetuate 
the visuality of the state by way of “perceived” threats (Mirzoeff, 2011; Neocleous, 2000). 
Therefore, even as circumstantial voyeurism invites others to witness an event devoid of context 
and to participate in the interpretation of the event in attempts to situate the context, the rhetoric 
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of the “perceived threat” to self, to institutions of authority, and/or to the state works to support 
the necessity of surveillance, documentation, and force to maintain social order.  
Due to the ongoing documentation of police through formal watch programs and 
impromptu recordings that often position police as perpetrators of vicious acts through 
antagonistic frames, countersurveillance has been met with uncertainty, hostility, and outright 
aggression. As a challenge to the visuality of the state, the practice of “watching the watchers” 
has led to what Tyler Wall and Travis Linnemann (2014) describe as a figurative and literal “war 
on cameras”: figuratively, as police forces feel threatened by the potential misrepresentation of 
the public documentation of their duties; and, literally, as police forces have confiscated, deleted, 
and destroyed visual evidence captured by bystanders. While photographing and recording police 
in public are legal, the documentation and public critique of police practices—whether 
intentional or accidental, formal or unplanned—poses a threat to police power as it falls outside 
the authority of the police who are keen on deciding what is and is not authorized (Wall & 
Linnemann, 2014). Photographs, videos, and audio recordings by non-authority figures, despite 
the perhaps ironic support such uses confer on the overall ethics of surveillance, provide 
unauthorized accounts that challenge the singular, unified narrative police rely on to affirm their 
authority and maintain social order.   
Camera Wars in the Case of People v. Mehserle 
The fatal shooting of Oscar Grant was not the only shocking occurrence at the Fruitvale 
BART station in Oakland, California on the morning of January 1st, 2009. As Grant lay bleeding 
on the ground from the bullet that pierced his back, the situation escalated beyond the officers’ 
abilities to craft a conclusive narrative of subduing the drunken and disorderly and maintaining 
control of the scene. Officers saw passengers from various train cars with cellphones pointed at 
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them, anyone of them having potentially documented the entire event from the moment they 
started recording. Attempting to contain the array of evidence housed on these devices, police 
demanded that passengers hand over their phones. Though the police had no legal authority to 
confiscate the cell phones, they behaved as if they had the authority to do so. Officers coerced 
passengers to comply with their orders and even swiped some of the devices out of the hands of 
passengers (Miller, 2009).  
Yet, though they seized numerous devices, they failed to seize control of the scene. As 
the train finally left the station, the police could only wait to see what would happen next. Within 
minutes of returning home, several witnesses who had retained their phones uploaded their 
videos to YouTube. Including descriptions with “police brutality,” “unnecessary force,” and 
“another black death” (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012), the numerous videos captured the 
aggressive use of force by police officers and soon generated a media spectacle when local news 
media picked up the story and used the videos to galvanize the local public to demand justice for 
the death of Oscar Grant.  
Formal evidence in the shooting death of Oscar Grant came from autopsies of Grant’s 
body, witness testimony, platform surveillance video, and cellphone videos taken by five BART 
passengers. Because surveillance footage was limited in capturing the events surrounding the 
shooting, the prosecution moved to admit the cellphone videos that BART passengers recorded 
before, during, and after the event (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). Taken by Karina Vargas, 
Tommy Cross, Daniel Liu, Margarita Carazo, and Jamil Dewar, the five videos broadened the 
scope of the case by contrasting against the narratives provided by each officer dispatched to the 
scene and by further challenging the defense’s testimony of an accidental shooting motivated by 
circumstantial stress. A form of informal, impromptu cop watching, these videos became crucial 
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evidence in People v. Mehserle (2009/2012), particularly as they provided insight into Officer 
Johannes Mehserle’s state of mind and actions, and as they resituated the context of that fateful 
morning through various angles and perspectives. 
Because the prosecution charged Officer Mehserle with second-degree murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, and the lesser verdict of involuntary manslaughter, all circumstantial evidence 
centered on the question of intent to kill. Using the cellphone videos to highlight the aggressive 
force exerted by Officers Pirone and Mehserle during the altercation, the prosecution argued that 
Pirone’s physically hostile actions initially compelled passengers to record the events, which 
appeared both indecorous and unbefitting of an officer on duty during New Year’s Eve (People 
v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). Citing Pirone’s forceful handling of Greer as confirmed by witness 
testimony, the prosecution reasoned that it was Pirone’s display of unrestrained force that 
inextricably intensified the situation and later motivated Mehserle to employ aggressive force 
(People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012).  
Using the cellphone videos to corroborate this claim, the prosecution posited that 
Pirone’s erratic actions and intense takedowns of both Greer and Grant not only subdued both, 
they also carried the intention of quelling the uproar emerging from the passenger cars as the 
men previously detained by Prione protested the extreme use of force. When Mehserle arrived on 
the scene, therefore, the atmosphere was already charged with hostility, fear, and distrust. The 
prosecution argued that Mehserle fed off of Pirone’s aggressiveness as he approached Grant and 
followed Prione’s orders (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). Again, citing the cellphone videos, 
the prosecution noted that the situation escalated when four other men from one of the passenger 
cars approached Officers Domenici and Woffinden. Although Woffinden managed to pacify 
them, the perceived threat of instability between the detained men and the crowd of onlookers, 
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the prosecution reasoned, contributed to Mehserle’s heightened emotional stress and lack of 
mental acuity. Provoked by Pirone and attempting to quell the growing tumult, Mehserle 
reached, not for his Taser as he had claimed, but rather his gun to forcibly subdue Grant and 
thereby to indirectly subdue the crowd. 
As the prosecution established its case against Mehserle through witness testimony, 
autopsies of Grant’s body, and cellphone videos, the defense dismantled the question of intent to 
kill. While video evidence exposed Pirone’s aggressive actions, the defense argued that it did not 
indicate that Mehserle had a malicious intent to kill Grant or any others that early morning 
(People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). Citing the cellphone videos, the defense argued that the 
shooting was accidental, particularly as the expression of shock appeared on the faces of both 
Mehserle and Pirone after the intense display of force took a deadly turn. To support this claim, 
the defense brought a nonlethal force expert to the stand and questioned him on the training and 
usage of Tasers by the police force and the emotional stress that may impair personal judgment 
during a contentious event (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). The expert testified that all 
California police forces, like many of their national counterparts, were trained in the usage of 
Tasers and, in California, had to complete eight hours of training. The training highlighted how 
to use the device, and the possible physical harm it could cause to victims with medical 
conditions, whether stated, known, or unknown.  
The expert conceded that, in times of crises, impaired judgment due to heightened 
emotional stress led individuals trained in nonlethal force to sometimes lose track of their 
devices on their person, which could ultimately result in increased physical altercations between 
police and assailants and the use of unintended lethal force (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). 
Cross-examining the expert, the prosecution argued that Officer Mehserle had received training 
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in nonlethal force and that he knew which side of his person his firearm was on and which side 
his Taser was on. The expert conceded this fact, but rebutted that extreme circumstantial stress 
provoked by tension on the scene can lead to a demonstrated effect in officers misidentifying the 
location of the nonlethal option on their person (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012).  
Citing the cellphone videos that showed Mehserle struggling to grasp the device at his 
right side and the look of horror on his face immediately after he fired his gun, the defense 
reasoned that he did not shoot Grant with the intention of killing him. Conceding that Pirone 
escalated the tension of the scene, the defense posited that Mehserle became a victim of extreme 
emotional stress that clouded his judgment and led to his misidentification of his Taser. Against 
the indictment of voluntary manslaughter, the defense furthered that Mehserle, having arrived 
late to the scene, only intended to subdue Grant and the other detained men per Pirone’s orders. 
Noting that Mehserle followed Prione’s demands to try and cuff Grant and that Mehserle 
exclaimed that he was going to subdue Grant upon his inability to get a hold of Grant’s wrists, 
the defense reasoned that the cellphone videos—along with witness testimonies and official 
police records—only confirmed Mehserle’s inability to conduct himself “with a clear head” in 
stressful altercations (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). According to the defense, the failure was 
that Mehserle not only misidentified nonlethal force on his person, but also that he, and other 
police officers, were not adequately trained in real-life scenarios that demanded the use of 
nonlethal means to subdue individuals. As a result, the defense concluded that Mehserle did not 
fail to perform his legal duties on the fateful night; instead, they argued, his actions were 
symptomatic of the failure of police forces far and wide to employ nonlethal tactical training as 
extensively as lethal tactical training (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). 
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As the prosecution and defense rested their cases, the jury began deliberation. Reviewing 
the charges of second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and the lesser verdict of 
involuntary manslaughter, the jury deliberated the extent to which Mehserle was aware of his 
actions in the heat of the moment. Focusing on the cellphone videos, the jury assessed witness 
and expert testimony alike and determined that Mehserle was not fully aware of his person or his 
actions (People v. Mehserle, 2009/2012). Considering the three indictments against Mehserle, 
the jury reached its verdict and found him guilty only of the lesser charge of involuntary 
manslaughter. Citing Mehserle’s failure to uphold his duties to protect the lives of others, the 
jury concluded that Mehserle did not willfully kill Oscar Grant; instead, Mehserle exercised 
decidedly poor judgment due to misidentification of his Taser and his poor mental acuity during 
the heated event.  
The Contextual (Picture) Frame  
The “camera wars” highlighted in People v. Mehserle (2009/2012) demonstrated how 
visual evidence contextualized the events surrounding the death of Oscar Grant. By turning the 
camera on police officers in an unplanned and circumstantial act of watching, witnesses 
employed technology to document, share, and make sense of the violent display of police force 
they experienced. This allowed visual evidence not only to contrast the typical legal record 
furnished by police forces in trials, it also galvanized the public to reconsider how police enforce 
order and how they physically exercise their authority. Because these impromptu recordings 
illustrated a microcosm of the perceived racist displays of force performed by police, moreover, 
they performed the project of countersurveillance. By contributing to the ongoing documentation 
and counter-archive of police force, these videos challenged the authoritative narrative of the 
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police by broadening the context of the shooting to include various interpretations, perspectives, 
and voices cast as authority due to their direct experiences of the scene.  
These videos and the eventual hearing, however, only momentarily challenged the 
visuality of the police. Subject to interpretation, the videos broadened the context so crucial to 
making sense of the event, yet they also exposed the racial politics surrounding police force and 
the almost innate system of power accorded to the visual image (Biber, 2007; see also Williams, 
2007). Summoning the specter of the 1991 beating of Rodney King Jr. by Los Angeles police 
officers, the videos of the Oscar Grant shooting were used to highlight the ways specific officers 
dispatched to the scene exerted extreme force toward racial others and further enlivened the 
entrenched socio-political concerns surrounding the police’s visuality (see Wall & Linneman, 
2014).  
The documentation of Officer Pirone’s expressions and actions, in particular, 
demonstrated his racist motivations that undoubtedly shaped both the intensification of the event 
and its fateful outcome. In violently manhandling Greer and Grant, and in purportedly calling 
them “niggers” (People v. Mehserle 2009/2012), Pirone’s actions resurrected the specter of 
Rodney King Jr. and its racial tensions. As a white man of authority armed with weapons and 
supported by capable counterparts, Pirone always had more power and agency than any of the 
men he was tasked with handling on the scene due to his position alone. His display of extreme 
force coupled with racist undertones, therefore, only extended the hegemonic supremacy of the 
police acting to pacify perceived threats most noticeably found in bodies of difference (see Wall 
& Linneman, 2014; see also Williams, 2007). Pirone’s actions, more so than Mehserle’s, then, 
perpetuated the culturally entrenched bias against authority and its association with domineering 
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white patriarchy (see Mirzoeff, 2011).9  It was Pirone, the primary responding officer tasked with 
both handling the detainment of aggressors and maintaining peace in the situation, who 
remarkably failed in his duties and whose actions sparked the powder keg of racial tension and 
police brutality. 
Yet, because Mehserle shot Grant and because racial tension and distrust for authority 
already infused the situation due to Prione’s actions, Mehserle became the central incendiary 
figure charged with the failure “to protect and to serve.” The damning evidence contained in the 
videos challenged the police’s visuality, or rather, the hold on authority and ability to maintain 
order in the public eye (Wall & Linneman, 2014). Against the police’s visuality, media coverage 
of the Grant case established the context of the shooting by abstracting the primary actors from 
the videos and placing them in reductive, dichotomous frames. Positioning Mehserle as the sole 
police officer and aggressor who killed Grant, an innocent black man, media coverage affirmed 
the visual evidence as “definitive proof” without broader consideration of the other actors who 
shaped the event and its outcome (see Biber, 2007 regarding context of photographic ways of 
knowing and the taxonomy of knowledge associated with visual evidence). In “captioning the 
event” for the public, the media shaped its context; its captioning overly emphasized racial 
tensions through its reductive framing, which ultimately resulted in an attack on the character of 
Mehserle and other police officers rather than a deconstruction of the police’s visuality.  
Despite the diversification of context that the cellphone recordings illuminated about that 
early morning, media coverage, reductive interpretations, and culturally entrenched distrust of 
authority fundamentally shaped the way in which the footage was received by the public. Rather 
                                                
9 Pirone claims he did not call any of the detained men by the racial slur. Video evidence, moreover, does not 
conclusively show that Pirone said the racial slur. Numerous eyewitness testimonies, that corroborated Pirone’s 
aggressive actions, however, cited his racial invective as the motivating force behind their recordings and 
willingness to testify against him and Mehserle. 
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than combat the police’s visuality in the legal proceedings, these impromptu recordings instead 
became part and parcel of the case that ultimately recontextualized the authority of the police to 
maintain order and properly carry out its duties. These unplanned recordings, therefore, 
contributed to the counter-archive (and arsenal) of information championed by the practice of 
countersurveillance, yet they also afforded both news media and law to interpret the event and 
establish contexts that primarily supported their particular, and often narrow, frames (Wall & 
Linnemann, 2014; see also Biber, 2007).  
Whereas news media portrayed the case through the frame of “police brutality” in the 
court of public opinion, law placed the burden of proof on the prosecution to demonstrate 
whether Mehserle intended to kill Grant. Because the defense assumed the benefit of 
presumption, as it does in all cases, it only needed to cast “reasonable doubt” on any of the 
arguments brought forth by the prosecution. In supporting the State, moreover, the defense had 
the added advantage of citing legal precedent that affirmed police authority (see Wall & 
Linneman, 2014 regarding evidence and law as fundamental support for State authority). 
Therefore, as the prosecution established its case against Mehserle through witness testimony 
and the impromptu recordings, it challenged the authority of the police and their abilities to 
properly execute their duties. Against the dominant visuality of the police supported by the law 
and further affirmed by the defense, the prosecution wrestled with intentionality and ultimately 
failed to indict Mehserle on charges of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. 
Despite these failings, shaped in part by the lack of conclusive evidence regarding 
Mehserle’s motivations and mental state, the prosecution did succeed in challenging the police’s 
visuality and opened up a public dialogue that critiqued the use of force in pacifying assailants 
and witnesses alike. Aided by the impromptu recordings, which crucially illustrated the context 
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of the event beyond the singular narrative proffered by police, the prosecution showed that the 
police failed to properly perform their duties with respect to the safety of those they were 
enlisted to protect and serve. Mehserle’s indictment for involuntary manslaughter served as both 
a punishment and a warning to police. 
At the same time, Mehserle’s indictment fueled greater distrust of the public by police 
forces far and wide. Seen by police as an attack on police visuality and the authority of the State, 
the final verdict of People v. Mehserle (2009/2012) contributed to an enduring negative reception 
of cop watching, cameras, and, increasingly, social media by police forces. While the verdict 
attempted to temper police force by holding police officers accountable for their actions, it 
reproduced concerns that countersurveillance threatens police visuality by challenging the 
authority of the police to respond to and manage crime scenes.    
When those from “below” turn the camera on those in power, institutions of authority 
fear how their actions and image will be taken out of context. Yet, as this chapter highlights, 
countersurveillance and the visual array of evidence it illuminates remain subject to context and 
interpretation. Consequently, countersurveillance does not necessarily generate all the 
emancipatory ideals of information sharing that it portends. Though countersurveillance aids in 
the deconstruction of an event by a single source or from multiple sources, the evidence is still 
subject to interpretation in the court of law and in the minds of those who view it. Within the 
confines of law, visual ways of looking and knowing still contend with the systems of authority 
that support and reify “necessary” action to maintain social order (Biber, 2007). Visual evidence 
may, therefore, serve institutions of authority more as law fundamentally supports them and as 
the alleged “objectivity” of authority figures often carries greater influence in legal proceedings.  
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As People v. Mehserle highlights, and as Chapter Five extends, law must be made to 
better contextualize non-State evidence. Whether evidence is collected through 
countersurveillance tactics from mobile devices or an individual obtaining screenshots of 
harassing messages shared online, law must adapt to better represent the diversification of 
“authority” that is produced as digital media and the social web encourage and rely on greater 
documentation of self and other. As visual evidence in the form of photographs, videos, and 
images has become a form of personal expression and documentation of everyday life as part of 
the “participatory condition” (Barney et al., 2016), it has become a means through which citizens 
speak to each other and to society. When law primarily supports accounts from authority figures 
because they are deemed to be “neutral,” then, it does violence to democracy by ignoring or 
outright denying the voices of the citizens that law itself is supposed to protect.  
Where visual evidence is perceived as a threat to authority and the State, it appears that 
the culturally entrenched visuality of the State and the police must be met, not only with visual 
evidence, but also with additional and adequate forms of contextualization that resituate the role 
of police to protect and serve. Perceived as “unauthorized” and “abstracted from the source” 
(Wall & Linnemann, 2014), evidence produced by countersurveillance tactics contrasts the 
alleged “objectivity” of authorial narratives to expose inconsistencies in testimony and action. In 
contrasting the hegemonic visuality of the State (Mirzoeff, 2011), these forms of evidence 
essentially contest the application of police power and, by extension, the power of the State by 
(re)introducing subjectivity and extending context. Countersurveillance tactics, therefore, appear 
to contribute to the destabilization of authority in the eyes of law enforcement, yet they 
fundamentally operate to clarify and reestablish the relationship between citizen and State by 
drawing attention to “necessary force” and “intent,” and giving great voice to citizens in legal 
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proceedings. In so doing, countersurveillance tactics implicitly bring the question of integrity to 
bear on those entrusted to protect us from unnecessary harm and the systems that support them 
with the aim of making sure justice is equally applied to all. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
DAMAGE WITHOUT INJURY: THE HARMS OF VISUALITY  
IN OUR TECHNOLOGICALLY MEDIATED SOCIETY 
 
Introduction 
Weeks after the freeway collision that ended Nichole “Nikki” Catsouras’ life, her father, 
Christos Catsouras, a Los Angeles real-estate agent, opened an email that appeared to contain a 
property listing. In an instant, the severed head of Nikki appeared on the screen captioned with 
the words: “Woohoo Daddy! Hey daddy! I’m still alive” (Bennett, 2009). Christos had not seen 
this image before, neither had he seen any of the other photographs taken by California Highway 
Patrol officers at the site of his daughter’s fatal collision. Yet, this gruesome image could not be 
unseen, and, as the entire Catsouras family would soon realize, it would be only one of many 
photographs of Nikki to surface online. 
The photographs of Nikki’s dismembered body quietly spread from the California 
Highway Patrol (CHP) officer’s cameras to individuals neither connected to the ongoing 
investigation into the collision nor the Catsouras family. Initially sent via email by two CHP 
officers to their family and friends, the images were quickly forwarded on to others, posted to 
websites, and saved on personal computers and mobile devices from which they would later 
resurface and recirculate across the internet and mobile technologies. As the photographs of 
Nikki's body spread across the web, they not only exposed the sometimes dark and 
fundamentally diffusive power of digital sharing, they also exemplified the ease through which 
images become decontextualized as they traverse time and space through digital 
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technologies. Stemming from the misconduct of two CHP officers, the postmortem replication 
and dissemination of Nikki's body in images resituates the trust and authority placed in police 
and authority figures by, first, showing how documentation becomes a tool and a means of 
power over individuals, even in an act of dereliction; and, second, how digital technologies 
outpace current law, leading to potentially grave consequences for individuals, their families, and 
institutions of authority. 
This chapter begins with the events surrounding Nikki's death and the family’s lawsuits 
against the CHP. It examines the implications of the verdicts adjudicated in these lawsuits in 
order to argue that individuals collectively render the source/body depicted in an image shared 
online as separate from its embodied corporeal form, and that they do so by overlooking the 
importance of body materiality in relation to context and social attachments to others in favor of 
emphasizing an initially personalized, and subsequently collective, online interpretation of this 
body’s identity and context. Afforded physical, emotional, and personal distance from the 
source/body though connective media, individuals engage in a form of disassociation that allows 
them to fetishize and objectify the source/body, progressively rendering it a malleable object of 
public interpretation that becomes infused with personal beliefs, social values, and/or collective 
judgments of morality until such time as it has lost its charms as a fetish object.  
Even as the source/body becomes an object of intense social approbation or humiliation, 
it remains an abstraction of the person depicted; yet the humiliated person (assuming she or he is 
alive) and those with whom she or he associates profoundly feel the effects of this collective 
interpretation. I call this process “crowdsourced morality,” and contend that it seems to place on 
the person in question not only a contemporary “scarlet letter” that serves to categorize and 
distinguish “aberrant behavior” juxtaposed to the categorizer’s personal feelings about order in 
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the world (read: truthiness) or otherwise decorous social norms, but that it is also a product of the 
technologies individuals use that extends their distance from the original source/body as well as 
extending the collective engagement with it as an object of commentary and critique.10  
Cannot Be Unseen: Resituating the Scene 
In the early afternoon of October 31st, 2006, Nikki Catsouras slipped past her mother, 
grabbed the keys to her father’s Porsche, and took off from her home in his car. As it roared to a 
start, Nikki’s mother, Lesli, ran from the kitchen to see Nikki backing toward the road. Though 
Lesli screamed for her daughter to come back, Nikki sped down the road. Uncertain of Nikki’s 
mental state due to her frequent bouts of psychosis stemming from hereditary brain conditions, 
Lesli called her husband, Christos, in the hope that he could track Nikki down before she hurt 
herself or someone else. Christos, who happened to be driving back to work after lunching at the 
house, reassured his wife that he would find Nikki and then drove in the direction in which she 
allegedly disappeared. 
Weaving through traffic, Christos glimpsed a sign to report drunk drivers and, in a 
moment of panic, called emergency services to report his daughter and seek assistance. As the 
dispatcher obtained the necessary details of the stolen vehicle, Christos noticed two California 
Highway Patrol (CHP) cars speed past him. Concerned, Christos inquired about any recent 
accidents in the area. The dispatcher replied that an accident had occurred in the area, but that 
details could not be immediately provided. The dispatcher assured Christos that police had been 
                                                
10 My theory of crowdsourced morality differs from its articulation in artificial intelligence (AI). In AI, 
crowdsourced morality is a term referring to a developmental process where AI learns to act ethically based on a 
framework composed of an aggregation of collective moral views of a crowd on various issues. The logic behind 
crowdsourced morality in AI is that it can help technologies respond in ethical ways that an average person might 
respond. For example, if a self-driving car is speeding toward pedestrians in a crosswalk, should it attempt to hit a 
light pole? Should it hit three adults but spare all children? In this work, crowdsourced morality follows a similar 
logic in that individuals share their opinions and thoughts to foment collective action in favor or against a 
phenomenon, but there is no connection to technologies learning from and responding to the aggregation of 
responses from the crowd. 
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dispatched to look for his daughter and that they would update him immediately if they found her 
or the Porsche. 
Christos continued his search, but after driving around for almost two hours without any 
updates or leads the reality of the moment began to set in. He drove back toward the toll road 
where he had seen police cars dispatched. Nearing Alton Parkway, he noticed that the road was 
closed and flooded with first responders and patrol vehicles. Pulling up to the blockade, he 
stepped out of his car and asked the nearest officer for specifics about the accident. The 
responder evaded Christos’s questions, urging him to step away from the blockade to let the 
police continue their investigation. Beyond the officer, Christos saw a crane pulling debris from 
the accident scene. The glimmering of a chrome wheel caught Christos’s eye, and that was when 
he knew. 
Christos decided to return home until he had proof of the horrific loss he already felt. Met 
by his visibly shaken wife, Christos informed her that the police would arrive soon and as they 
waited for the police, Helen, their next-door neighbor and friend, gathered with them as red and 
blue lights approached their house. An officer exited his car and asked to speak with Christos 
and Lesli. Helen urged everyone to come into her home. Christos and Lesli agreed, following 
Helen into the house with the officer and coroners behind, who once inside, explained the details 
of the accident: A black 911 Porsche Carrera registered under Christos Catsouras was involved 
in a fatal accident. The occupant was a single teenage female. Traveling around 100 miles per 
hour, the vehicle had spun out of control after clipping another car while attempting to pass and 
sailed end-over-end across the southbound lanes until it collided with a concrete tollbooth. The 
occupant died instantly. No others were harmed in the accident. 
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Christos asked to see Nikki or any remnants of her, but the officer declined his request. 
Unbeknownst to Christos and Lesli, Nikki’s body had been so gruesomely torn apart during the 
accident that the coroner would not allow them to identify her body (Bennett, 2009). Instead, the 
officer assured Christos and Lesli that the CHP would take care of the ongoing case and inform 
them of the final findings. Soon after, Lesli and Christos informed Nikki’s siblings of her death.  
Two weeks later, Lesli’s brother, Geoff, received a call from a neighbor who told him about 
some disturbing photos he had received in an email. Images of the crash site and Nikki’s body 
appeared in his inbox, masked as a chain email. Geoff began investigating the matter. He enlisted 
the aid of Pepi Catsouras, Christos’s brother. Together, Geoff and Pepi contacted various senders 
and recipients of the emails, and asked them to cease forwarding the email, delete the images, 
and to tell others to do the same. Geoff then contacted the CHP and inquired about the 
dissemination of the photos. Geoff learned that someone from the CHP offices with access to the 
case file emailed photographs to others outside of the force. When Geoff pressed for a name and 
a motive, the sergeant he spoke with assured him that the situation would “just blow over” and 
that he needed to remain calm (Catsouras, 2012, p. 102). Geoff, however, knew that the situation 
was escalating, and that he had to get to Christos and Lesli before either received one of the 
emails or news of the circulating images. 
Geoff and Pepi drove to the Catsouras’s and explained the situation to Lesli. From there, 
they set up a base of operations: Pepi monitored emails and sent requests to individuals, while 
Geoff created a list of people who spread the emails in order to track down the original sender. 
When Christos came home from work, they notified him about the peculiar situation before 
them. The family worked together to stop the spread of the images, but it was too late. In the 
days that followed, the images appeared on various websites, some dedicated to “hardcore 
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pornography and death,” and others as seemingly innocuous as a fake MySpace page dedicated 
to Nikki Catsouras (Bennett, 2009). Despite Geoff’s requests to remove the images, individuals 
continued to share them online and even to threaten him and the Catourases for infringing on 
their purported right to free speech (Catsouras, 2012, p. 115). Worse, there was no way to stop 
the spread of the images, which became linked to the search term “Catsouras” on almost every 
search engine, causing them, for example, to pop up alongside Christos’s name and his realty 
listings. The situation seemed never-ending until Geoff uncovered information about how the 
photographs might have spread beyond the CHP offices: Whoever initially emailed the photos 
sent them to his or her friends and family as “a Halloween prank” (Catsouras, 2012, p. 113). 
Lesli and Christos then turned their frustrations toward the police who had promised to protect 
their family. 
A call to the coroner’s office provided information that served as the grounds for the 
eventual lawsuit. The coroner expressed her condolences to the Catsourases and asked if the 
CHP was helping them figure out who leaked the photographs. When Christos told her that the 
CHP had not helped at all, the coroner was taken aback. She told him that she knew the photos 
circulating online didn’t belong to her office. “If these were my photographs, they’d be 
considered illegal. These types of photographs require a court order and a judge’s signature 
before they can be released to anyone. It’s also illegal to uncover the body and take photographs 
during a coroner investigation. These photographs were taken during a coroner investigation,” 
she said (Catsouras, 2012, p. 121, emphasis added). She further explained crucial details about 
the coroner investigation process: “When we’re finished with our investigation, we cover the 
body before we open the scene to the other investigating agency. . . .Nothing should be disturbed 
until my investigation is complete. . . .We [also] don’t take pictures of our own people picking 
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up body parts. That’s not a relevant part of any type of investigation” (Catsouras, 2012, p. 121). 
This discussion, and future inquires with the CHP, revealed that CHP officers dispatched to the 
scene took the photos and shared them without the direct knowledge or consent of the CHP. New 
questions and tensions emerged. Why hadn’t the CHP notified the Catsouras of this particular 
development? Who was at fault? Were the people behind it being punished? Whom could they 
now trust? 
Soon after this revelation, Christos met with a CHP officer who told him that someone in 
the department leaked 9 of the 50 photographs taken during the department’s investigation. Yet, 
despite this lapse in protocol, the officer assured him that the agency “broke no law” in sharing 
the photos (Catsouras, 2012, p.123). Christos inquired how leaking facts to the public from a 
crime scene did not compromise the investigation. Instead of a direct answer, the officer 
explained that the CHP had begun an internal investigation into the leak two weeks earlier and 
that Christos would have to wait until the internal investigation was complete before CHP 
headquarters would render any judgment.  
Dissatisfied with the account, Christos called the FBI, seeking any advice or assistance he 
could get. He told them that the photographs belonged to the CHP and had been leaked from its 
office during the investigation. The FBI agent explained that the CHP was not supposed to leak 
materials under investigation to the public, whether the investigation was ongoing or not. The 
agent then clarified that the FBI had no jurisdiction with state government records, so the FBI 
could not get involved with the case. “You’ll have to get the CHP to handle [the photographs 
online] for you. Legally, those photos belong to the state of California. It’s up to them to get their 
property off those websites,” the agent concluded (Catsouras, 2012, p. 129). The agent then 
urged Christos to seek legal counsel. Thereafter the family filed a formal complaint about the 
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release of the photos, retained attorney Keith Bremer as legal representation, and enlisted 
Reputation Defender, a then-recent web startup that claimed to defend the reputation of 
individuals online, and to help remove photographs from the internet.  
While the family waited to hear the findings from the CHP internal investigation, Bremer 
and Reputation Defender worked together to remove the images from the internet. Issuing cease 
and desist letters and authoring coding that obscured the results of search terms, the team tried to 
make the photos harder to find. Their efforts, however, fell short. The family had no legal basis 
to compel website owners to remove the images after all. And no amount of coding could 
completely hide them from search engines or stop the images from populating new sites 
(Bennett, 2009). There was only one option left: The family would sue the CHP and whoever 
was behind the original leak of the images to hold them accountable. 
As the family initiated its suit, the Department of the California Highway Patrol released 
the findings of its internal investigation. They revealed that two dispatch supervisors, Aaron 
Reich and Thomas O’Donnell, admitted to releasing the photographs in violation of CHP policy. 
Yet, while the department recognized that both Reich and O’Donnell had violated departmental 
policy, it reaffirmed that their actions had not infringed upon any governmental regulations or 
statutes (Avila, 2007; Catsouras v. Department of the California Highway Patrol, 2010). In spite 
of this, Officer O’Donnell was suspended for 25 days without pay, while Officer Reich quit the 
CHP citing “unrelated reasons” pertaining to any impending litigation (Avilia, 2007; Bennett, 
2009; Catsouras v. Department of the California Highway Patrol, 2010). Accompanying the 
release of the internal review was a letter of apology to the Catsouras family. It assured the 
Catsourases that the department had begun to take the necessary action to prevent similar 
incidents from happening in the future.  
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Trials and Tribulations 
Although the Department of the California Highway Patrol denied legal culpability on the 
reasoning that no existing laws or statutes were violated, the Catsourases moved forward with 
the suit. Eight causes of action were filed against the CHP and Officers O’Donnell and Reich.11 
In response, the CHP filed a demurrer as to the first and sixth causes of action, which held the 
CHP in violation of its duties as a state agency and negligent supervision and retention, 
respectively. As the case moved forward, the plaintiffs dismissed the sixth cause of action 
against the CHP in recognition of the substantial burden of proof required to combat the 
Department’s internal review and suspension of O’Donnell. The court, meanwhile, sustained the 
demurrer as to the first cause. Citing that the CHP was not a “person” for the purpose of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, more commonly known as Section 1983, the court maintained that the CHP had 
11th Amendment immunity that protected it from monetary relief in suit.12  
With the first and sixth causes dismissed, defendants Reich, O’Donnell, and the 
Department of the California Highway Patrol motioned for a summary judgment, which asked 
that the CHP be absolved of any wrongdoing since all factual issues were already remedied by 
the internal investigation and the subsequent suspension of those found culpable. The motion for 
                                                
11 The Catsourases, hereafter referred to as plaintiffs, asserted eight causes of action: (1) violation of section 1983  
(all defendants) (see next footnote for further detail about Section 1983); (2) negligence (O'Donnell and Reich); (3) 
negligent infliction of emotional distress (O'Donnell and Reich); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(O'Donnell and Reich); (5) invasion of privacy (O'Donnell and Reich); (6) negligent supervision and retention (CHP 
and O'Donnell); (7) tortious act or omission of public employees (Gov.Code, §§ 820 , subd. (a), 820.8 ) (O'Donnell 
and Reich); and (8) vicarious liability of public entity (Gov.Code, § 815.2 , subd. (a)) (CHP).  
 
12 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is more commonly referred to as "Section 1983." I will refer to it in its more common usage 
from here on. Section 1983 states, “Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act 
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree 
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”  
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summary judgment argued that the case need not be tried because the Department and its 
employees violated neither state nor national statue. Referencing Section 1983 in extension of 
the dismissal of the first cause, the summary judgment advanced that Reich and O’Donnell: 
primarily acted within their capacities as state officials tasked with enforcing state laws, which 
nullified claim of negligence; neither knowingly nor intentionally harmed the Catsouras family 
in initially sharing the photographs online, which nullified claims to infliction of emotional 
harm; and, as the internal investigation affirmed, violated no current legal statutes pertaining to 
privacy invasion because the victim had no legal claim to privacy as deceased (Catsouras v. 
Department of the California Highway Patrol, 2010). So reasoned, Judge Steven L. Perk granted 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Reich and O’Donnell were removed as 
individual capacity defendants. 
With the primary perpetrators no longer deemed individually liable through summary 
judgment, the case was to be dismissed. Protected by Section 1983 and 11th Amendment 
immunity, the CHP could not be sued for negligence, emotional harm, and privacy invasion as a 
single entity. Although Judge Perk felt the officers’ actions were “utterly reprehensible,” he 
dismissed the case citing no existing laws allowing for punishment (Catsouras v. Department of 
the California Highway Patrol, 2010). 
The plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision to the California Court of Appeal. During the 
lengthy wait before the case was heard, the CHP made efforts to work with the Castouras family 
by issuing cease and desist notices based on those authored by the Catasouras’ lawyers and 
Reputation Defender. Yet, despite the added “authority” of law enforcement alongside the efforts 
of the Catsouras’s legal and technical team, few images were removed. Instead, many website 
owners cited their 1st Amendment rights to maintain the images, arguing that the images were 
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public domain due to freedom of information and due to the public nature of the accident on a 
state highway in view of the public (Catsouras, 2012; Catsouras v. Department of the California 
Highway Patrol, 2010). When the CHP and Reputation Defender escalated the cease and desist 
notices to the companies hosting the image-laden sites, they were met with another legal 
impasse. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, approved by Congress in 1996, 
protected the web-service hosts from liability for the speech of individuals using their services.13 
Absolved of responsibility through this legislation, web-service hosts denied the cease and desist 
requests, and so the images of Nikki continued to spread.  
In June of 2009, a year after the initial filing, the California Court of Appeal for the 
Fourth District finally heard the case. Reviewing the summary judgment from the trial court, 
constitutional law surrounding free speech, legal statutes pertaining to official duty in office for 
law enforcement and other state agencies, as well as written arguments of the plaintiffs and 
defendants, all three appellate court justices reversed Judge Perk’s grant of summary judgment.14  
Authoring the court’s opinion for the appellate court, Justice Eileen C. Moore rejected 
                                                
13 Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, more commonly referred to as Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, states, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” It provides immunity 
from liability for providers and users of an interactive computer service that publish information provided by others. 
With regard to the Catsouras case, website hosting providers like Wordpress and Blogger, among others, were 
immune since they did not directly publish the images of Nikki and merely provided a service through which 
individual site owners, of their own volition, published content they wished to share.   
 
14 In trial courts, a judge or jury hears the testimony of witnesses and reviews physical evidence, exhibits, and 
documents, and then decides which version to believe and reaches a decision. Appellate courts, by contrast, do not 
decide an appeal by taking new evidence or reassessing the credibility of witnesses who testified in trial court. 
Rather, they review the written record to determine if the trial court properly interpreted the law and used the correct 
procedures when considering the case. Appellate courts typically consist of three justices. If a majority of the 
appellate court justices agree with the written record, appeal is denied and the trial court does not rehear the case 
unless new, valid charges are filed. Whenever an appellate court reverses the decision of the trial court, however, it 
almost always allows the trial court to rehear the case using the correct laws and procedures. With grant of summary 
judgment in the trial court of Catsouras v. the Department of the California of Highway Patrol by Judge Perk, 
testimony, physical evidence, and exhibits were not available for review since the case was dismissed. Instead, the 
three appellate court justices reviewed Judge Perk’s reasoning for grant of summary judgment, and then called for a 
review of the parties’ written arguments to determine if Judge Perk properly interpreted the law and properly 
adjudicated the case before him.  
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O’Donnell and Reich’s objections to culpability since evidence pointed to the fact that they 
deliberately emailed 9 of 50 “gruesome death images to their friends and family members on 
Halloween–for pure shock value” (Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol, 
2010). Finding that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers as to the invasion of privacy 
cause of action from both O’Donnell and Reich, the appellate court argued that damages were 
sustained to the family without physical injury through the dissemination of the death images to 
members of the public unrelated to the investigation. Although California law provided surviving 
family members no right to privacy in the context of written media discussing, or pictorial media 
portraying, the life and death of a decedent, the appellate court clarified that “the publication of 
death images [was] another matter” (Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol, 
2010).15 According to the appellate court, the surviving Catsourases had a common law privacy 
right in the dissemination of any death images of Nikki due to the sheer gruesomeness of the 
depiction of her body in death and the foreseeable devastation these images would cause the 
family members seeing them. 
The appellate court further found the trial court erred with regard to the demurrers as to 
the causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. The court 
reasoned that “the CHP and its officers owed a duty of care not to place the [death images of 
Nikki] on the internet for the purposes of vulgar spectacle” (Catsouras v. Department of 
                                                
15 California law is clear that in any cause of action for invasion of privacy, the context of the violation belongs to 
the individual in life and expires along with her or him in death. Nikki Catsouras’ privacy, therefore, could not be 
violated as decedent. Yet, the death images of Nikki could cause harm to the living—to her family members—and, 
within the circumstances of the case, would violate the otherwise private nature of their loss, grieving processes, and 




California Highway Patrol, 2010).16 For the appellate court, the issue at hand was not a matter of 
freedom of the press; rather, it was a matter of dereliction of duty by CHP officers. “It was not in 
furtherance of the investigation, the preservation of evidence, or any other law enforcement 
purpose, to deliberately make a mutilated corpse the subject of lurid gossip”  (Catsouras v. 
Department of California Highway Patrol, 2010). To support this ruling, the court applied three 
factors from Rowland v. Christian (1968): foreseeability, moral blame, and the prevention of 
future harm. Given the relatively unrestricted nature of the internet, the appellate court found the 
conduct of the CHP and its officers “morally deficient” because it was “perfectly foreseeable” 
that the public dissemination of images of the disembodied remains of Nikki would traumatize 
her family and put them at grave emotional distress into the future (Catsouras v. Department of 
California Highway Patrol, 2010, emphasis added). Elucidating the seriousness of its ruling and 
the duty of care owed to the greater public by law enforcement, the appellate court further 
reasoned: 
We rely upon the CHP to protect and serve the public. It is antithetical to that 
expectation for the CHP officers to inflict harm upon us by making the ravaged 
remains of our loved ones the subjects of Internet sensationalism. It is important 
to prevent future harm to other families by encouraging the CHP to establish and 
enforce adequate and effective policies to preclude its officers from engaging in 
such acts ever again (Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol, 
2010)  
 
So reasoned, the appellate court found the trial court fundamentally erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of the CHP, except in the demurrers to the first cause of action for 
                                                
16 A duty of care is a legal obligation that is imposed on an individual requiring adherence to a standard of 
reasonable care while performing any acts that could foreseeably harm others. The claimant must be able to show a 
duty of care imposed by law that the defendant breached. Breaching a duty, in turn, may subject an individual to 
liability. The duty of care may be imposed by operation of law between individuals with no current direct 
relationship, but eventually become related in some manner, as defined by common law. Duty of care, therefore, is a 
formalization of the social contract between individuals and between individuals and the state. As such, it is not a 
requirement that duty of care be defined by law, but rather that it will develop through the application and continual 
understanding of common law. A duty of care is also a tort law, which means that it applies to civil wrong(s) that 




all defendants. The reversals authored by the appellate court, moreover, held O’Donnell and 
Reich liable as individual capacity defendants for the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of 
action of the suit, which in turn made the CHP liable under Government Code section 815.2, 
subdivision (a).17 The plaintiffs, therefore, could now seek relief for the damages indicated in 
almost all of the causes of action.  
Justice is a slow process. While the appellate court largely ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, 
Reich filed an amended claim alleging that emailing photographs was covered under the 1st 
Amendment because he was acting in the public interest.  From 2010 to 2011 in the appellate 
court, Reich and his attorneys argued that he emailed the photographs—from his home—as a 
public service announcement to his recipients regarding the dangers of drunk driving, despite the 
Catsouras’ postmortem examination revealing a blood-alcohol content of zero (Hardesty, 
2011).18 His attorneys further argued that the photographs were no more public than those 
anyone in view of the accident could have taken, and that neither he nor O’Donnell could have 
known that the images would spread so rapidly and so easily directly target the Catsourases.  
The appellate justices, however, disagreed that Reich’s actions constituted protected 
speech. Indeed, while Reich contended that his emails included a cautionary message about the 
dangers of drunk driving per the call Christos Catsouras made to dispatchers, none of the emails 
he sent were provided to the court during the time of his appeal. Reich argued that he deleted all 
                                                
17 California Government Code 815.2. subdivisions (a) and (b) state, “(a) A public entity is liable for injury 
proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if 
the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his 
personal representative. (b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury 
resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” 
Therefore, because the reversals authored by the appellate court re-cast O’Donnell and Reich as individual capacity 
defendants, the CHP became a liable entity for the actions of its officers in Catsouras v. Department of the 
California Highway Patrol (2010).  
 
18 Toxicology reports indicate that Nikki did have trace amounts of cocaine in her system. According to Nikki’s 
parents (2012), Nikki had taken cocaine the night before the accident, which contributed to her psychotic episode. 
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of the emails he sent in compliance with CHP protocol after the internal review. Yet, when the 
justices questioned whether any of the initial recipients of Reich’s emails still had them, Reich’s 
attorneys conceded that they hadn’t investigated. Without evidence to the contrary, the justices 
filed a final ruling on the matter stating, “Any editorial comments that Reich may have made 
with respect to the photographs are not before us. In short, there is no evidence at this point that 
the e-mails were sent to communicate on the topic of drunk driving” (Catsouras v. Department 
of Highway Patrol, 2010; Hardesty, 2011). In addition to this, the appellate court ordered Reich 
to pay the Plaintiffs’ litigation costs related to the appellate court and further ruled that the initial 
trial court costs could be pursued by the family in the lower courts.  
With the appellate court’s final ruling clarified, the case returned to trial court in early 
June of 2011.The attorneys for both parties continued negotiations while awaiting a court date. 
With the law refined in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants sought a settlement that would 
prevent the exorbitant costs of continued litigation and a jury trial. Over the next seven months, 
the parties deliberated. Finally, on January 30th, 2012, a little over five years after the tragic 
death of Nikki, the CHP reached a settlement with the Catsourases. Under the terms of the 
settlement, the family received about $2.37 million in damages. In a statement issued that same 
day, CHP spokesperson Fran Clader stated, “No amount of money can compensate for the pain 
the Catsouras family has suffered. […] It is our hope that with this legal issue resolved, the 
Catsouras family can receive some closure” (Rojas, 2012).  
Despite helping lead to the creation of a law that secures rights to images of the deceased 
and despite the end of litigation through settlement, the family remains vigilant and wary to this 
day. The death images of Nikki remain online and appear, even now, in almost any search 
including “Catsouras.” New sites carry the images, and individuals with a morbid fascination for 
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death within the United States and around the world maintain them. The law that the family 
fought so hard for and won with incredible cost to their livelihood and futures, ironically, does 
not secure family members’ protection from seeing any of the images at any time, or protect 
them from new ways the images might be used to haunt and traumatize them in the future. The 
law the family helped create, though, does secure greater privacy protections for others, and may, 
for a time, prevent the kind of postmortem tragedy that others continue to live with to this day. 
In an age where the internet has become crucial to everyday life, the Catsourases use it 
with caution. It is impossible for them to avoid using it altogether, though. The family’s loss is a 
horror that is forever attached to each through the connective technologies that structure society. 
The internet allows for this deconstruction of the individual as a composite of images, text, and 
data removed of the fleshy embodiment and familial attachments to which she or he is 
inextricably materially tied. This visuality the internet offers—the ability to see and be seen, to 
search and be searched, to store and be stored—creates both an excess and an absence of each of 
us through the information anyone can share: We, like Nikki, are increasingly the digital 
presence we collectively create and shape through at times excessive online sharing—a sharing 
that always has the potential to continue into the future beyond even our own existence. Yet 
online all users, like Nikki, are also the absence of the body and its physical and psychic 
attachments, as user both individually and collectively become disembodied subjects of the 
words, images, and data they share without much forethought through technology.  
Crowdsourcing Morality 
As people are encouraged to share aspects of their lives and the lives of others through 
digital media and the social web, situations akin to those that befell the Catsouras’s are less and 
less uncommon. Indeed, Jon Ronson’s So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed (2015), a New York 
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Times bestseller, documents accounts of various individuals whose lives were cast awry when 
something posted online by themselves or others was taken out of context, leading to situations 
that spiraled out of control. Though not as devastating as the Catsouras’s tragedy, the accounts in 
Ronson’s book highlight the deeply virulent nature of online shaming. Positing parallels to 
concepts of “group madness” first developed by 19th Century physician Gustave Le Bon and of 
“contagion” witnessed in Philip Zimbardo’s infamous 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment, Ronson 
extends the idea that individuals lose behavioral control when immersed in the “digital crowd” 
promoted on social media.19,20 While Ronson doesn’t claim that the digital crowd constitutes a 
near-complete devolution of the individual toward a more primal state as Le Bon historically 
asserted of physically co-located gathering, he argues that social media induce an almost 
                                                
19 Gustave Le Bon’s (1895/1960) conception of “group madness” is most often cited in Sociology with reference to 
Contagion Theory or the Contagion Perspective (Turner & Killian, 1972). Written over 20 years after the Paris 
Commune of 1871 where revolutionary crowds burned numerous buildings to the ground before the rise of the Third 
Republic, Le Bon suggested that anonymous individuals precipitated collective, almost primal outbursts in 
physically co-located settings, forming a “group mind” or “group madness.” He notes, “…that the individual 
forming part of a crowd acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which 
allows him to yield to instincts, which, had he been alone, he would perforce have kept under restraint. He will be 
the less disposed to check himself from the considerations that, a crowd being anonymous, and in consequence, 
irresponsible, the sentiment of responsibility which always controls individuals disappears entirely” (Le Bon, 
1895/1960, p 30-31). In Le Bon’s comment on the “the sentiment of responsibility” we also see the inflection of 
“public” from Sennett’s analysis, as class distinctions maintained social order and, for a time, inhibited individuals 
from engaging in indecorous behaviors that might threaten said social order. Although Le Bon’s conceptualization 
of the “maddening crowd” was regarded favorably after publication and well into the early 20th Century as a way of 
explaining crowds and social protests, Sociology and other fields have largely discredited Le Bon and Contagion 
Theory since the 1960s. Contemporary research and discussions regarding crowds and collective behavior instead 
favor the idea that most physically co-located crowds develop in three stages (i.e., assembly, gathering, and 
dispersal) where individuals participate and organize with others they know through some friendly or familial social 
tie, often with distinct purposes, and with deference to agents of social control (i.e., police officers) who often enlist 
“negotiated management” through the usage of protest permits (see Aveni, 1977; Couch, 1968; della Porta & Reiter, 
1998; McPhail, 1991, 1997; McPhail et al., 1998; McPhail et al., 2006). 
 
20 Philip Zimbardo’s 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment was an experimental study where young college students 
were assigned roles as either prisoners or prison authority figures. A highly immersive prison simulation, college 
students assigned the role of prisoner were picked up by real local police in a simulated arrest, labeled as numbers, 
and locked up in cells. Students who were assigned roles of authority such as “guard” and “warden,” conversely, 
formulated a set of coercive rules governing prisoner behavior from the start of the experiment and exercised their 
power to the point of adverse psychological harm to the students labeled as prisoners. Zimbardo (2008) ultimately 
concluded that students assigned authority roles engaged in contagion as they rationalized their acts of 
dehumanization due to deindividuation that afford guards relative anonymity through their “standard uniforms” and 
“silver reflecting sunglasses” and the relative anonymity bestowed upon prisoners labeled as numbers.   
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“anarchic” group mentality fueled by the availability of content shared online. This “mob 
mentality” develops when individuals encounter and share content, feeding into individuated 
digital feedback loops where individuals receive acknowledgement from and encourage 
engagement with others. Ronson, however, does not clarify the conditions or the mechanics that 
structure this emergent practice; neither does he examine the central role of sight in shaping 
perceptions online as a performative spectacle of both the environmental condition of 
participation and normative visuality in emerging media.21  
As public and private collapse into each other through technology, individuals 
increasingly fail to recognize or even understand public and private as separate contexts and 
conditions. The wide public availability of personally created content and the encouragement to 
share more only further perpetuates this notion. Content is, therefore, not only public by default 
online, it is also presented as material to be encountered and engaged—followed, liked, 
challenged, or ignored. Interpellated into greater participation as an environmental condition of 
digital media and the social web (Barney et al., 2016; see also Althusser, 1971), individuals 
respond by creating, sharing, and categorizing content as they connect with others across space 
and time. Unlike physically co-located gathering, which contemporary sociological research 
suggests entails known social ties and rational organizing with social control agents and 
authority figures (Aveni, 1977; Couch, 1968; della Porta & Reiter, 1998; McCarthy, 2005; 
McPhail, 1991, 1997; McPhail et al., 1998; McPhail et al., 2006), digitally-mediated gathering 
                                                
21 Here I use the term “normative visuality” to draw attention to the more localized practices and behaviors of 
collectives that often attempt to situate and redefine normative social behavior of self and other. My 
conceptualization echoes Nicholas Mirzoeff’s (2011) conception of “visuality,” in which state power exercises and 
performs its authority through various practices and technologies to maintain hegemonic appearances and control; 
however, my emphasis here draws attention to the ways the internalization of such visuality—or “governmentality” 
(see Foucault, 1957)—in collectives and individuals renders it as a “normal” social practice of curtailing and 




(or, more aptly, “converging”) is not necessarily initiated through known social ties, and, further, 
is rarely a collaborative, orchestrated effort with social control agents and authority (Jenkins, 
1992; Jenkins et al., 2009, 2013; Rambukkana, 2015; Tufecki, 2017). Instead, as a circumstance 
of the “participatory condition,” anyone across space and time with access to content created and 
shared online is given the opportunity to participate in whatever logic that entails. Anyone, for 
example, can become a “friend” or a “follower” of another online across a wide range of social 
web platforms, regardless of the lack of familiarity and knowledge with the person they friend or 
follow. As a result, individuals coalesce around content—imagery and text—they and others 
easily create and readily share online, making privacy less a collective condition of being 
unobserved by others and more a personal choice in whether to share content or not. 
Participation online, then, is more nuanced because the media and technologies that enable it 
operate through: visuality over embodied experiential engagement, as participation online 
foregrounds imagery and text and does not presuppose physical engagement beyond sight 
(Hillis, 1999, 2009); diffusion, as content easily spreads and anyone with access can converge 
around content in a variety of ways (Jenkins, 1992; Jenkins et al., 2009, 2013); and 
deindividuation, as content is increasingly disassociated from the source/body and its context 
(Hillis, 2009; see also Zimbardo, 2008 regarding deindividuation reducing personal 
accountability).   
Taken in sum, these attributes allow individuals to easily share and forward content; form 
collective “publics” where they converge and participate together, often through the 
categorization of content in hashtags and/or group specific pages; and even formally organize in 
the liminal spaces between online and offline in the formation of collectives for fan 
communities, advocacy groups, and protests (Jenkins, 1992; Jenkins et al., 2009, 2013; 
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Rambukkana, 2015; Tufekci, 2017). Yet, these attributes also illuminate a dark side of the 
“participatory condition.” As sight on its own supersedes other experiential ways of knowing in 
participation through digital media and the social web, individuals are enabled, encouraged, and 
even incentivized to primarily relate to each other, our society, and our world through visuality. 
Hailed to envision and engage content shared online as information as yet to be interpreted 
(Hillis et al., 2013; see also Barney et al., 2016 regarding information though the participatory 
condition), individuals respond by substituting the absent physicality of the source/body with 
imagery (and text) and their own interpretations of these. When this occurs, online content is 
refashioned as an intermediary text further disassociated from its embodied corporeal form, a 
process that Hillis (2009) identifies as leading to the production in online settings of a virtual 
“middle ground.”  
A brief excursus highlights the application of the idea of middle ground within my 
broader argument. Middle ground is a parallel concept to “middle voice,” which is a literary 
technique employed by an author to induce a reader to sympathetically identify with a character 
in the text. As the reader interprets the character in written word, the reader negotiates the 
author’s ideas in a way that both inflects the ideas induced by the author and, concurrently, 
allows the reader to negotiate the author’s depiction within his or her own perspective. 
Comparably, visual content shared online comes to occupy a “middle ground” as the viewer 
seizes the visual array in a sense-making interplay of perceptual schema, personal experiences, 
and affective engagements and sees the imagery as analogous to the user (Hillis, 2009). Unlike 
middle voice, which implies a particular understanding inscribed by the author (read: authorial 
voice) that may or may not elicit similar personal interpretations through the array of connotative 
meanings in words within the mind of the reader through characters and/or the written word, 
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authorial middle ground extends personal interpretations by rendering the author/subject as a 
visible object associated to a physical referent—a face, a body, or a physical form juxtaposed to 
a setting—contained within the visual display apprehended by the viewer (Hillis, 2009). Visual 
content online, therefore, seem to immediately “embody” the materiality of the phenomena it 
represents by seeming to fuse the image depicted on the screen to the subject within the visual 
frame whose material form remains behind/beyond the screen elsewhere, a process that Hillis 
(2009) refers to as “telepresence.”  
Despite the ostensibly dynamic nature of appearing both “materially here and seemingly 
there at the same time,” telepresence ultimately compresses the source/body as data envisioned 
by the viewer in digital spaces.22 So physically and temporally distanced from the source/body, 
the viewer is free to interpret the Janus-faced telepresence, not as a reproduction of the otherwise 
animated corporeal form frozen in a moment in time, but instead as a “material trace of the 
object or person on the other end of the transmission”—a “telefetish” (Hillis, 2009, p. 90). 
Imagery in digital spaces, therefore, constitutes experience of another in a way that not only 
suggests that an image now stands for full and immediate presence within a viewer’s affective 
interpretations (Hillis, 2009), but also, crucially, as an otherwise precise target that points to the 
source/body and those associated with it when the viewer objectifies the visual form in affiliation 
with or criticism of it.  
As an image spreads across digital spaces, then, it becomes an ongoing public 
interpretive product(ion) for the countless viewers who engage it. Increasingly removed from the 
                                                
22 While Hillis (2009) primarily refers to telepresence in the more interactive forms of avatars and personal webcams 
in his analysis, he critically notes that telepresence compels an individual to become one with an image, which I 
extend here as it pertains to all of the subjects in my case studies. I also deliberately use “subject” instead of 
“author” in comparing middle voice and middle ground because the author of content shared online may or may not 
be the subject seized in interpretation. Due to the visual, diffuse, and deindividuated attributes of participation 
through digital media and the social web, any individual can share content that renders another visible to others who 
are distanced from the source/body depicted. 
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context in which the image was produced as it spreads beyond its original nodal point (see 
Jenkins et al., 2009, 2013), viewers interpret the image in relative anonymity, or in 
“deindividuation,” as they are physically, temporally, and/or emotionally distanced from the 
object or person depicted (see Zimbardo, 2008). Further masked by their profiles on the social 
web (Coleman, 2014), yet also fundamentally operating at a distance from the object or person 
depicted in an image (Hillis, 2009), individuals operate with reduced personal accountability as 
they participate with little to no consequence for their actions. As a result, viewers ultimately 
ascribe their perceptions onto the object or person depicted, and as they do, they dehumanize the 
source/body by substituting its corporeal form with imagery.  
In coming to regard imagery as somehow equivalent to the totality of a human, personal 
perceptions of the source/body supersede embodied, experiential engagement of the material 
form that might otherwise temper affective responses aimed at harming the individual(s) 
depicted. Thus, when individuals share the imagery with others in email or in posts on social 
media, coupled with their personal sentiments, they shape and reshape the discourse surrounding 
the imagery. Casting their personal sentiments out to the digital crowd, individuals engage in 
crowdsourced morality, they crowdsource moral judgment to not only add the power of the 
collective to their individual interpretations, but also to inflect broader collective beliefs and 
values aimed at supporting or, as is often the case, curtailing the behavior of others. Thus, in 
contrast to Le Bon’s conception of “group madness,” which presupposes a total loss of 
individual rationality to the crowd, and in contrast to the rational organizing of known social ties 
leading to sensible collectives articulated by contemporary sociology, crowdsourced morality 
illuminates a middle path. Content is not simply encountered in online participation; rather, it is 
engaged as it either confirms or challenges an individual’s personal beliefs and values within 
 
 92 
middle ground. Whether in affirmation or negation, individuals share content, and as they do, 
they contribute to the shaping of its context and its place in the broader discourses of social 
order. As more and more individuals converge around particular content, collectives form, 
imbued with the power to resituate with reduced accountability the coherency of the object or 
person on the other end of a transmission.  
Crowdsourced morality demonstrates the affective power of middle ground and telefetish 
in the wider social imaginary (see Turner, 1982 regarding social drama). When, for example, 
Reich and O’Donnell produced and shared the images of Nikki through email, they irrevocably 
cast Nikki’s corporeal form as content to be interpreted, shared, and spread across digital media 
and the social web by anyone who encountered it. They framed Nikki’s body as a “Halloween 
Prank,” as content removed of the interpersonal, social dimensions it was accorded in life and in 
death. Although the horrific events that befell the Catsourases occurred over 10 years ago, 
crowdsourced morality continues today in ways that highlight greater personal, cultural, and 
political divisions between individuals. Here are three recent examples that highlight the growing 
disassociation between individuals as they objectify one another through visuality.  
On February 17, 2017, an Airbnb host cancelled the reservation of Dyne Suh, a then 25-
year-old law student as Suh and her friends were minutes away from the cabin, stuck in the snow 
on the mountain road. Suh had previously texted the host to inquire if two friends and two dogs 
could be added to the reservation, and was told that it would be fine. Within minutes of arriving 
at the cabin, Suh texted to ask how they might pay for the additional guests on the reservations, 
only to be met with a reply she did not expect. Tami, the host, responded, “If you think 4 people 
and 2 dogs ate getting a room fir $50 a night on big bear mountain during the busiest weekend of 
the year ..… You are insanely high” (Wang, 2017). Suh noted their earlier conversation and then 
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protested to the host, stating she would notify Airbnb of this issue. Tami then replied, “Go ahead. 
I wouldn’t rent to u if u were the last person on earth. One word says it all. Asian.” Suh then 
stated, “Good job. Say goodbye to Airbnb,” to which Tami replied, “it’s why we have trump” 
(Wang, 2017). 
Suh then took pictures of the exchange and posted them to Facebook page where her 
friends began to search for information about the host (see Figure 3). Digging through the 
information provided on the Tami’s Airbnb profile, Suh’s friends found the LinkedIn profile of 
one Tami Barker, which appeared to match up with the Tami on Airbnb. From there, 
crowdsourced morality took full effect. Suh’s friends found Tami’s place of work and 
organizations she was part and then encouraged others to email her friends, family, and co-
workers (see Figure 4). One friend even posted links to Tami’s work email and her community 
newspaper, stating, “If you wanna out the bitch to her community, here’s their news paper. Ruin 
her. Half my family is Asian and members, including dad, have faced disgusting treatment by 
Trump supporters. I’m sick of this shit.” With the social shaming escalating and spreading from 
Suh’s Facebook page to others and then to local news media, Tami was soon banned from 
Airbnb for violating their “Open Doors” policy that emphasizes inclusiveness of all individuals, 
regardless of race, gender, and sexual orientation.  
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Figure 4: Dyne's friends respond, crowdsourcing morality in action. 
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Beyond the micro-level between individuals communicating through apps, texts, and 
social media, crowdsourced morality also occurs at the societal and political levels. With the rise 
of “fake news” as a right-wing moniker for anything seemingly at odds with a partisan’s 
worldview, President Trump and many individuals who support him have not only aligned 
themselves in an apparent mission against media outlets deemed “fake,” they have spread 
content that greatly, and often violently, disparages journalists as “enemies of the state.” 
Notably, in early July of 2017, President Trump tweeted a video clip that first appeared on reddit 
under the subreddit /The_Donald in which he is seen pummeling a wrestler with the CNN logo 
superimposed on his face with the caption, “#FraudNewsCNN #FNN” (Kacynski, 2017). Shared 
with over 33 million followers, the tweet read more as incitement to violence than as a joke, due 
to the violent imagery and the preceding rhetoric from the President, and in the bigoted, violent 
comments associated with it by the original creator, HanAssholeSolo, on reddit (Kacynski, 
2017). From there, users on twitter retweeted the President’s tweet, often including comments 
supporting violence against journalists and critiquing the state of “fake news,” and dehumanizing 
journalists as purveyors of content and even as content themselves. 
In response to the tweet and video, CNN investigated how the President obtained the 
tweet and who was behind the original video. Although The White House denied that the clip 
came from reddit, the original creator, HanAssholeSolo, took credit for it, and even initially 
expressed great enthusiasm for the President’s usage of it (Kacynski, 2017). Yet, as journalists at 
CNN identified the person behind the post, HanAssholeSolo issued a formal apology and 
subsequently deleted all of his other posts. In his apology he stated, 
To people who troll on the Internet for fun, consider your words and actions 
conveyed in your message and who it might upset or anger. Put yourself in their 
shoes before you post it. If you have a problem with trolling it is an addiction just 
like any other addiction someone can have to something and don't be embarrassed 
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to ask for help. Trolling is nothing more than bullying a wide audience. Don't feed 
your own self-worth based upon inflicting suffering upon others online just 
because you are behind a keyboard (Kacynski, 2017). 
 
Despite this admission of guilt, individuals beyond this situation, and even the President himself, 
continue to cast imagery itself as transmission of content. In so doing, they ignore or deny the 
profound consequences this may pose to the object or person(s) depicted, they also upset 
authority in all its forms by casting publicly shared information as all there is to be known.  
 In a similar fashion to moral outcry from President Trump with “fake news,” numerous 
individuals have also taken to social media without the presumed authority of the President to 
shame others after events involving gun violence. In particular, after over 500 thousand people 
protested in Washington D.C. on March 24, 2018 as part of the March for Our Lives movement, 
an image of Parkland shooting survivor, Emma Gonzalez, circulated online. Posted to Twitter by 
Gab, a social media platform popular with conservative users, the image depicted Emma 
Gonzales tearing up the Constitution of the United States. Yet, this image was entirely doctored. 
Originally taken from a video still produced in conjunction with Teen Vogue in which Gonzalez 
tears up a target practice poster, the doctored image quickly spread on Twitter and Facebook 
(Mezzofiore, 2018). Though no one has claimed responsibility for the doctored image at this 
time, the creation and spread of this image appears to be a form of crowdsourcing morality to 
feed into fears that this movement could threaten the 2nd Amendment by attacking one of the 
most visible figureheads of the movement in Gonzalez. The spread of the image also ignores the 
movement’s five-point policy agenda, which federal courts have ruled to be wholly compatible 
with the 2nd Amendment since none of them call for a full ban of all firearms (Ingraham, 
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2018).23 In response to the spread of the image, Philip Pricardi, Teen Vogue’s Chief Content 
Officer contextualized the original video and image by tweeting to the public on Twitter. Noting 
that the viral image was photoshopped, Pricardi went on to add that “the fact that we even have 
to clarify this is proof of how democracy continues to be fractured by people who manipulate 
and fabricate the truth” (Mezzofiore, 2018). In resituating the context of the image, Pricardi 
helped fend off the expanse of crowdsourcing morality online, but his words alone do not stop 
numerous individuals from believing that the doctored image is real and that the movement is 
merely a hoax funded by celebrities. Indeed, his rebuke of the creation and spread of the image 
may even feed into this narrative that some ultra-conservative individuals believe. 
Coherency and context of information are, therefore, increasingly challenged, contested, 
and shaped by the crowd online that becomes the authority leveraging its interpretation into 
action against an individual or “other” group. Whether crowdsourced morality transpires to 
shame a racist and potentially cause her to lose employment, to denigrate and devalue the 
integrity of an entire profession, or to portray a survivor of gun violence as anti-American, 
context, fact, expertise, and even reality itself become matters of individual interpretation at a 
distance. The voices of many begin to drown out exculpatory evidence, creating a destabilization 
of social order, democratic processes, and law. Authority is no longer assumed to be expertise, as 
individuals source and sustain their worldviews through filtered content that often affirms their 
own beliefs (Nichols, 2017; Pariser, 2011), further contributing to the false dichotomy of “us 
versus them” and the greater disunity of us and them.  
                                                
23 The five points of the policy agenda are to fund gun violence research; strengthening the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Firearms, Tobacco, and Explosives; calling for universal background checks; a ban on high-capacity magazines; and 
a ban on assault rifles. While these policies may restrict access to firearms and ban access to specific classes of 
weaponry, none of them fully ban guns.  
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An Image Is Worth A Thousand Words 
Digital media and the social web do more than extend our communicative abilities 
beyond a localized geographic space as some media scholars suggest (Baym, 2010; boyd, 2008, 
2012; Marwick, 2013; Marwick & boyd, 2011a, 2011b; Van Dijck, 2012, 2013); they 
fundamentally promote visuality as the primary means through which individuals engage each 
other and come to “know” the world around them (Hillis, 2009; Hillis et al., 2013; Jenkins, 1992; 
Jenkins et al., 2009, 2013; Nichols, 2017). Whether imagery is shared “privately” in emails 
intended for family and friends, tweeted in the public space of Twitter, or reposted on a 
Facebook group page urging a company to fire a person, the coherence of the object or person 
depicted is suddenly rendered massively public, a visual spectacle open to the interpretation of 
the vast audiences that encounter it, engage it, and circulate it as content. 
Imagery, therefore, comes to have greater power over individuals and their 
understandings of context, fact, and reality as it spreads across digital media and the social web 
as content, which works to minimize interest in embodied, experiential engagement of the object 
or person depicted (Hillis, 2009). As a consequence of distance, authorial intent is no longer 
contained within text (Nichols, 2017), as the context of content is increasingly constituted in the 
broader public collective that interprets and shapes its meaning within the intermediary space of 
the middle ground. It is not that images no longer retain an innate context (if they ever did, as 
Althuser reminds us), but rather that the uncoupling of the materiality of the object or person in 
content shared through digital media and the social web has allowed individuals and collectives 
to ascribe meaning in ways that profoundly affect the “other” behind the transmission, as well as 
shape broader social discourses and social norms.  
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Indeed, while digital media and the social web “unite” people by bringing them together 
as they share self-generated content (Baym, 2010; Jenkins, 1992; Jenkins et al., 2009), the 
emphasis on the visual within these platforms ultimately blinds people from the reality of one 
another. Reimagined as imagery and/or cast as content, individuals no longer have to experience 
the messy, complicated reality of one another and can, instead, align themselves with those like 
themselves and those things they “like” as a public display for others (Pariser, 2011; Turkle, 
2010). As an all too common practice of the participatory condition and crowdsourced morality 
today, individuals can and do vehemently critique the things they do not like, easily inciting 
others to do the same.  
Furthermore, as Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol highlights, 
authority figures are not wholly exempt from the harms that occur when corporeal form is 
transubstantiated as content in transmission. While all police officers are trained to at least give 
the appearance of disinterest from their subjects in an attempt to keep clear records that are free 
of an account of the emotions that would be inherently present in any confrontation, they may 
still form a visceral connection to their subjects, for better or worse, that affects how they 
respond on the scene and the ways citizens interpret their responses and actions thereafter. Even 
as the institution of law enforcement acknowledges that there is a power imbalance between 
itself and everyday citizens, individual officers may not fully recognize this disparity and the 
ways their actions further shape and reshape the sociopolitical relationship with authority. When 
the credibility of authority figures is questioned and when police appear to be protected by law 
even as they have done wrong, as witnessed in both Catsouras v. Department of California 
Highway Patrol and People v. Mehserle for disparate yet related reasons, a message is sent that 
authority is somehow exempt from being held accountable to those it is enlisted to protect and 
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serve. As a consequence, greater suspicion of authority in its abilities to establish truth, order, 
safety, and security emerges, giving rise to challenges to authority in countersurveillance, 
protest, and even outright violence.  
 As the Catsourases learned in their fight with the Department of California Highway 
Patrol, a lack of trust in authority speaks volumes about human nature and our relationship with 
one another. Laws appear to protect those in authority, practically making them exempt from suit 
in demonstrated harms to those they are tasked with protecting. Laws, too, can only do so much 
to reclaim what is lost, particularly as technology now allows for the kinds of online disciplining 
practices achieved through crowdsourced morality. “Justice,” therefore, is rendered less a system 
meted out by common law and a greater social contract, and more a practice enlisted by 
individuals and collectives using digital media and the social web to shape and decree morality 
from afar, with little to no accountability for their actions. Taking content at face value—as all 
there is to be seen and known in the moment of capture—individuals, as “shamers-in-chief,” now 
increasingly become judge and jury by framing another’s identity through imagery alone, by 
adjudicating another’s scruples through their actions frozen in time, and by then converging 
together to bring the “authority” and power of the crowd to bear on those deemed “culpable” 




CHAPTER FIVE:  
POLICE (IN)ACTION: THE LIMITS OF LAW  
IN PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL’S PRIVACY AND BEYOND 
Introduction 
In April 2013, Ross Landry, then Justice Minister of the Canadian province of Nova 
Scotia, introduced a striking and novel piece of legislation: the Cyber-safety Act. Outlining legal 
protections for victims of cyberbullying, creating a unit tasked with investigating complaints of 
cyberbullying, and clarifying procedures for identifying, pursuing, and penalizing cyberbullies, 
the Act was the first of its kind in Canada. Passing into law that August, the Cyber-safety Act 
allowed for the creation of a CyberScan unit that became fully operational in September 2013. 
The unit pursued 820 cases of alleged cyberbullying until the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 
struck down the law in December of 2015. Seen as too broad and far-reaching by Supreme Court 
Justice Glen McDougall, the law was struck down because it was deemed to violate the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, particularly as it infringed upon the right to life, liberty, and security of 
the person.  
Created as a reaction to the suicide of Rheteah Parsons, a young woman who took her life 
following the yearlong investigation of her alleged rape that concluded that there was 
“insufficient evidence to lay charges,” the law attempted to assuage the harms of overlooking 
and ignoring hurtful communications and bullying online. Although the law granted the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) more power and authority to pursue perpetrators of online 
harassment, it fundamentally failed because of the ambiguous and arbitrary nature of language of 
the law and the entrenched categorization of what counts as evidence in cases involving 
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technologically mediated communications. Using the Segal Report, which was charged after the 
death of Rehteah Parsons with investigating the errors committed by police investigating claims 
brought forward by Parsons, and the Milton-Pepler Report, which investigated the errors in 
school policies that may have contributed her death, I draw attention to the yearlong 
investigation of the alleged rape of Rehteah Parsons, the creation of the Cyber-safety Act, and 
the reasons the Act was overruled.  
To understand better the contemporary landscapes of digital media and the social web 
that enable crowdsourced morality and, in turn, pose challenges to police power and law, this 
chapter extends the theory of crowdsourced morality to the law. Building on analysis from the 
previous chapters in which I establish the role of imagery in both challenging authority and 
decontextualizing the source/body, this chapter focuses on the role of law in protecting 
individuals as they are constituted in the aforementioned intermediary space of the “middle 
ground” enabled by the ubiquity of digital media and the social web. I explore the flexible, yet 
precarious nature of law as it is made to respond to newer contexts across digital media and the 
social web. I argue that law enforcement fails to apply the law equally in cases where digital 
media reveal new threats to the individual, and that such unequal application leads to harm for 
individuals as their personal lives become a public spectacle for any to partake in online. 
Additionally, in exploring the failure of law and law enforcement, I question the role law plays in 
contextualizing victims’ and bystanders’ narratives, particularly as it enables and promotes the 
voices and experiences of certain individuals over others. I also critique the ways law constitutes 
evidence, and I argue that it often fails to recognize “non-State” evidence because it is not 
codified in law or law has not caught up to considerations of “private” and/or “personal” 
information online. Finally, I explore the problematic nature of creating a proactive framework 
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in law that attempts to ensure remedies for individuals who have had their lives upset by content 
shared online without their consent. Because consent is “assumed” in sharing content from 
offline to online in Western societies (boyd, 2012), and because Western societies enshrine 
various forms of free expression in law, I argue that law itself cannot solve the contemporary 
predicaments with the spread of information online until we, as a society, encourage greater 
contextualization of information and greater practices of consent.  
Rape Law or Rape Culture?: Conceptions of Rape, Victimization, and Consent 
Canadian law criminalizes “sexual assault” in Section 265 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code.24 Defined as sexual contact with another person without that person’s consent, the law 
clarifies consent in Section 273.1(1) as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in 
the sexual activity in question” (Criminal Code, 1985). The absence of consent defines the crime 
of sexual assault, and since 2011 crimes of sexual assault have been further interpreted to include 
the provisions that a person must have an active mind during the entirety of sexual activity in 
order to consent and that individuals cannot give consent in advance of sexual activity (see R. v 
                                                
24 The word “rape” is not used in the Canadian Criminal Code. After explaining the law as it stands in Canada, I will 





J.A., 2011).25 Yet, despite these progressive shifts in ongoing affirmative consent in Canada (and 
parts of the United States), the criminal justice system and its representative parties in law 
enforcement and the judiciary continue to reproduce systemic patriarchal practices that fuel and 
shape both the legal and popular imaginations of rape, victimization, and consent.  
Sexual assaults are ambiguous and, therefore, problematic for the criminal justice system 
because they challenge the popular imagination of rape depicted in media and historically 
inflected in law. “Stranger danger” is a historically popularized, societally accepted conception 
of rape and it usually includes a scenario in which a woman is randomly assaulted by a man who 
is a stranger to her while she attempts to escape or fight off her attacker (Johnson, 2017; Randall, 
2010; Yung, 2017). The emphases on the “randomness” of the attack, the attacker as an unknown 
“stranger,” the “attempt” to defend oneself, and the notion that such assaults happen to women 
exclusively have had both societal and political effects on how rape is conceptualized and 
understood, even as laws have shifted beyond these archaic conceptions. While the majority of 
sexual assaults are committed by someone the victim knows (Johnson, 2017; see also McGregor 
et al., 2000), police, prosecutors, and even the media continue to respond to and describe sexual 
                                                
25 R. v J.A. was a criminal law case regarding consent in the case of sexual assault and was decided by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The alleged offense involved J.A. having consensual sexual activity with, K.D., his long-term 
partner. During the activity, K.D. consented for J.A. to choke her. K.D. knew that she might lose consciousness, and 
after about three minutes, she did. While K.D. was unconscious, J.A. tied K.D. up and performed sexual acts on her. 
K.D. could not recall consenting to the sexual activity J.A. performed on her while unconscious. When she regained 
consciousness, they resumed consensual activity. On July 11, 2011, K.D. made a complaint to the police that the 
activity was not wholly consensual, leading to charges of aggravated assault, sexual assault, attempting to render a 
person unconscious in order to sexually assault them, and breaching a probation order. At trial, the judge acquitted 
J.A. of aggravated assault and choking, but found that K.D. did not consent to the activity, or that if she did, she did 
not legally consent. J.A. was found guilty of sexual assault and breaching his probation order. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeal for Ontario ruled in favor of the defendant, J.A., concluding that there was insufficient evidence to 
conclude that K.D. did not consent to the sexual activity. The majority also ruled that persons can consent to sexual 
activity to take place even after they are rendered unconscious. The dissenting judge, however, argued that consent 
for the purpose of sexual assault required an active mind during the sexual activity in question. At the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the majority ruled only on the consent in the case of sexual assault. The Court reviewed the 
definition of consent for sexual assaults in Section 273.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada and the majority 
concluded that a person can only consent to sexual activity if she is conscious throughout that activity. If a person 




assaults in ways that emphasize either “stranger danger” or the rare false reports of rape (Yung, 
2017). The classic discursive strategy of using passive voice further complicates understandings 
of rape. Rather than employ active voice to describe rape (e.g., “40-year-old man sexually 
assaults woman in back alley”), rape is described as something that happens to women (e.g., 
“she was raped,” “20-year old woman sexually assaulted”) (see Johnson, 2017; Yung, 2017 
regarding popular conceptions of rape). Such framing removes the subject and renders him 
invisible so as to make it seem that the action happened without a motive or without a subject; it 
also encourages a deep-seated aura of skepticism with respect to the victim that pervades 
organizational knowledge, society, and culture.  
Within the institution of law enforcement, the overwhelming, deeply embedded cultural 
beliefs about rape manifest in how many police officers approach victims and how they 
determine whether an allegation of criminality is true. The strong biases against alleged rape 
narratives lead police to approach complainants with skepticism or aggression and to frame 
information in a way that “takes ambiguous information and forms it in an understandable 
pattern to which the agency can respond to in routine fashion” (Gilsinan, 2012, p. 102). Police 
contextualize, process, and frame complainant testimony, actions or lack thereof, and emotional 
and mental states in ways that then align with cultural norms about rape, which reify a 
dichotomy between a credible, “good” victim who was “innocent” and “fought of the attacker,” 
and a questionable, “bad” victim whose “actions or sexual history” put her at fault (Benedet, 
2010; Corrigan, 2013; Johnson, 2017; Randall, 2010).  
Characterizing the victim, consequently, is crucial in establishing a case, but such 
characterizing is problematic as it is filtered through personal, institutional, and cultural lenses, 
just like crowdsourced morality. Victims, whether in person or online, become an ongoing 
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production of massively public dialogue where they are decontextualized and objectified at a 
distance as others (here, the police) project their beliefs, values, and morals onto them. Victims 
who challenge the historically stereotypical ways that law enforcement assumes victims should 
behave or appear in their emotional affect, sexual history, race, sex, and gender ultimately pose 
dilemmas for the criminal justice system and society at large (Benedet, 2010; Gotell, 2008; 
Johnson, 2017; Randall, 2010; Yung, 2017). Often, differences from the “normed” perceptions 
of victimhood lead police to classify rape as either a lesser crime or a non-criminal event 
(Gilsinan, 2012). Further, in the rarer instances where a case moves to trial, defense counsels 
often employ the use of myths and stereotypes about rape to undermine the credibility of the 
victim, even where rape shield laws are designed to prevent such practices (Craig, 2014; 
Johnson, 2017; Yung, 2017). When this occurs, the victim’s sexual history and past actions can 
become implicated in the allegation of rape and, in turn, can affect perceptions of consent. 
Intoxicated victims, for example, are often seen as defying standards of sexual safekeeping by 
placing themselves at risk, even if they did not become intoxicated of their own volition 
(Benedet, 2010). Intoxication, therefore, introduces doubt between “legal consent” and “moral 
consent” in the case, which the defense can exploit. After all, legally, the fact that a complainant 
was intoxicated does not negate her or his capacity to consent, neither does lack of memory 
mean the complainant did not consent at one point (McCabe, 2017). Even where the Canadian 
Criminal Code has clarified that an individual must have an active mind during sexual activity to 
consent, then, myths and stereotypes of the “ideal” victim pervade the criminal justice system 
and continue to test the application of the sexual assault law in practice.  
Research also suggests that, across the United States and Canada, police and prosecutors 
complicate how rape is reported and documented. Laying charges in sexual assault cases is also 
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highly political, as charges affect crime statistics, police department response rates, city safety 
indexes, as well as the reputation of police officers, prosecutors, and other political authorities. In 
Nashville, Tennessee, for example, Police Chief Ronal Sherpas claimed great successes in 
reducing crime in the city over a span of six years. Yet, from 2004 to 2010, the department’s 
numbers did not align with annual crime reports conducted by the FBI and the Tennessee Bureau 
of Investigation, which showed that crime rates were on the rise. An investigation into the 
discrepancy later revealed that, under Sherpas’ guidance, police officers deliberately 
underreported rape cases or classified them as “matters of record” to claim a significant decrease 
in crime rates (Williams, 2011).26 Hundreds of rape cases were later reclassified, but Sherpas 
continued on in his career without reprimand and eventually, for a time, became the 
Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department. Furthermore, Yung (2017) explored the 
lack of investigation by police departments in forcible rape cases in America and found that not 
only are rapes highly underreported by the police, but also rape kits are often not obtained. When 
rape kits are obtained, Yung found that police often do not test them, leading to as many as 
400,000 untested rape kits by 2014. Further, in rare instances where evidence is obtained from a 
rape kit, Yung (2017) note that the prosecution rarely introduces it at trial due to “spillover 
effects,” such as lengthy delays in processing rape kits, that may affect institutional reputations. 
Similarly, McGregor et al. (2000) found that an “estimated 94% of sexual assault cases never 
come to the attention of the criminal justice system” in Canada because victims feel they will not 
be believed or that they are somehow to blame.  
                                                
26 In Nashville, TN, as well as other states, a “matter of record” does not show up in in crime statistics because it is  
not reported as a crime or a criminal investigation. A “matter of record” refers to anything—testimony, evidence, 
rulings and sometimes arguments—that has been entered into the formal written public record of a court, which can 
be proved by the production of that record. Matters of public record are generally available to the public unless state 
law or court order prevents them from being released. For example, many courts refuse to release the names of 
minors who are victims of sexual assault.  
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The power and authority police and prosecutors exercise in pursuing a case and laying 
charges, allows them to act as gatekeepers who shape legal and popular discourses of rape 
through their action and inaction. As a criminal charge, moreover, rape must be proved “beyond 
a reasonable doubt,” as the consequence of a conviction is the loss of liberty to the accused. A 
judge or jury must have little to no doubt that there was criminal intent on the part of the 
accused, that the act occurred, and, in some instances that there was malice. With such a high 
burden of proof, then, it is conceivable that police and prosecutors primarily pursue cases where 
they believe they have substantial evidence to ensure a conviction. Further, police and 
prosecutors are duty bound to respect due process, which secures the accused the right to defend 
himself or herself against the allegations. Yet, in instances where a case moves to trial, 
evidentiary burdens make a rape conviction harder to secure because any ambiguity associated 
with consent introduces doubt that the sexual activity was unwanted. Therefore, as Yung (2017) 
and Johnson (2017) conclude, the institutional “culture of skepticism” that infuses the criminal 
justice systems of America and Canada, respectively, fundamentally shape whether evidence is 
collected or not, what evidence counts, and whether a case is worth pursuing based on a 
combination of evidentiary burdens, evidence collected, and personal discretion.  
Evidentiary Burdens and the Limits of Law: Laying Charges in the Rehteah Parsons Case 
Amidst laws that have reaffirmed ongoing affirmative consent and an active mind to 
consent, the prevailing standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” remains lofty and often 
problematic for victims of sexual assault because intervening circumstances such as intoxication 
introduce doubt in consenting to sexual activity (Benedet, 2010). In Rehteah Parson’s sexual 
assault allegation, then, intoxication and the lack of DNA evidence contributed to an enormous 
burden of proof, even as visual evidence was present to establish that sexual activity of some 
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kind took place. Despite the facts that Rehteah could not recall consenting to sex or to being 
photographed during sex, the image of a young man penetrating her from behind as he gestured a 
thumbs up while she vomited was not enough to establish criminal intent. Rehteah had attended 
the party of her own volition, she drank of her own volition, and she did not report the alleged 
assault until five days after the incident when DNA evidence was no longer present (Segal, 
2015). Only when she found out about the photo and its circulation on social media did Rehteah 
report the case (Milton & Pepler, 2015). 
Left with few evidentiary means to secure a criminal charge of rape, Detective Constable 
(D./Cst.) Patricia Snair of the Halifax police's Sexual Assault Investigation Unit (SAIT) began 
the investigation by interviewing Rehteah, pursuing phone records of the accused, and 
attempting to interview individuals who attended the party where the incident occurred. During a 
preliminary interview with Rehteah conducted on November 29th, 2011, Snair identified both 
alleged sexual assault and child pornography offenses, as Rehteah was a minor (Segal, 2015). 
Attempting to establish intent through evidence, Snair worked to collect BlackBerry Messenger 
(BBM) data associated with the various phone numbers Rehteah disclosed. Snair also contacted 
Constable Jason Hill, the police school liaison officer at Cole Harbor High, which Rehteah and 
the suspects attended. Snair believed that organizing interviews at the school would expedite the 
process, as this strategy had been employed in previous cases with success (Segal, 2015). Yet, 
the school administration blocked her efforts, arguing that the interviews could not be carried out 
on school property because the incidents did not occur at the school.  
In the months that followed, Snair actively pursued all angles of the case. Eventually 
obtaining from on of Rheteah’s friends a copy of the photo of Rehteah that circulated in Cole 
Harbor High, Snair explored the child pornography angle with the Royal Canadian Mounted 
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Police/Halifax Regional Police’s (RCMP/HRP) Integrated Internet Child Exploitation (ICE) unit. 
Learning the means through which the maximum amount of evidence could be collected, Snair 
prepared and filed two production orders. The first, filed with BlackBerry’s corporate parent, 
Research In Motion (RIM), attempted to capture and preserve the data of the cellphones of three 
suspects so it could be used in the ongoing investigation. The second production order, filed with 
the telecommunications service providers, attempted to unearth the specific text messages of the 
suspects implicated in the investigation, as this information would greatly aid in contextualizing 
the events of the evening and possibly establish motive.  
Complying with the first order in December, RIM preserved text messages, BBM data, 
emails, and pictures sent to or from the cellphones of the three alleged suspects for the period 
from November 12 to November 23 of 2011. With the data preserved, Snair worked to obtain a 
court-issued production order to unlock the specific phone numbers and PINs so she could 
process the second production order and obtain the data directly from the telecommunication 
service providers (Segal, 2015). Snair continued to pursue interviews with individuals who may 
have been involved while she waited for the court-issued production order to process. Blocked 
by the school, Snair interviewed Rehteah’s friend Lucy and Lucy’s mother, and a second friend, 
Amanda, who had initially informed Rehteah of the photo.27 Snair learned that Lucy and her 
mother attempted to take Rehteah home the night of the incident, but neither could get her to 
leave the house. Neither reported seeing the alleged rape. Similarly, Amanda was not at the 
party, and claimed she could not remember who she had received the photo from before 
informing Rehteah about it.   
                                                
27 As is customary in sexual assault cases due to threat of retaliation, names of bystanders, the accused, and, usually, 
the victim(s) are masked. I’ve used the pseudonyms used in The Segal Report. 
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During this time, Rehteah transferred schools twice. One month after transferring to 
Dartmouth High shortly after the spread of the alleged rape photo at Cole Harbor High, she 
decided to transfer again in early December. Rehteah notified the principal and school liaison of 
the circulating photo, but no authority took any disciplinary action (Milton & Pepler, 2012; 
Segal, 2015).  
In February, Snair obtained the phone numbers and PINs of the suspects, which she used 
to retrieve the cellphone data from the two telecommunication service providers of the suspects. 
Filing the second production order, Snair waited approximately 30 days before the providers 
returned most of the cellphone data including text messages for three of the four numbers in the 
capture. From late March 2012 to the end of April 2012, Snair combed over the text messages 
and noted that “while they corroborated various aspects of the allegations, they did not provide 
any indication as to who sent or received the impugned photo” (Segal, 2015, p. 15). Further, no 
messages “confirmed” Rehteah Parsons was sexually assaulted.  
From April 2012 to June 2012, Snair tracked down the individual who gave Rehteah the 
photo and attempted to interview other potential witnesses. Rachel, a friend of Rheteah’s who 
received the photo, agreed to meet with Snair. Rachel informed Snair that she asked Lucy for the 
photo, which she later forwarded to Rehteah three days after the party. Snair determined that 
neither Rachel nor Lucy held malice for Rehteah in sharing the photo. Continuing the 
investigation, Snair sought an interview with the mother of two of the boys present the night of 
the incident—Max and Adam in the Segal Report (2015)—and whose house had been the place 
where the alleged rape took place. Based on previous interviews she had conducted, Snair knew 
the boys’ mother had also been present at the house for part of the evening. Snair left numerous 
voicemails with the boys’ mother, but was unable to reach her throughout June.  
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At the end of June, prompted by threats Rehteah had received online via social media, a 
meeting was held with Snair, Sergeant Legere (Snair’s supervisor), Rehteah, Leah Parsons 
(Rehteah’s mother), Glenn Canning (Rehteah’s father), and Verona Singer, a Victim Services 
case worker. During the meeting, Leah expressed concerns that the investigation was taking too 
long, but was assuaged by Sgt. Legere who noted that such investigations can take up to a year to 
complete (Segal, 2015). Rehteah then shared the threats she had received online, and a video 
interview was conducted. A determination was made that the threats were unrelated to the 
ongoing investigation, and they were assigned to patrol for investigation.  
From July 2012 to August 2012, Snair continued to reach out to Max and Adam’s 
mother, as well as another potential witnesses At the end of July, Adam picked up the phone, and 
Snair informed him that she was conducting an investigation and wanted to speak with him, 
Max, and his mother, as well as two other potential witnesses, Eric and Josh. Snair advised him 
to have his mother contact her to schedule a time to meet. While Snair waited to hear back from 
Max and Adam’s mother, she called Eric’s mother and convinced her to have Eric come in to 
provide a statement. In late August, Eric met with Snair and a video interview was conducted. At 
the end of August, Snair received a voicemail from Max and Adam’s mother. She provided her 
email address and indicated that it was the best way for Snair to reach her. Snair sent an email in 
which she clarified that she was “investigating a sexual assault that would have taken place at her 
home while she was present for a certain period of time, as well as child pornography offences” 
(Segal, 2015, p. 17). Snair asked to meet with her and her sons. A day later, Max and Adam’s 
mother agreed to meet, but then hesitated to pin down a date until she spoke with her husband.  
In early September 2012, Snair emailed the mother to arrange a time to meet. During this 
time, Leah Parsons contacted Snair for an update. Snair disclosed that she was pursuing 
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interviews and that she would update Leah accordingly. On September 19th, Max and Adam’s 
mother replied to Snair, declining to meet. That same day Snair reached out to Josh, who agreed 
to meet with her. Because he was a minor, Snair advised him to speak with his parents and call 
her back to arrange a time. On October 9th, Snair left a voicemail with Josh. He later returned 
the call and asked if it was mandatory for them to meet. Snair informed Josh that it was 
voluntary at that time, and he subsequently declined.  
On October 26th 2012, Snair once again met with ICE. She and Corporal Jadie Spence 
reviewed the file and agreed that they had sufficient evidence to arrest Adam and Josh for 
distributing child pornography, and Eric for possessing child pornography (Segal, 2015). They 
discussed the need to seize the phone pursuant to arrest, and that a warrant would be required to 
search the phones once they were seized. From here, Snair contacted the RCMP Technological 
Crime Unit and learned that it could possibly retrieve evidence of a photo to or from a 
Blackberry, even if it had been deleted.  
That same day, Snair met with her supervisor, Sergeant Legere, to discuss whether 
charges could be laid in either offense. Upon review of the file, both determined that the sexual 
assault charge might be challenging, and, thus, decided to seek the advice of Crown counsel. 
According to the Segal Report (2015), “They were of the view that, based on memory issues, 
conflicting evidence and internal inconsistencies in Rehtaeh’s account, there was insufficient 
evidence to proceed with the laying of that charge” (p. 18). As for the child pornography offense, 
both Snair and Legere believed they had sufficient evidence to lay charges. They planned to 
proceed with arrests and seize the suspects’ phones. 
Days later, on October 30th 2012, Snair consulted with Crown counsel, Shauna 
MacDonald. Upon review of the file, Ms. MacDonald determined that no sexual assault charges 
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would be laid. An experienced sexual assault prosecutor, Ms. MacDonald clarified that the 
“memory/reliability issues, as well as credibility issues stemming from inconsistencies between 
Rehtaeh’s first and second statement, between her statements and text messages she had sent, 
and between her statement and Lucy’s statement” made it such that there was no reasonable 
prospect of conviction (Segal, 2015, p. 22). Upon review of the child pornography offense, Snair 
and Ms. MacDonald sought the advice of senior Crown Counsel responsible for child 
pornography and cyber offenses. At the time, they were unable to get a hold of the senior 
specialist, and so determination of proceeding with the charge was temporarily stalled.  
During the same day, Leah Parsons called the police and complained about the length of 
the investigation and the attitude of Snair. The responding officer informed Leah he would 
review the case and follow up with her. The responding officer reviewed the file and met with 
Legere. Both agreed that “a considerable amount of work had been done,” and Legere agreed to 
follow up with Leah (Segal, 2015, p. 19).  
The next day Legere spoke with Leah and informed her that, following a Crown 
consultation, there was insufficient evidence to lay sexual assault charges. Legere shared that 
senior Crown counsel was currently reviewing the child pornography offense. Legere then 
concluded the conversation, agreeing to follow up with Leah about the findings. 
On November 2nd, 2012, Snair spoke with junior Crown counsel, Peter Dostal. He 
informed her that the Crown would “not be in a position to proceed with child pornography 
charges” (Segal, 2015, p. 19). Dostal explained that, if the sexual assault allegation was no 
longer part of the charges, it might avail the photographer a “personal use defense”  (Segal, 
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2015, p. 24).28, 29 Dostal also believed it would be hard for individuals to determine whether the 
subjects depicted were underage or not, even though Rehteah could identify herself in the photo. 
Upon further discussion with Dostal, Snair indicated that it was, “her interpretation that the 
Crown was ‘not willing’ to proceed with charges of child pornography or sexual assault” (Segal, 
2015, p. 19). Snair then discussed the case with Legere, and both determined no charges would 
be laid. 
One year after the initial incident, on November 14, 2012, Legere finally reached Leah to 
discuss the case. Legere explained that the police had consulted with the Crown and informed 
her that the child pornography charges were not going to be laid. Here, Leah claims police told 
her it was a “he said, she said” case and that there was insufficient evidence to lay charges 
(“Rape, bullying,” 2013).  Legere also explained that he would notify the suspects and their 
families, cautioning them against such behaviors in the future.  
Upon Leah’s request that Legere be the one to inform Rehteah, Legere phoned her on 
November 16th, 2012. During this phone call, Legere clarified that no charges would be laid 
(Segal, 2015). He explained the results of the investigation. Rehteah indicated that she 
understood. After the conversation, Legere emailed Leah, letting her know he had spoken with 
Rehteah, and attempted to connect them with Victim Services.  
In early December 2012, Snair contacted the suspects’ families to inform them that no 
charges would be laid. Meeting with each of their families over a span of three days, Snair 
                                                
28 This defense allows individuals who engage in lawful sexual activity to record their activity, provided it is for 
their own private use. Possession of imagery is, therefore, lawful if those individuals consented to its creation and 
that the picture is only kept for their own use and has therefore not been distributed to others.  
 
29 On this point the Segal Report is clear that the Crown failed Rehteah Parsons. Because the image had been 
distributed to numerous individuals, there was no reasonable claim to a “personal use defense.” Instead, the junior 
Crown counsel relied on the circumstantial evidence to ascertain that, without the allegation of sexual assault, doubt 
could be cast as to whether the individuals consented to its creation.  
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obtained assurances that the parents would talk with their children about the seriousness of their 
actions. On December 7th, 2012, Snair closed the file and filed a concluding report.  
After Rehteah learned that no charges would be laid, Leah claimed that Rehteah became 
increasingly depressed. In addition to the school transfers as the photo circulated from one 
school to another, Rehteah was bullied for more than a year after the alleged sexual assault. Leah 
claimed that Rehteah was slut-shamed at school and online, and that she received solicitations 
for sex from strangers (Newton, 2013; “Rape, bullying,” 2013). In March 2013, Rehteah sought 
mental health services for suicidal thoughts from IWK Healthcare Center (Milton & Pepler, 
2015; “Rape, bullying,” 2013), but she did not free herself of them.  
On April 5th, 2013, Rehteah hung herself in the bathroom of her mother’s home. Leah 
found Rehteah after breaking down the door, but Rehteah was already comatose. Rehteah was 
rushed to a hospital. There she was put on life support until her family made the decision to take 
her off of it on April 7th (Jauregui, 2013). On April 8th, Rehteah passed away.  
According the Segal Report (2015), Leah Parsons received a private message on 
Facebook from Josh the day after Rehteah passed away. That same day, when the Chief of Police 
and Chief Superintendent met with Rehteah’s parents, Leah shared the email with them.30 With 
new disclosures revealed upon review of the email, the Chief of Police and Chief Superintendent 
promised to take another look at the file. Around this time, too, the hacktivist group known as 
Anonymous became involved in the case, creating the campaign “#OpJustice4Rehteah.” On 
April 10, 2013, Anonymous released a formal statement online wherein the organization 
                                                
30 According to a post from Glen Canning’s blog dated August 9th, 2013 (the day after charges were laid against 
both Josh and Adam), Josh revealed everything about that evening to Leah after hearing Rehteah died. “He told her 
everything he knew. He said Rehtaeh seemed fine with everything. He stated she gave permission even when she 
was throwing up and that she was willing even though they had to carry her around and dress her when they were 
finished. He said he didn’t want to live with the title rapist and that it was the most hurtful thing he could imagine. 
He said he was sorry, and that he cried when he found out Rehtaeh had died. He said he regrets giving a thumbs up 
and smiling as the photo was taken. But, he says, ‘..I cannot lie to you and say we all did not rape her, I can tell you 
for sure that I did not rape her…’” (Canning, 2013).  
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demanded that the RCMP act swiftly to provide justice for Rehteah’s family or else the names of 
the alleged rapists would be revealed (“#OpJustice4Rehteah,” 2013; “Rehteah Parsons suicide,” 
2013).  
Over the next two days, social media exploded. “Nova Scotia” trended on twitter and 
social media lit up with Anonymous’ hashtag as countless people claimed to identify the names 
of the alleged rapists (“Rehteah Parsons mom calls,” 2013). The outpouring of condemnation 
compelled Leah to ask the public to respect her family’s privacy and let the justice system mete 
out the final verdict. In response to Leah, Anonymous ultimately decided not to reveal the names 
of the alleged rapists out of respect for the family (“‘Anonymous’ won’t release names,” 2013; 
“Rehteah Parsons mom calls,” 2013). Concurrently over the same two-day period, the RCMP 
worked quickly to capture and preserve information related to Josh’s Facebook page and emails 
from April 8 to April 10 (Segal, 2015). Once Facebook complied, the National Child 
Exploitation Coordination Centre (NCECC) reviewed the preserved data. Shortly after, the 
RCMP issued a press release regarding the re-opening of the investigation (Segal, 2015; 
“Rehteah Parsons case to be reopened,” 2013).  
From April 2013 to August 2013, the RCMP reviewed Snair’s extensive case file 
alongside the recently captured evidence in Josh’s Facebook message to Leah Parsons and 
collected additional information. On August 8th, 2013, the RCMP/HRP then laid charges against 
Josh and Adam. Josh was charged with distribution of child pornography, while Adam was 
charged with distribution and creation of child pornography (Segal, 2015).  
Criminal trial proceedings ensued, and in September of 2014 Adam, then 20, entered a 
guilty plea on the charge of creation of child pornography. The Crown withdrew the charge of 
distribution of child pornography, as it appeared Adam had only sent the photo to Josh (Bruce, 
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2014). Given that Adam was a minor at the time of the crime, however, and under guidance of 
Canada’s Youth Criminal Justice Act, Judge Gregory Lenehan was limited in the penalties he 
could mete out. In November 2014, noting that the young man had battled mental health issues 
since the incident, Judge Lenehan sentenced him to a conditional discharge and 12 months of 
seeing a probation officer (“No jail for Canadian man,” 2014). In outlining his decision, Judge 
Lenehan delivered a strong rebuke to the young man:  
“In a few seconds, (you) set in motion a series of events that led to a great deal of 
shame, humiliation, anger, despair, anguish, loss, hurt and destruction for (the 
girl), for her family, for you, for your family, for the entire community” (“No jail 
time in high-profile pornography case,” 2014). 
 
The judge also ordered Adam to write an apology letter to the family and to abstain from contact 
with Rehteah’s parents and the other suspect on trial. Although Rehteah’s parents desired a 
harsher penalty, they felt that the judge ultimately delivered justice since the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act prevented more severe sentencing (“No jail time in high-profile pornography case,” 
2014). 
Later that same month, Josh, then 19, pleaded guilty to one charge of distribution of child 
pornography. He admitted that he sent the photo to two young women at his school, and that the 
photo spread across social media thereafter (“Second young man pleads guilty,” 2014). Two 
months later, Judge Lenehan sentenced him to one year of probation and required him to submit 
a DNA sample to a national databank. Noting that this young man “stole from [Rehteah] her 
dignity, privacy and self-respect,” Lenehan offered a broader contextualization of the entire case: 
“I suspect that through this process and the notoriety of it, there have actually 
been a number of people saved from the humiliation that Ms. Parsons suffered. 





So ruled, the judge also ordered Josh to take part in the provincial sexual offender treatment 
program and receive mental health counseling. At trial’s end, Josh apologized, noting, “If I knew 
what one picture could do, there would not have been that one picture” (Bruce, 2015). Indeed, all 
it took was one picture to end Rehteah’s life, and one picture to vindicate her death. 
What Counts as “Evidence”?: Gatekeeping in Law 
With an understanding of the work conducted by Snair and the RCMP/HRP and a deeper 
contextualization of the case than condensed media reports, I now turn to consider the ways the 
case progressed in attempting to meet the various evidentiary burdens in both offenses. In 
analyzing these evidentiary burdens, I highlight how law enforcement determined what counted 
as evidence and whether charges could be made based on the “reasoned” interpretations by 
authority figures. I also critique what counts as “viable” evidence, as law enforcement failed to 
consider and include the ongoing harassment Rehteah experienced online, which she 
documented and shared with the RCMP.  
Throughout the investigation into the alleged sexual assault of Rehteah Parsons, 
numerous problems emerged in the collection of evidence and its interpretation. While the Segal 
Report (2015) reveals that the RCMP rightly concluded that there was not enough evidence to 
lay charges in the sexual assault offense, it also highlights numerous areas where police and 
prosecutors acted as gatekeepers based on personal discretion and their interpretations of the law. 
This is not to say that any of the authority figures were wholly “wrong” in the process or in their 
interpretations, but rather that a greater duty of care was not exercised during the process with 
respect to the exigent issue of cyberbullying and the year-long torment Rehteah suffered.  
While Rehteah did not report the alleged rape until after she learned of the circulation of 
a photograph depicting her engaged in a sexual act to which she did not recall consenting (Milton 
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& Pepler, 2015), the lack of broader contextual evidence became a central consideration in 
whether to lay charges in the sexual assault offense. Without more detailed testimony from 
witnesses and suspects, which Detective Constable Snair had tried to obtain over a series of 
months (Segal, 2015), there was not enough “hard evidence” to move forward with charges. As 
the Milton and Pepler report (2015) makes clear, Rehteah’s school, Cole Harbour, stymied Snair 
in her attempts to interview potential witnesses and suspects. Cole Harbor school administrators 
knew about the seriousness of the allegations, but took no further action because Rehteah 
transferred to another school as the investigation ensued (Milton & Pepler, 2015). As a result, 
school administrators ignored any accountability to their former student, Rehteah, and also 
asserted authority in ways that inadvertently protected bystanders from being more involved in 
the investigation. Therefore, when Snair sought interviews directly with individuals, the added 
“veil of deniability” cast by Cole Habrour administrators contributed to a reduction in personal 
accountability in bystanders and a reticence to participate, as the interviews and the investigation 
were not deemed crucial enough to warrant broader attention. Even when reports of bullying and 
cyberbullying surfaced, school administrators remained uninvolved and did not share this 
information with any of the three schools Rehteah had subsequently transferred to over the next 
year (Milton & Pepler, 2015). 
Coupled with the lack of DNA evidence, Rehteah’s memory issues due to intoxication, 
and inconsistencies between her first and second statements, the lack of witness/suspect 
testimony became the death knell for the sexual assault charge in the investigation. When Snair 
met with Crown counselor Shauna MacDonald to seek guidance about potential charges, 
MacDonald made it clear that there was no reasonable prospect of a conviction since there was 
reasonable doubt as to Rehteah’s credibility, especially when compared to the testimony 
 
 122 
obtained from Lucy (Segal, 2015).31 Even though Snair collected a great deal of evidence in 
obtaining the photo, text messages, and some testimony, the suspects’ phones and digital traces 
of the photo were never obtained during the initial investigation. Curiously, digital information 
on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter and other online sites was also not included as 
evidence, even though Rehteah collected, preserved, and shared it with police over the course of 
the year-long investigation (Ross, 2013). Instead, the information from online sources was met 
with either skepticism or outright dismissal, as police and prosecutors focused exclusively on the 
evidence Snair obtained in-person during the investigation (Segal, 2015).  
Furthermore, even if legal procedures mandated strict protocols in the collection of 
evidence, the Segal and the Milton-Pepler Reports highlight that authority figures at all levels 
largely ignored the seriousness of the cyberbullying, even as it was connected to the case. 
Casting “evidence” as only that which could be obtained through in-person seizure, the police 
fundamentally failed to consider the digital information online that may have related to the case 
and could be captured and preserved in the same way that the cellphone data was during the 
investigation. As a result, police reproduced the “culture of skepticism” even as they had reason 
to believe the digital information might pertain to the case.  
It is perhaps ironic, therefore, that digital information shared online on the boys’ 
Facebook pages and Rehetah’s social profiles became the impetus for reopening the case after 
Rehteah’s death. As Anonymous threatened to expose the alleged rapists and called others to put 
pressure on the police through the #OpJustice4Rehteah hashtag that trended on Twitter, 
                                                
31 Lucy was a friend of Rehteah’s who attended the party with her. As previously noted, she and her mother 
attempted to remove Rehteah from the house that evening, but Rehteah claimed she was “too tired” and did not 
leave with Lucy and her mother (Segal, 2015). It appears that Lucy provided a more lucid account of the evening, 
having consumed significantly less alcohol than Rehteah, though, by the reports obtained for this analysis, there is 




crowdsourced morality manifested in intense public scrutiny directed toward the RCMP online 
and offline. As the RCMP received both the Facebook email that Josh sent to Leah Parsons and 
the package of digital information mined across various platforms and electronically delivered to 
police by Anonymous (Ross, 2013; Segal, 2015), it is no surprise that the RCMP was suddenly 
“compelled” to reconsider the case as crowdsourced morality placed social pressure on them to 
act or face greater embarrassment. Though the RCMP claimed new evidence emerged that 
wasn’t from online sources, a review of the Segal Report (2015) makes it clear that Josh’s email 
rekindled the investigation.  
Despite this reversal of policy and the subsequent convictions, Crown counsel initially 
acted as a gatekeeper in the laying of charges in the creation and distribution of child 
pornography. Again, when Snair and her supervisor, Legere, discussed the case before meeting 
with Crown counsel, they believed they already had enough evidence to warrant laying these 
charges (Segal, 2015). Yet, after the meeting, Snair was left with the impression that the Crown 
was “not willing” to proceed with the charge of child pornography due to concerns surrounding 
identification of the individuals depicted (Segal, 2015, p. 19). A day later, Snair’s impression 
was solidified after a conversation with junior Crown counsel, Peter Dostal, who explained that, 
without the underlying allegation of sexual assault, the case appeared to fall to a “personal use 
defense” that would nullify the charge of child pornography (Segal, 2015, p. 22). Yet Dostal and 
his supervisor, senior Crown Craig Botterill, overlooked the fact that the photograph was not for 
personal use, as it was distributed to numerous individuals without the knowledge or consent of 
all parties depicted (White, 2015). Indeed, with the photo publicly disseminated the day after the 
alleged rape, it became the primary means through which others engaged in crowdsourced 
morality to shame and torment Rehteah first at Cole Harbor High and then as she transferred 
 
 124 
from school to school to school. In relying only on the circumstantial evidence collected by 
Snair, then, the prosecution foreclosed possibility of the child pornography charges until “new 
evidence” emerged that was, paradoxically, already part of the investigation.  
Once again, the gatekeeping role that authority figures exercise fundamentally shapes the 
constitution of evidence, as well as its preponderance. Relying on law, legal procedure, and 
personal discretion, police and prosecution construct and reconstruct a case through the 
collection and codification of evidence that nonetheless still may not fully capture and 
contextualize the case. As both the victim and evidence are subjected to diverse interpretations in 
the ongoing process of an investigation, institutional and popular influences of “rape” and “rape 
culture” continue to affect the laying of charges and also inflect a patriarchal understanding of 
the law. Indeed, while Rehteah’s statements may have been inconsistent, as many rape victims’ 
statements can be after experiencing such trauma (Benedet, 2010; Johnson, 2017; Randall, 2010; 
Yung, 2017), the dereliction of duty to protect Rehteah by including the ongoing digital 
information she collected during the initial investigation remains a haunting reminder that those 
in authority control the flow of information, what counts as evidence, and whether a case ever 
sees trial.  
In the end, both child pornography convictions were hollow victories for Rehteah and her 
parents. They could not reclaim their loss, but in their loss, were able to spark provincial, 
national, and international conversations about cyberbullying. Compelled by Anonymous and the 
power of crowdsourced morality that targeted the RCMP, the Nova Scotia provincial 
government responded to the tragic death of Rehteah by introducing the Cyber-safety Act days 
after her death. While not a remedy to her alleged rape and death, the passage of the bill 
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remedied what authority figures believed to be the most exigent and salient issue overlooked in 
the investigation: online harassment.  
Cultural Shifts in Sharing Information: Lessons from the Cyber-safety Act 
As digital media and the social web have produced an “always on” media landscape that 
casts any digital disclosure as “public by default, and private through effort” (boyd, 2012), 
crowdsourced morality has become an outcome of the intersection of what technology allows for 
and various human desires and drives. Consequently, Rehteah’s image became a public spectacle 
the moment it was shared without her knowledge or consent. From there, as with the imagery of 
Nikki Catsouras and Oscar Grant, the image spread due to its graphic nature, allowing 
individuals the opportunity to imbue it with their own thoughts and beliefs in the “middle 
ground” of digital space and then to victim-blame and, therefore, dehumanize the person behind 
the image.  
The passage of the Cyber-safety Act into law, therefore, sought to ameliorate the 
numerous failings by law enforcement in the Rehteah Parsons case by ensuring greater 
protections for individuals and their information online. The Act established a special taskforce 
known as CyberScan and imbued this unit with the powers to identify, pursue, and penalize 
online offenders through protection orders (Cyber-safety Act, 2013). The Act afforded police a 
more discernable presence online that, it was thought, would curtail harassment online. It also 
expanded the power and authority of police into digital space, an environment that no law had 
previously ever fully addressed, leading to new tactics of surveillance, data collection, and 
punishment that, however, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia would find infringed upon 
individual rights to life, liberty, and security of the person.   
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CyberScan became fully operational in September 2013. A new unit of the local RCMP, 
its primary mission was to “provide safer communities by creating administrative and court 
processes that can be used to address and prevent cyberbullying” (Cyber-safety Act, 2013, p. 2). 
The Cyber-safety Act (2013) defined cyberbullying as 
any electronic communication through the use of technology including, without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, computers, other electronic devices, 
social networks, text messaging, instant messaging, websites and electronic mail, 
typically repeated or with continuing effect, that is intended or ought reasonably 
[to] be expected to cause fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or other damage 
or harm to another person’s health, emotional well-being, self-esteem or 
reputation, and includes assisting or encouraging such communication in any way.  
 
So defined, the law allowed individuals (legally referred to as applicants) to seek protection 
orders from the CyberScan unit if they could demonstrate harassment online from a bully 
(legally, a respondent). If issued, a protection order had wide ranging powers including: the 
ability to restrict the actions of the respondent(s); public identification of the respondent(s); 
allowing suit of the respondent, and, if the respondent was a minor, holding parents liable for the 
damages; and, in extreme cases where the respondent failed to curtail his or her behaviors, 
confiscating, for a limited time, that respondent’s phone and other electronic devices, as well as 
requiring the respondent to “discontinue receiving service from an Internet service provider” 
(Cyber-safety Act, 2013; “New anti-cyberbullying act,” 2013). Police, therefore, had greater 
power and authority to intervene on the part of victims, where they were previously restricted in 
law; and victims legally had a right to sue for damages if they could adequately demonstrate 
harms in tort.  
Between September 2013 and December 2015, Nova Scotia regulated cyberbullying, as 
the Cyber-safety Act initiated new legal procedures for assessing tortious damage in online 
communications and harassment. In one high-profile case, actress-turned-politician Lenore Zann 
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sought a protection order after a teenager posted a topless photo of her on Twitter and refused to 
take it down. After working with the CyberScan team and police, who apparently intervened in a 
more informal fashion by speaking with the teenager and his parents, Zann dropped her 
complaint (MacDonald, 2013). In another instance, however, the owner of Halifax’s largest 
tabloid magazine, Parker Rudderham, attempted to bring suit against a Cape Breton woman and 
her son for “cyberbullying” tweets about him (Kimber, 2014). The definition of cyberbullying in 
the Cyber-safety Act was broad in its scope and interpretation, and it became increasingly 
unclear where free speech stopped and cyberbullying began. Even as Roger Merrick, the 
CyberScan Team Director, and his team actively worked to dismantle cyberbullying cases 
informally through one-on-one discussions with individuals and educational efforts, the law was 
met with concerns about infringement on freedom of speech. 
In August 2015, the law met its first constitutional challenge. In this particular case, Giles 
W. Couch sought a protection order from the CyberScan Team when he noticed that his former 
business partner, Robert Snell, began posting vague, threatening messages he felt were aimed at 
him (Couch v. Snell, 2015). Mr. Couch was granted a protection order ex parte, without notice to 
Mr. Snell, after police reviewed numerous messages posted by Mr. Snell from July 2014 to 
December 2014. Thereafter, the protection order prohibited Mr. Snell from engaging in 
cyberbullying of Mr. Couch, directly or indirectly communicating with or about Mr. Couch, and 
implored him to remove all comments from social media that might be directly or indirectly 
associated with Mr. Couch (Couch v. Snell, 2015). When Mr. Snell did not remove numerous 




After review of the case, Honorable Justice Glen G. McDougall found that neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant were beyond reproach in their online communications (Couch v. Snell, 
2015). Yet, he found that Mr. Snell’s actions online had, in fact, crossed a line when they 
intended to embarrass and shame Mr. Couch prior to a CTV News interview to discuss cyber 
security. At that time, Mr. Snell posted on his Google+ account, “That is brilliant, almost like 
asking a plumber for medical advice. #news.” Snell posted such messages across all his social 
media, and the veiled messages appeared to attack Mr. Couch for months. Consequently, Justice 
McDougall ultimately decided to reconfirm the protection order on August 25, 2015, citing that 
“Mr. Snell engaged in cyberbullying of Mr. Couch […] and that behavior was likely to continue” 
without the protection order (Couch v. Snell, 2015, p. 19).  
Still, Justice McDougall also found the definition of “cyberbullying” too broad and 
vague. Questioning the legality of the application of the law, McDougall argued that the 
definition itself did not necessarily include the role of malice—the desire to do harm or cause 
mischief to others. Instead, he noted that “the statutory definition of cyberbullying includes 
conduct where harm was not intended, but ought reasonably to have been expected,” thereby 
opening the law to a constitutional challenge (Couch v. Snell, 2015, p. 21).  
Upon further review, McDougall struck down the law. Citing concerns with the 
arbitrariness, overbreadth, gross disproportionality, and vagueness of the law centering around 
the definition of “cyberbullying,” McDougall outlined the numerous ways the law, while well 
meaning, infringed upon freedom of speech. In particular, he found that, without a clear 
definition of cyberbullying that included malice and clear mechanisms to remedy and prevent 
cyberbullying, the law was too imprecise to warrant even a temporary stay of it (Couch v. Snell, 
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2015). So moved, the CyberScan Team could no longer conduct investigations, leaving roughly 
20 active cases in limbo at the time the law was overruled (Corfu, 2017).  
Since the law was struck down, there have been rumblings in Nova Scotia to revise and 
revive the law to protect both youth and adults. In fact, as of this writing, legislation has been 
discussed and is to be introduced later in 2018 (Gorman, 2017). Yet, of fundamental concern, 
whether the new law is passed or not, is the ongoing tension between freedom of speech and 
governmental control. Any new iteration of the Cyber-safety Act will continue to contend with 
the thin line between personal expressions, arbitrary social rules of appropriateness, and 
government authority to determine what is and is not acceptable. 
While the Cyber-safety Act was well intentioned, and while any new law will likely be in 
the same vein, the policing of expression online fundamentally threatens free speech when it 
attempts to prevent individuals from expressing their thoughts. Regardless of whether that 
speech is personal opinion or borders on hatespeech, freedom of speech protects individual 
expression in person and online to the extent that it is not wholly inflammatory, an incitement to 
violence, or outright hatespeech in most Western democracies. Of course, where threats are made 
online and become perpetual and personal to the point of destroying the safety, dignity, and 
respect of the individual, the law should expand to protect the individual, especially if there is a 
“gap” in law that does not fully ensure legal protections. In Rehteah Parsons’ case, however, it 
was not the absence of law that failed her. Rather, it was the failure by police to account for 
digital information in an ongoing practice of unequal application of laws that were already in 
place and the failure of will to enforce them with a duty of care to Rehteah that led to the failure 
of law and law enforcement to protect her and her family. Thus, the creation of the Cyber-safety 
Act was (and any new iteration(s) will likely continue to be) a response to the public outcry for 
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justice to be served where law enforcement had failed. Instead of looking to new laws, however, 
justice can already be served if attitudes and ideas about sexual assault, evidence, and the role of 
bystanders change on the part of those charged with enforcing the law. 
Resulting Action, Waiting for Resolution 
In an attempt to understand the extent of the problem and address it, the Nova Scotia 
government, in 2013, mandated external reviews of the local schools and the RCMP/HRP. These 
reports clarified where mistakes were made in the process. The Milton-Pepler Report (2015) 
addressed numerous areas where Nova Scotian schools needed to do a better job of handling 
harassment and sexual aggression. The Segal Report (2015) addressed the failings of the police 
to exercise greater duty of care to the victim. Notably, the Segal Report provided 17 
recommendations from improvements to policies, evidence collection procedures, and actions 
relating to cyberbullying and sexual assault. The Attorney General of Nova Scotia has since fully 
implemented almost all 17 recommendations outlined by Murray Segal and displays them on its 
website (The Crown of Nova Scotia, 2017). 
While acknowledging systemic problems can help to fix law for the future, the law is still 
too slow to address the exigent harms faced by those threatened by the spread of personal or 
otherwise private content across the public spaces of digital media and the social web. As 
previous chapters indicate, when content is shared across digital media and the social web, it is 
cast and understood in visuality that allows individuals to interpret and create context in “middle 
ground” and also to engage it with reduced personal accountability to the individual(s) depicted.  
So if law alone cannot solve the contemporary problems we face with digital media and the 
social web, what recourse is there?  
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Looking to our contemporary moment, there are numerous responses to the 
misapplications of legal recourse, but they, too, are problematic. As a response to cultural and 
institutional skepticism with respect to the victim, the heightened evidentiary burdens for rape 
cases, and the lack of formal charges for alleged rapists, victims have turned to social media to 
unite with others and mete out justice in the absence of adequate legal statutes to prevent abuse. 
Born from the October 2017 revelations of Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein’s sexual 
misconduct and the call to action by the actress Alyssa Milano who encouraged women to share 
“Me too” in their status updates and tweets online, the #MeToo movement has become a 
collective force aimed at problematizing rape culture and exposing perpetrators in all arenas of 
society across the United States, Europe, South America, the Middle East and beyond 
(Kohmami, 2017). The #MeToo movement has galvanized women and men into speaking out 
about the abuses they have faced and endured with the aims of bringing justice to bear on the 
men who perpetrated it and facilitated it. As a result, numerous Hollywood producers, 
executives, and actors, as well as politicians, television hosts, athletic coaches, and university 
officials have come under intense scrutiny for their actions and past conduct that directly or 
indirectly supported these abuses.  
Notably, the recent conviction of former USA Olympic gymnast team doctor Larry 
Nassar of child abuse and sexual assault highlights the magnitude of the #MeToo movement in 
shaping the discourse of sexual assault in the United States. After more than 150 women and 
girls testified in court that Nassar sexually abused them over the past two decades, he was 
sentenced to 40 to 175 years in prison (Levenson, 2018). Thereafter, the domino effect took hold. 
USA Gymnastics cut ties with the Karolyi Ranch in Texas, which had been the official US 
Women’s National Team Training Center since 2001. The entire board of USA Gymnastics 
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stepped down at the demand of US Olympic Committee (USOC) Chief Executive Scott 
Blackmun. The USOC has also called for an independent third-party investigation to examine the 
institutional practices that allowed the abuses to go undetected for so long. Under public pressure 
that the school response was not enough, Michigan State President Lou Ann Simon resigned, as 
well as three other athletic officials at the school (Hanna, 2018). Additionally, the NCAA began 
investigating Michigan State for its handling of the allegations against Nassar to see if it violated 
any of the national organization’s rules. Numerous civil lawsuits against Michigan State and 
USA Gymnastics have also been filed, each further examining the extent of culpability and each 
further kindling the fire of #MeToo as more and more women and men speak up about sexual 
assault. 
In a similar fashion, the “March for Our Lives” movement that spread across Facebook, 
Twitter, and Instagram has heightened awareness of concerns around gun violence. A response 
to the shooting on February 14, 2018 at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, 
Florida that left 17 people dead, the movement has united people to formally protest in 
Washington, DC on March 24, 2018. It has also united people across social media platforms and 
encouraged them to engage their politicians who have failed to pass any gun restriction 
legislation over the past two decades. In particular, CNN moderated a live town hall on February 
21, 2018 where survivors of the shooting decried Florida Senator Marco Rubio for his historic 
support of unrestricted access to guns, and NRA Spokesperson Dana Loesch for inciting violence 
in her numerous videos, tweets, and public appearances. Additionally, the formal protest inspired 
concerned citizens across the United States to do the same at their state capitals, leading to over 
400 citywide protests. In uniting with Everytown for Gun Safety, a nation-wide volunteer 
movement founded on ending gun violence, the March for Our Lives movement has also 
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increased the visibility of the sensible gun law platform online amongst teenagers, young adults, 
and parents who now follow and subscribe to Everytown’s updates on social media and in text 
messages. With over 500 thousand protesters marching in Washington D.C. and thousands more 
marching in other cities in the United States, the March for Our Lives movement, like the 
#MeToo movement, appears to be gaining momentum as more and more people converge 
through technology to collectively reshape the discourse of gun control.  
While collective organizing through social media hashtags appears to serve social justice 
and possibly create resulting action when individuals form collectives online and engage 
collectively offline, it is not without its potential complications. Collective organizing enables 
individuals to collectively argue for greater protections through mounting social pressure. Yet, it 
becomes a form of crowdsourced morality when it results in indictments of the totality of any 
individual and their family and friends without a greater awareness of context or by denying 
context altogether. In particular, while the #MeToo movement has ushered in a tide of ousters for 
many who have engaged in sexual harassment and/or sexual assault, some questionable 
indictments have also emerged. In Canada, the Progressive Conservative (PC) party leader, 
Patrick Brown, dropped out of the Ontario PC leadership on January 24, 2018 race after months 
of refuting what he has called “false” and “slanderous” misconduct charges (Blackwell, 2018). 
Whether the allegations are true or not, as they remain unproven at the time of this writing 
(Wallace, 2018), outraged individuals and constituents have shamed, verbally attacked, and 
threatened Brown and his family through tweets and Facebook messages (Blackwell, 2018). 
Though no one has physically attacked Brown or his family at this time, the allegations have had 
a dramatic effect on the Brown, the Ontario PC party, and Ontario that highlights how 
crowdsourced morality affects individuals, collectives, and society. As users exercise their 
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democratic rights, therefore, they must also be careful to allow everyone—public figures, private 
citizens, public and private institutions, accusers and the alleged accused—the opportunity for a 
swift and fair review. 
Where collective organizing from online to offline falls short, other options include 
redesigning technology, in part, to respond to prevailing social concerns like skeptical sources of 
information, as well as policing content on social media. Facebook, for example, has recently 
updated its algorithms in an attempt to decrease the amount of posts users see from brands, 
businesses, and media (Wagner, 2018). In promoting posts from family and friends, the site is 
attempting to address the abundance of Russian-backed sources of information that promulgated 
the site during the 2016 election. Additionally, Facebook, Google, and Twitter, are currently 
redesigning their dashboards to label the source of campaign advertisements in similar ways that 
are standard in broadcast commercial advertisements (Romm & Wagner, 2018).  
 Additionally, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram attempt to police “inappropriate” content 
through the usage of “terms of service” and “community standards,” as well as “concern reports” 
that allow any individual to report content she or he finds objectionable. In particular, Facebook 
launched a pilot program at the end of 2017 where users volunteer full, uncensored nude images 
of themselves, which are then reviewed by Facebook workers. After a “fingerprint” of each 
submitted image is created, Facebook workers—not an algorithm—then track similar images and 
determine if malicious posts by other users qualify as revenge porn (Cox, 2017). Facebook 
claims that the full, uncensored images will only be held for a limited time, and that they will be 
blurred after they’ve been entered into the database that only a limited taskforce of workers can 
access. The irony, of course, is that a person must submit an image of herself or himself, and 
thereby publicly expose herself or himself, in order to potentially protect or regain her privacy. 
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Yet, the (absent) presence of authority does not wholly inhibit people from sharing 
content online freely and with reduced personal accountability to others. Individuals still share 
content that, 20 to 30 years ago, could never have had as vast an audience as it can today. 
Moreover, content that is shared is subject to interpretation and wide sharing. What one finds 
offensive, another may not. As a result, at least as far as organizational authority goes, unless the 
content depicts harm to or the death of an individual, it remains visible on these platforms, and it 
is further shared across connective media potentially into perpetuity. 
Where organizations are limited in policing content on their platforms, individuals and 
collectives increasingly monitor content and engage in crowdsourced morality. When content is 
not removed after it is flagged for review by site authorities, individuals and collectives can 
either demand the content be removed or attempt to contextualize the content and fend off those 
who attempt to shame and dehumanize the individual(s) depicted and those with whom they 
associate. In the former instance, for example, YouTube users shamed Logan Paul into deleting a 
video that he created wherein he makes fun of the dead body of a Japanese man he and his crew 
found in Aokigahara, Japan’s “suicide forest” (Griffiths, 2018). In the latter instance, 
comparably, numerous fans of Maddie Ziegler, pop star Sia’s famous dancer, came to her 
defense on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram when a video of then 13-year-old 
Maddie flashing her breasts was leaked after her iCloud was hacked (Garrett, 2016). As the 
video spread, fans collectively organized to report the content and compel users and sites to 
remove the content, as the video was child pornography. 
Beyond engaging through technology, reconfiguring it, and policing content, as a society 
we can teach greater media literacy and encourage better understandings of consent. In the 
former, individuals need to gain greater skill in learning to contextualize information and 
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determine the merits and credibility of content. In the latter, individuals, not just men, need to 
better understand and then accept whether someone wishes to mutually engage in an activity 
and, more important, whether content should be shared in the first place if another person has not 
authorized it to be shared.  
Whatever we as a society ultimately decide to do, it must be done it with respect for one 
another. In casting others and ourselves in visuality, our reality of others and ourselves around us 
becomes obscured to the point that we easily dehumanize each other without thought to the 
effects of our actions. Only when we decide to recognize each other as humans and not as 




CHAPTER SIX: HANUNTED BY SPECTERS,  
WE ARE THE SPECTATORS  
 Digital media and the social web continue to challenge the ways we understand self, 
other, society, and the world around us. As we have become spectators observing each other 
through connective media, we engage each other at a distance that not only affords each of us 
greater convenience in choosing when, where, and what to communicate to others, but also a 
greater disassociation from one another. Individuals increasingly engage digitally, and as they 
do, they disengage interpersonally. Users of social media construct and curate images of 
themselves, communicating to one another through their profiles. Users contribute to the 
construction and (de)contextualization of one another in what they share about each other, and 
users are duly shaped by what others share about them.  
 As our identities become increasingly projected onto the screen, we become commodified 
assemblages of the content shared by others and ourselves—continuously manufacturing the self 
as information for ongoing consumption by others. Whereas, in the past, the process was an 
active construction on display in physical public spaces accompanied by physical gestures and 
adorning the body in clothing by organized by social station to differentiate the self, today the 
process is less discernably dichotomous by class, more diffuse across space and time, and more 
rapidly engaged. Digital media and the social web collapse the space between public and private, 
making all content shared online “public by default, and private through effort,” this is true even 
when someone shares content without the expressed permission, consent, or knowledge of the 
subject of that content. 
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 A consequence of the aforementioned “participatory condition” and shifting 
understandings of socialization enabled by our usage of digital media and the social web, this 
dark turn in communication online highlights the central problem of “visuality as reality” that 
increasingly organizes our relationships with self, other, society, and the world around us. 
Supplanting embodied, face-to-face experiential engagement for online communication that 
features the visible and often renders text subservient, nuanced practices of communication 
online not only drive users into further physical isolation from one another, these practices also 
contribute to greater selection and confirmation biases that encourage “truthiness”—personal 
feeling over recognition and acknowledgement of others. Users deny each other’s presence, they 
participate with abandon, and only when (or if) they are confronted with the reality of the 
consequences of their actions do they take pause to consider what is wrong with how they 
interacted with one another. This is the process I call crowdsourced morality and it not only 
infuses all of the cases I explore in this dissertation, it also permeates our contemporary moment 
and requires deeper consideration of the precarious position of privacy in modern Western 
societies at the interpersonal, organizational, and cultural levels. 
 Before I go on to discuss the broader social dimensions of the project, I will first explain 
the delimitations and limitations of this project. After contextualizing the parameters of the 
project, I explore avenues for future investigative research and practical engagement.  
Finally, I conclude with some parting thoughts about the ways connective media affect us 
interpersonally, organizationally, and culturally. 
Delimitations and Limitations 
I made deliberate choices that focused the work and influenced the interpretations in the 
course of developing this project. In choosing case studies where nuanced communication 
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practices and technology engendered newer tensions between law enforcement, law, and citizens, 
I focused on extreme examples where death, race, rape, violence, and threat of violence were 
highlighted. While I chose these case studies to highlight the failures of law, law enforcement, 
and individuals in accounting for the physical presence of the source/body behind/beyond the 
screen, I recognize that these extreme examples are not wholly representative of broader legal 
discourse and legal resolution in the United States and Canada, nor the experiences of all users of 
digital media and the social web in contemporary Western societies. Indeed, each case study in 
this work is but a snapshot in time that attempts to crystalize the state of law in conceptualizing 
public and private and the ramifications of such interpretations in law for our contemporary 
moment and the future, and only in contemporary Western societies.  
In choosing these case studies, then, my aim was to highlight, describe, and consider the 
severe consequences posed to any individual when the social contract and the mechanisms and 
apparatuses that support it fail. As a result, I recognize that my analysis may appear morose and 
alarmist at times, even though my intention was to expose the devastation wrought by such 
failures and the uncertain ways law enforcement, law, technology, and individuals and 
collectives respond now and into the future. In providing a deep description of each case through 
resituating the scene of each tragic event, then, my aim was to humanize the victims and those 
associated with them by describing the loss, damage, and harms as it affected the victims and 
those associated with them. Yet, words alone cannot capture all the action, and I realize that I 
was not able to fully illustrate nor describe all the ways individuals and collectives beyond the 




Additionally, in highlighting the perils of each tragic event, my theory of crowdsourced 
morality illuminates a more negative valence than the conceptualization may actually entail. 
Since I started this project, social movements such as Me Too and March for Our Lives have 
emerged that—while I label them as collective virtual organizing here—broaden the 
conceptualization of crowdsourced morality in so far as they, too, use imagery and the collective 
leveraging of morality to foment engagement and action online and in person. In recognizing 
these movements and the ways that they encourage users to engage online and then collectively 
organize as individuals in person, I see that the theory of crowdsourced morality may, in fact, 
entail a broader neutral valence that encompasses both positive and negative aspects as it is taken 
up in particular practices, on particular platforms, and as it enlists imagery to encourage greater 
collective action where law has failed to address systematic and historic abuses and harms.  
Beyond the negative valence of crowdsourced morality, I recognize that my 
historiographical account of public and inflect a noticeably soft-technological determinist 
framework. While these interpretations serve my project, as each case study looks at the 
intersection of technology and law in accounting for public and private information, I recognize 
that public and private carry different interpretations in various contexts. Yet, as a consequence 
of the participatory condition we occupy where digital media and technology structure so much 
of the modern world and continue to envelope more and more of it, I stand by my interpretations 
as I believe they elucidate deeper considerations of public and private that society needs to 
consider and embrace if there is ever to be greater change in creating privacy as a collective 
value that can become further enshrined in law and protected and policed by collectives.  
Finally, since I started this project, social media have shifted from spaces of sociality to 
spaces of greater curation, branding, and surveillance capitalism. As platform developers such as 
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Facebook, Google, and Twitter have developed over the past 20 years, each has increasingly 
commodified users by codifying them in capturing their behavioral data on their sites, across 
other sites, and in responses to content through reaction icons and nuanced sharing practices 
enabled by the technology in use. As a result, spreadability of content has become less a means 
of social connection—of which social media were founded on—and more of a mechanism 
through which developers, advertisers, researchers, and other third parties monitor, itemize, and 
manipulate individuals and collectives with profound effects interpersonally, organizationally, 
and culturally. While I am aware of these changes and further intrigued by the current 
developments and sociopolitical effects of this shift as witnessed in the coverage of Facebook 
and Cambridge Analytica, at the time of selecting and writing up each case study for analysis, I 
was not inclined to focus on the “anti-ethics” of developers and other related entities. Given the 
parallels between these developments and my work, however, my future research will trace the 
technical, social, and political continuities of these shifts as they, too, profoundly shape 
interpretations of public and private.  
Future Research 
With an understanding of the parameters and limits of this project, it is clear there are 
many avenues for future investigative research and practical engagement. Future research should 
consider, contextualize, and juxtapose broader interpretations of public and private from other 
modern democracies. Countries like Germany and Japan, for example, champion privacy as a 
greater collective value by enshrining it in laws that provide greater legal protections and control 
for individuals in how and where their information and imagery are used and distributed. Japan, 
in particular, relies on a collective understanding that one must obtain the consent of anyone that 
can be easily identified in an image before that image can be posted online. If one cannot obtain 
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the consent of the person(s) in the image, he or she can only post the image if they somehow 
obscure the face, body, or presence of the person(s) who did not consent.  
Additionally, as noted in the previous section, future research should trace and describe 
the historic shifts and continuities of social media and the ways surveillance capitalism has 
influenced content creation and circulation, as well as understandings of public and private 
information. Given the revelations of the Cambridge Analytica data breech on Facebook, and the 
likelihood that other sites and platforms such as Google, Twitter, and Amazon, also expose 
personal information of their users to threat of capture, itemization, and manipulation, future 
research might turn a critical lens on the ways developers and corporations negate and erode 
privacy through near incessant tracking and monitoring. Future research might also critique the 
ways such practices fundamentally alter democracy by always already potentially delimiting the 
ability of any citizen to express himself or herself without threat of exposure that may silence 
him or her. 
Beyond investigative research, this project highlights numerous areas for practical 
engagement. Because social media and visual technologies have become environmental through 
the “participatory condition” we occupy (Barney et al., 2016), interventions should be made in at 
least three places where they may secure greater change in resituating privacy as a collective 
value: schools, law enforcement agencies, and social media. Schools are centralized locations of 
education that inculcate and instill knowledge and values that make adolescents and young adult 
productive citizens of the State, as Foucault reminds us. Yet, they are also places of sociality and 
socialization where communication online poses dramatic effects in person. In sharing this work 
with students through workshops, public speaking engagements, and public performances, I 
 
 143 
believe this work can help adolescents become more informed about their sharing practices and 
the effects these practices have on others and themselves now and into the future.  
Similarly, as police officers have struggled to control the spread and flow of imagery 
captured by others, I believe sharing this work with law enforcement agencies may help them 
forge better connections with the communities they serve. As this project makes clear, law 
fundamentally supports law enforcement in ways that appear problematic to citizens when there 
appears to be evidence that contrasts the allegedly detached authorial narratives of police 
officers. I therefore, believe that sharing lessons from these case studies with law enforcement 
agencies may help the distrust in authority that appears to be growing as digital media and the 
social web enable the spread of imagery and the crowdsourcing of morality.  
Lastly, in light of the Cambridge Analytica scandal on Facebook, I believe this work can 
be shared with social media developers and engineers. While Mark Zuckerber and Sheryl 
Sandberg apologize for their ‘optimistic belief’ that connecting individuals across the world 
could not possibly lead to egregious violations of privacy or harm, it is clear that they were 
complicit in allowing capitalist interests influence their decisions to not provide greater controls 
for users. Regardless of if these platforms are ‘free’ and, therefore, allow developers and third 
parties to mine and use the data of users, they dramatically affect the ways individuals 
understand self, other, and society as the data stands in for the individual and can be used to 
manipulate the individual in turn. If social media developers and engineers will listen, despite the 
documented history of ignorance, then connection might be broadened to include greater 
considerations of privacy that allow an individual control over his or her information and the 
integrity of his or her image. 
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Contextualizing our Contemporary Moment 
When individuals are confronted with content, whether acceptable or objectionable, 
individuals participate by treating it as information to be engaged or discarded, consumed and 
shared. Across digital media and the social web, users treat each other in much the same way. 
Relationships online are constituted as a series of interactions displayed on the screen for others, 
documented, disclosed, and disposable to vast audiences who are encouraged to participate 
without an awareness of the context of the interaction or the coherence of the person(s) depicted. 
User’s visual representations stand in for their physical presence; they become the person, 
though they are not the person. Individuals appear to others across time and space in digital 
content, and as individuals do, they straddle the divide between how they appear and who they 
are. Flattened in imagery, users attempt to imbue our digital personae with “who they are;” they 
adorn our profiles in similar ways that we historically adorned the body for the public, using 
images, comments, and content to breathe “life” into an otherwise two-dimensional 
(tele)presence.  
 Lindsey Stone, for example, tried to highlight her sarcastic humor and wit when she 
shared a picture of herself flipping off the “Silence and Respect” placard at the Arlington 
National Memorial. Though only shared with her friends on Facebook, it was seen as 
objectionable after one of them shared it with another outside her friend group. In that moment it 
was stripped of context. Regardless of whether others believed the photo was inappropriate or 
not, its spread beyond its original context allowed others to objectify and demonize Lindsey as 
this wholly vile, unpatriotic figure. Cast as information in imagery and totally encapsulated in the 
image, the photo allowed its growing audience to create its own associations with the image 
through “middle ground.” The audience cast Lindsey’s image/telepresence as a “telefetish” by 
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imbuing it with their own beliefs and feelings about her actions and affectively and effectively 
encouraging others to do the same as the photo spiraled beyond Lindsey’s control.  
In supplanting the visual for embodied in-person engagement, the digital crowd engaged 
in crowdsourced morality. Organizing to shame Lindsey and to demand she lose her job—while 
never bothering to contextualize the event, question the authenticity of the image, or understand 
the person behind/beyond the visual frame—the digital crowd leveraged collective morality 
against a precise target it could label and shame. Lindsey not only lost her job, she also became a 
social pariah, as the image continues to follow her online to this day.  
The tragic events surrounding the deaths of Oscar Grant, Nikki Catsouras, and Rehteah 
Parsons, similarly, highlight the contemporary obsession with visuality and the intrusive nature 
of crowdsourced morality. As each case study illuminates, visuality and digitally shared content 
in the form of videos, emails, and photographs fundamentally destabilizes the coherence of the 
individual(s) depicted. Physically distanced from those portrayed in imagery, the visual is 
substituted for the corporeal from, and as this occurs it becomes easier to dehumanize one 
another, to shame, to victim-blame, and to feel little, if any, accountability for what one says or 
does in response to the visual.  
In Oscar Grant’s case, “countersurveillance” videos contextualized the actions of 
authority figures in mishandling Grant. Those same videos, however, also affectively and 
effectively obscured the racism of Officer Pirone, which was not captured on film. Instead, the 
videos highlighted the naiveté of Officer Mehserle the moment he fired his gun instead of his 
taser and then twisted the coherency of the moment to fit prevailing anti-authority discourses in 
broadcast media. In this way, the videos performed the project of countersurveillance and 
contributed to a kind of crowdsourced morality seeking justice for the unnecessary loss of life at 
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the hands of those entrusted to protect the citizenry and society. Yet, in fixating on Officer 
Mehserle in the moment of the fatal shooting and solely blaming him, the digital crowd 
overlooked the broader context of the event that Officer Pirone fomented through his aggressive 
actions and overt racism. Crowdsourced morality, therefore, delimited the parameters of the case 
by flattening the circumstances of the event into a concise anti-authority narrative intended to 
(re)kindle racial tensions between the police and the policed in similar ways to the aftermath of 
the Rodney King Jr. beating. 
Nikki Catsouras’ death also highlighted the ways an individual becomes decontextualized 
as well as the effects such practices have on those affiliated with the individual. When Officers 
Reich and O’Donnell shared the images of Nikki, they cast her corporeal form as information to 
be consumed and discarded, and stripped her and her family of any dignity she might have 
maintained in death. Rather than elicit greater empathy for the tragic loss of life, the ways the 
images circulated manifest the perverse desires of those who encountered them in email and 
across social media in the process of crowdsourced morality. Appearing on death-porn sites, 
blogs, “private” Facebook group pages, and even in text messages later sent to Nikki’s sisters, 
the images objectified Nikki as content intended to shock or elicit curiosity or perversely gratify. 
By supplanting corporeality with visuality, individuals not only claimed “freedom of expression” 
in sharing the horrific images, they largely denied any accountability for the emotional harms 
they inflicted and continue to inflict on the Catsourases as the images remain online even today. 
Lastly, as the yearlong sexual assault investigation of Rehteah Parsons clarified, law and 
law enforcement failed to exercise a holistic duty of care to the individual, even when significant 
harms existed in content shared on digital media and the social web. While the RCMP and 
Detective Constable Patricia Snair followed protocol in investigating the sexual assault and child 
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pornography offenses, they ignored the ongoing torment Rehteah faced as the image of her 
alleged rape spread across her school and hometown to digitally follow her wherever she went. 
Rehteah could not escape the image, even as she transferred across three different schools. 
Instead, the image became the visual frame of reference that stood in for her presence and 
somehow became more important, the telefetish of crowdsourced morality that ultimately 
allowed others to shame her into suicide.  
Stone, Grant, Catsouras, and Parsons, living or deceased, are the specters haunting our 
present moment. Their tragedies expose the ways individuals deny each other’s presence through 
digital media and the social web as they suspend one another in imagery. In this conflation of 
visuality and the broader reality, users almost seem to forget that the physical referent—the 
object, figure, body, or person—depicted in the frame exists beyond the pixelated edges. 
Individuals fixate on these brief moments of capture, visualize them as all encompassing of that 
moment or those moments in time, and then project their thoughts, feelings, and beliefs on to 
them, as they are so easily enabled to as a circumstance of the “participatory condition.”  
The (Police) State 
If digital media and the social web complicate earlier modern conceptions of self and 
other, they also challenge the ways we understand authority and State power. As we use digital 
media and the social web to share information about others and ourselves, we also use 
connective media to contextualize, critique, and destabilize the role, power, and presence of 
authority and State power in our personal lives and across society. Prompted to participate 
through the expansive array of digital media and social web available to us, we respond and 
inscribe ourselves into the social order through sharing and sharing in information that confirms 
or challenges our beliefs, values, and notions about society. This practice is not only 
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demonstrated in each of the case studies explored in this dissertation, it is increasingly 
experienced in many places across the digitally connected world, especially in the emergent 
divide between liberal and conservative ideologies that casts authority and State power as 
increasingly contested spaces of order, safety, and security. Each case study highlights elements 
of this emergent divide, drawing attention to the various practices individuals/citizens and 
authority figures enlist in enforcing law. 
Countersurveillance tactics, discussed in the chapter on Oscar Grant, stress the growing 
concerns for how authority figures exercise “necessary force” and further demonstrate how 
“sousveillance” operates to check police power, contextualize events, and challenge “objective” 
authorial narratives. These ongoing “camera wars” between citizens and those representing State 
power highlight a distrust of authority in equal application of enforcement, and offer a scathing 
critique of those entrusted to enforce the law. If, on balance, citizens of diverse backgrounds and 
ethnicities see, visualize, feel, and experience the application of enforcement as unequal in these 
moments captured for others to see, can society trust the integrity of law and law enforcement? 
Given the specters of Oscar Grant, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Walter Scott—all unarmed 
black men killed by police officers in the United State in high-profile cases over the past five 
years—among countless other shootings captured on film and shared across connective media 
over the last ten years, coupled with reduced charges or “not guilty” verdicts for law 
enforcement, the answer appears to be no. This is not to say that law enforcement is some great 
societal ill out to get anyone who isn’t white. Rather, it suggests that the historic origins of police 
power are not wholly divorced from the application of enforcement today. Practices of law 
enforcement appear to be entrenched. Ideas about race, ethnicity, and class continue to shape—
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even if unconsciously—law enforcement, leading to concerns about how systemic the problem 
may be and what, if anything, can be done to solve it.  
Likewise, concerns about the role of authority in protecting individuals from unnecessary 
harm, as well as institutional attempts to absolve guilt when harm occurred, further highlight 
distrust in authority to exercise a duty of care to individuals and their families. Unnecessary harm 
is observed in each case study, but it occurs in different ways and is absolved by authority and 
law through different practices. Where Oscar Grant was shot and killed, authority figures and the 
defense originally claimed the shooting was in “self-defense.” Yet, as cellphone video showed 
that Grant was neither violent nor armed, authority figures later repudiated their original, default 
claim. Using the testimony of an expert in nonlethal force tactics, the defense worked to absolve 
Officer Mehserle of a duty of care, casting his dereliction of duty instead as a result of external 
factors at the organizational level.  
Comparably, when Reich and O’Donnell shared photographs of Nikki Catsouras’ 
dismembered body with friends and family through email, they did not exercise a duty of care to 
Nikki, her memory, or her family and friends. Instead, they acted without a full awareness of the 
eventual harm that would be caused if and when the photos spread beyond those to whom they 
were sent. Once again, law enforcement attempted to absolve itself not once, but twice. Initially, 
the Department of California Highway Patrol pardoned itself by conducting an internal review 
and claiming that the officers and the agency itself “broke no law” in sharing the photos. When 
the Catsourases challenged this claim and the case went to trial, the CHP absolved itself again. 
Claiming 11th Amendment immunity protected the CHP from monetary relief in suit, the defense 
was granted a motion for a summary judgment, which clarified that the CHP be absolved on the 
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grounds of the internal review and the disciplinary action administered at the organizational 
level.  
Similarly, the RCMP absolved itself in Rehteah Parsons’ case. In ignoring the 
cyberbullying Rehteah experienced and the digital evidence she collected and shared with the 
RCMP, law enforcement delimited the parameters of the initial investigation. Conforming to 
entrenched institutional ideas about sexual assault, the RCMP not only interpreted the sexual 
assault law within a narrow scope, it exercised tremendous authority in determining what 
counted as evidence, what charges were laid, and whether the case saw trial. Moreover, as the 
Nova Scotian Cyber-safety Act became law following Parsons’ death, it failed to address the 
problems with the case itself: the unequal application of laws that were already in place and the 
will to enforce them to mete out justice. Thus, whatever becomes of any future Nova Scotia law, 
it should not surprise if, in part, it continues to be a performance of State power to account for its 
own failings when, instead, the State needs to address systemic institutional attitudes and ideas 
about evidence, sexual assault, and the role digital media and the social web play in (re)shaping 
ongoing investigations. 
Where law defaults to protect and sustain State power in instances where authority 
figures are negligent, the deployment of absolution becomes a performance of denying 
culpability in the eyes of victims, their families, and the public. Such performances afford 
authority figures exemption, which appears contradictory to the role, power, and presence of 
authority, particularly as authority is entrusted and obligated to protect everyone in society, apply 
law equally, and uphold a duty of care to all involved. As harms occur—whether accidental or 
intentional and whether visible or inconspicuous—authority figures must fully recognize the 
power they wield and the ways their actions affect broader social understandings of their 
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presence and roles in the lives of all citizens. Authority figures must act with greater care in 
handling individuals and in handling ongoing investigations.  
In an era where seemingly almost every action is subject to capture through digital media 
and the social web, citizens must also avoid collapsing authority figures as imagery and ascribing 
stereotypes to those who serve. While countersurveillance tactics expose the actions of authority 
figures for the public, the resulting photos, films, and voice recordings are still subject to 
distortion, decontextualization, and manipulation at the hands of individuals and organizations. 
Citizens must, therefore, critically contextualize the media they consume in order to better 
understand the event(s), the actors, and the actions taken. Becoming more literate by mining 
multiple sources, interrogating personal beliefs and the beliefs of others, and questioning the 
actions taken on all sides, citizens can resituate authority and State power by collectively uniting 
both through reformulated technology and increasingly in person with each other to reaffirm the 
meanings of order, safety, and security as conditions equally applied and granted to those who 
abide by the law.    
Extended As We Are 
In Greek Mythology, Narcissus was a hunter known for his beauty. Proud, he held 
disdain for any who loved him. He is said to have rejected all his suitors. Nemesis, an incarnation 
of Aphrodite as revenge, noticed Narcissus’s strange obsession. She lured him to a pool where he 
glanced his reflection in the water and fell in love with it; not realizing it was merely an image. 
Unable to leave the beauty of his reflection, Narcissus stared longingly into the water until he 
lost his will to live.  
Marshall McLuhan (1964) argues that the West interprets the myth of Narcissus 
incorrectly by assuming that Narcissus fell so in love with his image that he drowned. Drawing 
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connections to technology, McLuhan notes that the water performs as a technology—a mirror—
that exteriorizes Narcissus’s body. Seemingly extended elsewhere yet not really so, Narcissus 
became narcotized by his image, not because he was so in love with himself that he could not 
turn away; but rather, because the extension of himself provided a release from his embodied 
corporeal form. Narcissus was narcotized by the illusion of existing elsewhere, even though this 
meant that he effectively negated the reality of his material form in his watery transfixion. 
In social media, which elevate the visual akin to Narcissus starring into the water/mirror, 
users become suspended in the image of themselves reflected outward into the wide waters of the 
world in their profiles; they perceive this image as a mirroring of themselves in digital media and 
the social web, as all that can be known or understood in the contemporary environment that 
constantly hails everyone to participate through sharing and sharing in information. Users also 
perceive others as their images, and they assume their presence in visuality, envisioning them as 
they visualize themselves projected on the screen and elsewhere.  
Yet, like Narcissus transfixed by the watery extension of himself, users seem to ignore 
the fact that the projection on the screen and elsewhere is only an image. This Janus-faced 
representation of the self, of appearing both “materially here and seemingly there at the same 
time” in imagery, flattens physicality into a two-dimensional form by making visual data to be 
consumed in digital spaces. The visual reproduction is taken as a totalizing encapsulation of “the 
material trace of the object or person on the other end of the transmission” without 
acknowledgment of the broader corporeality not captured in the frame. Imagery in digital spaces, 
therefore, constitutes experience of self and other in a way that not only suggests that an image 
now stands in for full and immediate presence within a viewer’s affective interpretations (Hillis, 
2009), but also, crucially, as an otherwise precise target that points to the object or person(s) 
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depicted as the viewer objectifies the visual form in affiliation with or criticism of it. Imagery is 
no longer the capture of ephemerality, it is increasingly the containment of reality; it delimits, it 
divides, and it denies.  
Preoccupied with image, users fail to see beyond the narrow frame, to see the damage 
they do to each other when they objectify one another as only that splayed on the screen. They 
deny each other’s presence, and as they do, they grow more insular, preferring to keep to 
themselves and to give of themselves only in ways that they can control and only in ways that 
confirm what they believe. Individuals online become victims of themselves through digital 
media and the social web, and they make victims of those who do not conform to what they 
believe is “appropriate” or “right” without taking the time and energy to contextualize and 
understand one another. They grow more isolated and they encourage their insular interpretations 
in others, leading to greater selection bias, confirmation bias, and truthiness. As a result, society 
is dichotomized, and empathy, disagreement, and vulnerability are cast aside.  
The aforementioned vociferous divide between liberal and conservative ideologies in 
chapter four—really, between one another—in the most recent US election cycle and in 
contemporary politics and everyday life illuminates the reality of crowdsourced morality at the 
cultural level. The idea that there are only two sides—that “you’re either with us or against us”—
is a false dichotomy that directs people to take sides for the purpose of weaponizing belonging 
(Brown, 2017). In occluding the reality that other alternatives exist, the dichotomy compels 
individuals to align with a particular idea or set of ideas and actively “other” those envisioned as 
oppositional through shaming. The results are a denial of broad informed discussion, a forgoing 
of engaged disagreement as a result of championing individual personal beliefs, and an erosion 
of civility due to the online denial of the humanity of “the other.”  
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With digital media and the social web it is easier to economize physical distance and use 
it to constrain and contain relationships with others as individuals curate their images to appear 
as they wish to be seen. Individuals come to shield themselves from vulnerability. Words and 
images shared through connective media become a form of armor, a layer of protection from 
betraying the façades constructed for others and preventing individuals from seeing the direct, 
physical and harm caused to others. Rather than reveal ourselves to each other in the richness 
and complexity of our feelings and emotions online, which are nuanced and can be painful to 
express and confront, individuals insulate and hide from each other. In choosing to focus on 
themselves and in choosing visuality of experiential engagement, they dispense with civility and 
its necessarily more fully embodied dynamics. 
Resituating Presence in Place of Absence 
In exploring the numerous dilemmas society faces today with connective media, imagery, 
law, and police power, this work aims to resituate presence as a practice of engaging with one 
another and engaging with difference. Instead of looking to law or technology to save us, this 
work highlights the need for collective, embodied solutions through technology and in face-to-
face interaction and organizing to help ameliorate the predicaments posed by the collapse of 
public into private by technology. In exposing the harms experienced by individuals and their 
friends and families, as well as the harms posed to context, fact, and truth, this work also 
highlights the need for greater empathy in how people relate to each other online and in person. 
 Rather than argue that individuals should resist Facebook and eschew all forms of social 
media, which is not realistic or really possible given the “participatory condition,” this work 
turns attention to recognizing that everything is contextual and that context is the key to greater 
understanding. Society can and—per the “participatory condition”—must, enlist digital media 
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and the social web to foster and create greater connection and context. Individuals can start by 
using connective media to bring people together, from online to in-person. For example, Make 
America Dinner Again uses social media to connect individuals of different, diverse 
backgrounds for real, in-person dinners where all are invited to discuss their politics and beliefs 
so long as they are civil and respectful of each other. As its site notes, where there are avenues to 
protest, to donate, to fight, and to be heard, “Make America Dinner Again is an avenue to listen” 
(Make America Dinner Again, 2018). In encouraging embodied, co-present engagement and 
listening, Make America Dinner Again creates context for self and other as it attempts to instill 
greater empathy in individuals by asking them to get comfortable with the uncomfortable—by 
being vulnerable—in talking with others and respecting disagreement and difference. 
Comparably, as individuals come together with others through the interplay of 
technology and crowdsourcing morality, movements can emerge when the visual spectacle in 
hashtags, memes, and images shared online carry over offline in physical, embodied actions such 
as rallies and protests. #MeToo and March for Our Lives, for example, encourage individuals 
and collectives to personally disclose their experiences in order to humanize the victims and 
survivors of violence. In owning their stories and willingly sharing them with others through 
technology, victims and survivors use vulnerability to resituate the visuality of the body as it is 
marked by violence and the harms of inaction. This self-disclosure, in turn, invites others to 
empathize and self-disclose, broadening the visibility of the movement and further amplifying 
the call to action for greater accountability in law and in authority figures and bystanders.  
Connective media can also be used to clarify context, resituate fact, and challenge 
dehumanization. Facebook, Google, and Twitter, as mentioned in Chapter Five, are 
implementing changes to their services that will reconfigure the visibility of content, as well as 
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label questionable accounts and sources of information. Technology can, therefore, be designed 
or reprogrammed, in part, to help individuals better understand context and help protect 
individuals from having certain personal information massively publicized. Though, as the news 
of data aggregation by Cambridge Analytica on Facebook in 2018 highlights, redesigning the 
technology itself may not be enough if users themselves do not change their attitudes toward 
their information and the ways it can be used, managed, and manipulated by others. As a society, 
then, we need to change how we engage with each other through digital media and the social 
web by resituating context, disagreement, and presence. 
Interpersonally, because nuance in argument is unclear online due to lack of nonverbal 
cues and because crowdsourced morality affords individuals greater opportunities to take content 
out of context, individuals can question the content shared and ask questions of each other online 
and in person. When individuals do not ask questions, they become bystanders who merely 
observe. As bystanders, individuals perpetuate problems through their silence, which not only 
implies acceptance, but also further affords a vocal minority the power of appearing as the 
majority. In this complicity, bystanders allow others to control the narrative and, typically, the 
outcomes. Asking questions, however, encourages others to clarify context and defend their 
positions, putting the burden of proof and the onus of defensibility on them. At the same time, 
asking questions allows for making sense of a person’s thoughts and feelings, giving greater 
insight into their beliefs and values. Though asking questions alone will not bring everyone 
together, it will help individuals begin to better understand one another and may provide 




As this work highlights, speaking and asking questions are powerful means to change 
perceptions. When most of Rehteah’s peers and school officials did nothing as the photo of her 
alleged rape circulated, they allowed her torment to continue. Though they were not her attacker, 
they effectively joined forces with her attackers as they perpetuated the trauma she faced. 
Through their silence or ignorance, they subjected Rehteah to a far greater harm: isolation. The 
voices of the minority then gradually became a majority, a cacophony that drowned out any hope 
of redemption for Rehteah. Conversely, when the passengers of the BART train recorded 
Officers Pirone and Mehsherle and shared their videos with others, they challenged the otherwise 
authorial narrative of the police to clarify context, resituate fact, and challenge the 
dehumanization of Oscar Grant. These passengers resituated the events of that evening by giving 
voice to those would otherwise be silenced. These passengers opened up a dialogue about police 
power and law enforcement, putting the police on the defensive as charges were laid. The victory 
here wasn’t the conviction; rather, it was a moral victory in encouraging others to speak for 
justice, even if justice is slow to respond. 
The project of presence—of speaking and asking questions and of greater awareness of 
each other—also entails a greater understanding of the media individuals consume. 
Organizationally and culturally, society needs to develop and reconfigure technologies and 
algorithms, and society needs to encourage greater literacy in the media individuals rely on. No 
one can assume that the media individuals use, enlist, and rely on provides adequate context or 
accurate detail in all that is shared. Citizens must, therefore, (re)learn: to understand consent in 
sharing information; to form opinions based on a wide assessment of information; to question the 
credibility and purpose of information shared; and to critically assess easily altered imagery. 
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Individuals must recognize that the content they share—however accurate or apocryphal, 
seemingly insignificant or substantial—shapes the world and shapes everyone in turn.  
In recognizing the conditions of the present moment that always already potentially 
connects users to others, yet also suspend individuals in physical disconnection from one another 
experientially, users need to continue to find ways to engage each other with greater 
vulnerability, curiosity, and civility. In supplanting experiential engagement for visuality, users 
have disengaged from one another and they allowed themselves to become consumed by what 
they visualize rather than what they experience. To combat this, users need to approach each 
other with openness, even if it is scary, lonely, and makes people feel vulnerable. As Brene 
Brown (2017) notes, individuals need to get curious about each other and ask questions. 
Individuals need to step outside the safety of their filter bubbles, echo chambers, and ideological 
bunkers to individually empathize and collectively problem-solve. As a society, everyone needs 
to work to reestablish civility—the act of “claiming and caring for one’s identity, needs and 
beliefs without degrading someone else’s in the process” (Spath & Dahnke, 2017)—and 
everyone needs to encourage it in each other. Individuals need to get comfortable with the 
uncomfortable and engage each other in the hope that everyone can all learn and grow for the 
better, as our res publica roots once maintained. Otherwise, as spectators, we will continue to 
stare longingly into the screen and we will fall victim to our own cultural Nemesis. Unlike 
Narcissus, though, our Nemesis is not some external ethereal other luring us to our demise; 
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